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Summary 
The thesis proposes to approach the idea of human rights as a specific truth regime on 
‘the human’ that contests those regimes of falsity which deny the essence of humanness on 
grounds such as race, sex, colour, gender, national or social origin. This theoretical 
proposition is supported by a case study of the deployment of the idea of human rights in the 
Gold Coast from 1945 up to Ghana’s independence from colonial rule in 1957. As such, the 
study analyses how the concept of human rights, affirmed in the 1945 United Nations Charter 
and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articulated in the 1950 European 
Convention on Human Rights, influenced domestic politics in one British colony in Africa. 
At the same time, the study highlights the way in which post-World War II nationalism 
produced some of the most important political changes affecting this region in this era.  
Relying on a first-hand investigation of archival and primary sources, the thesis 
scrutinizes the formulation of demands for the collective right to self-determination which 
emanated from nationalist movements, the evolving drafts for a bill of rights in Ghana’s 
Independence Constitution and the debates on whether or not to extend the European 
Convention on Human Rights to the Gold Coast. The particular and disprivileged position of 
women in the colony is a subject of critical commentary throughout the thesis. By examining 
critically the emergence of the human rights idea, the study draws attention to the complex 
interplay of factors as well as actors that inspired a new-fangled notion of universal rights, 
while highlighting the way politics, including Cold War politics, contributed to define the 
subject of human rights in an ambiguous, incomplete but promising way. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“If you judge people simply by their ethnic belonging or by the language they  
speak, then you will have no eyes to see them as members of the human family  
and no ears to understand them even if they spoke your native tongue.” 
Dagara proverb 
 
“You must not lose faith in humanity. Humanity is an ocean; if a few drops of the  
ocean are dirty, the ocean does not become dirty.” 
Mohandas Gandhi 
 
1.1. Human rights: An idea in need of defence 
In the course of my pastoral work as a Jesuit priest in various countries, I have 
encountered many occasions of injustice suffered by people because of their ethnic belonging 
or gender or race and/or political opinion. Sometimes, people suffering injustice have asked: 
‘Are we not human beings too?’ ‘Then why are we being treated so unfairly?’ Having grown 
up under four military regimes that suppressed civil liberties in Ghana, I know what it is to 
live under tyranny.
1
 Coming from a marginalised ethnic group, I have had first-hand 
experience of being treated as ‘the other’ in school and in the work place in my country of 
origin. I am deeply aware that in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7, the idea of human rights has 
come under attack from several fronts, some old and some new. In the last ten years a new 
twist has emerged in the human rights debate in which the idea of rights is so badly 
caricatured that it is losing its post-World War II intended meaning as well as enduring 
potential.
2
 In some cases, governments are contributing to the public misperceptions of 
human rights through inflammatory rhetoric and poor policies in the guise of the ‘war against 
terrorism.’ I fear that the real meaning and aspirational nature of human rights is gradually 
                                            
1
 Following the overthrow of Dr. Kofi Busia’s Progress Party (PP) government in 1972, Col. Ignatius 
Acheampong’s National Redemption Council (NRC) ruled Ghana until 1978 when Lt. Gen. Frederick Akuffo 
ousted that government. Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings toppled Akuffo’s Supreme Military Council (SMC) in 1979 and 
formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which handed power over to Dr. Hilla Limann in the 
same year following successful democratic elections. However, Rawlings overthrew Limann in a second coup 
d’état and formed the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), which was in power until 1992 when a 
home-grown constitution ushered the country back to democratic rule. 
2
 See, for example, James Welch, “Theresa May's twisted tale of a Bolivian's cat” in 
<www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/04/theresa-may-cat-human-rights-act?newsfeed=true> (accessed 
November 14, 2011). 
2 
 
being abandoned on the platform of political expediency, with new thinking that has justified 
extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects and complicity in the use of torture as an 
interrogation method being some of the primary examples.
3
 By creating loopholes in the 
human rights regime, such governments use the new thinking to rationalise their wiggling out 
of state obligations. The post-World War II human rights idea forms a specific picture of our 
shared humanity and offers a particular understanding of human beings’ inherent dignity. 
These attacks and misperceptions are beginning to distort not only the idea of human rights 
but also the way ‘the human being’ of human rights is constructed. 
This thesis derives from a dissatisfaction with the way the idea of human rights is 
deliberately being distorted in some political discourses and attacked in other quarters. The 
dissatisfaction is especially poignant when it is juxtaposed against the ‘promise’ of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that one has rights simply by virtue of being 
human and the fundamental assumption that every human being is ‘the human being of 
rights.’4 I believe that the core dilemmas of our time regarding human rights are as relevant 
today as they have been at any time in history. History is full of examples of how comparable 
constructions of ‘the human’ contributed to the subjugation of one group of human beings by 
another on grounds of racial, ethnic or gender difference. Colonial rule is one example of the 
way a group of people expressed their sense of superiority over the different other. 
I have selected the Gold Coast as a case study out of a sense of frustration with the 
dearth of empirical studies on how the post-World War II idea of human rights influenced 
political discourses in this British colonial territory.
5
 The possibility of misunderstanding 
what the ‘human’ in the concept of human rights means is open-ended. This study 
interrogates how the understanding of the ‘humanness’ of the other shaped colonial rule in 
                                            
3
 Isidore Bonabom, “The Many Faces of Torture in Libya” in 
<http://www.thinkingfaith.org/articles/20111012_1.htm> (accessed October 19, 2011). 
4
 See, for example, Preamble and Art 1 of UDHR, G.A. res 217A (II), UN Doc. A 810 at 71 (1948). 
5
 I first became aware of human rights issues in Ghana, which until 1957 was called the Gold Coast. 
3 
 
the Gold Coast. It also explores the role of human rights discourse in the independence and 
emancipatory politics of the Gold Coast. The necessity for such a research is in the fact that 
the theme of human rights in this period in the Gold Coast remains under-researched. In 
another sense, this need has been identified by Ibhawoh, who acknowledges that the human 
rights regime facilitated transformative processes in the colonial context.
6
  
I examine human rights texts in order to identify which idea of ‘the human’ is 
embodied in international human rights. Apart from interrogating the conventional 
history/debates of the human rights discourse, the thesis takes issue with the oft-repeated 
charge that human rights is a product of Western ethnocentrism imposed on the rest of the 
world. The research is an endeavour to discover the complex nature of international and 
domestic factors that influenced the emergence of the human rights idea, and also a way to 
discern the diversity of actors who shaped the ‘human rights’ debates in the Gold Coast. This 
case study leads me to argue that the idea of human rights is itself a truth regime about ‘the 
human’ which contested colonial rule as a specific regime of falsity.7 The idea that human 
rights is a specific truth regime on ‘the human’ is a proposal, indeed a stepping stone to the 
broader argument that the universal quest of the human being to be treated with dignity—and 
to treat ‘the other’ with dignity—is a normative basis for human rights. In other words, the 
idea of human rights brings out a universal quest of the human being to be treated with 
dignity. 
 
1.2. The Gold Coast as the case study 
I chose the Gold Coast in the period between 1945 and 1957 as the research focus for 
a number of reasons. It was the first British colony in Africa, south of the Sahara, to attain 
independence. The human rights ideas and anti-colonial nationalism, as I will prove in the 
                                            
6
 Bonny Ibhawoh, Imperialism and Human Rights: Colonial Discourses of Rights and Liberties in African 
History, Albany, NY: State University of New York, 2007, especially chapters 4 and 5. 
7
 Truth regime and regimes of falsity are frames of analysis explained in detail in section 2.5. of the thesis. 
4 
 
thesis, formed a nexus of emancipatory discourses in post-World War II domestic politics—
and with British policies towards one of its colonies.
8
 Moreover, the Gold Coast was also a 
model of the way the British colonial administration was applying the policy of indirect rule 
in sub-Saharan Africa during colonial rule. The selected period, 1945 to 1957, corresponds to 
the emergence of a somewhat hesitant human rights vocabulary on the international scene, 
and some of the major political landmarks that led to Gold Coast’s independence from 
colonial rule in 1957.
9
 This time frame is an open window from which to watch, as it were, 
and interrogate the understanding of human rights in colonial rule. 
In focusing the research on the Gold Coast in the post-World War II period, I am 
killing two birds with one stone: studying the new-fangled idea of human rights introduced in 
the UN within a specific historical and political context and trying to understand how 
Ghana’s early human rights history developed after World War II. The United Nations 
Charter (UN Charter) and UDHR championed specific ideas of human rights as rights one 
has by virtue of being human, with states having obligations to uphold the rights of their 
citizens. The UDHR, in particular, presupposed that being ‘human’ is synonymous with 
being a rights-holder by asserting in its preamble the inherent dignity of each human being 
and the inalienable rights of all members of the human family. Thus, the ‘accidents’,10 in an 
Aristotelian sense, of race, sex, gender, religion, political opinion or ethnic belonging were 
not preconditions for making claims to human rights. Human rights, as stipulated in the 
UDHR, are normative principles for safeguarding the rights of all human beings. Such an 
articulation of human rights inevitably questions the premises upon which discrimination on 
grounds of, for example, race or gender was legitimised. 
As Minow has argued, human rights provisions such as those found in the UDHR 
                                            
8
 Cyril Lionel Robert James, Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution, London: Alison and Busby, 1982, 133. 
9
 The two key human rights instruments are the United Nations Charter (1945) and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948). 
10
 For Aristotle’s idea of accidents, see Aristotle, The Metaphysics, trans. John McMahon, New York: 
Prometheus Books, 1991. 
5 
 
gave rise to rights’ consciousness so that individuals and groups imagined and acted in the 
light of what was formally recognised or seemed enforceable in their domestic context.
11
 In 
the specific Gold Coast situation, the colonial administration and the nationalist movements 
made claims mostly to civil and political rights. The right to self-determination was 
especially pivotal in the nationalist demands for independence, thus creating an important 
link in the trajectory of emancipation between the discourses of human rights and those of 
self-determination. Against this background, one aim of this research project is to clarify the 
emancipatory aspects of international human rights discourse among different interest groups 
and to analyse why the right of the people to choose for themselves the political and legal 
status of the Gold Coast trumped individual claims to civil liberties in the politics of 
independence.
12
  
On the one hand, the idea of human rights rests on a repertoire of rights that are 
specified in, for example, the UDHR. On the other hand, it also represents aspirational goods, 
so to speak, that are not reducible simply to the provisions in the UDHR or other human 
rights instruments. Thus, there is an important dialectic that connects the aspirational gap in 
the positivist understanding of human rights with the pragmatic ways people living under 
oppression draw on a broader understanding of the rights to be treated as human beings with 
dignity. Some aspirational aspects of the struggles for rights in the colonisation context in the 
Gold Coast overlapped with the provisions in the UDHR and the ECHR. It is against this 
background that the thesis will examine the uses of ‘human rights’ as aspirations which are 
not reducible simply to a positivist understanding. By drawing attention to this dialectic, the 
contemporary understanding of human rights is not being projected on the main actors in 
                                            
11
 Martha L. Minows, “Innovating Responses to Human Rights: Human Rights Institutions” in Nigel Biggar, 
ed., Burying the Past, Making Peace and Doing Justice after Conflict, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2001. 
12
 For a discussion of the idea of rights as trumps, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, London: 
Duckworth, 1977; Ronald Dworkin, “Rights as Trumps” in Jeremy Waldron, Theories of Rights, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984, 153-67. 
6 
 
post-World War Gold Coast.  
 
1.3. Human rights in Africa: Current approaches in the literature 
Human rights has always been conceptualised in a variety of ways. Dembour’s 
innovative study and proposal that there are four schools of thought is particularly useful in 
this regard.
13
 She proposes that ‘natural scholars’ conceive of human rights as given; 
‘deliberative scholars’ as agreed upon; ‘protest scholars’ as fought for; and ‘discourse 
scholars’ as talked about.14 This classification reveals not only the diversity of perspectives in 
the human rights literature but also the complexity of outlooks that influence both political 
activism and apathy. The variety of human rights agendas which governments deploy is very 
much influenced by processes of conceptualisation as well. While Dembour’s ideal types are 
themselves discursive, her contribution is a useful heuristic tool for understanding the extant 
human rights literature. 
Most studies which consider colonialism, nationalism and human rights tend to focus 
on the provenance of anti-colonial nationalism and to sidestep the way post-World War II 
nationalism represented a specific rhetoric of human rights.
15
 This is understandable because 
of the focus taken by different academic disciplines on, for example, nationalism. One 
exception is in Ibhawoh’s study of imperialism and human rights discourses from a historical 
perspective, which draws attention to the way Africans in one British colony deployed the 
idea of rights in their struggles for justice.
16
 This idea both contested and overlapped extant 
discourses of rights championed, for example, by the colonial administration and 
                                            
13
 Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, “What are Human Rights? Four Schools of Human Rights” in Human Rights 
Quarterly, 32(1), 2010: 1-20. Also see Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections 
on the European Convention of Human Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 10-11. 
14
 Dembour, “What are Human Rights?” 
15
 See, for example, Adu Boahen, Topics in West African History, London: Harlow, 1975; Adu Boahen, African 
Perspectives of Colonialism, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987; Adrian Hastings, The 
Construction of Nationalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; Carola Lentz, Ethnicity and the 
Making of History in Northern Ghana, Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 2007; and Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso, 1983. 
16
 Ibhawoh, Human Rights and Imperialism, 128-136. 
7 
 
missionaries. Another scholar who has critically studied the way bills of rights engaged the 
politics of decolonisation in some British colonies is Parkinson.
17
 Most debates about human 
rights in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, however, tend to overshadow the idea that rights 
are inalienable to human beings by virtue of their humanity. This appears to be due to a 
suspicion that the language of human rights is a mere tool for some Western governments to 
advance their agendas in Africa.  
There is also a plethora of writings on human rights in Africa generally and human 
rights in Ghana in particular.
18
 Much of this literature is inter-disciplinary, mostly engaging 
with human rights from the point of view of law, political science, anthropology and 
philosophy.
19
 In recent years, there have even been attempts to integrate human rights into 
                                            
17
 Charles O. H. Parkinson, Bills of Rights and Decolonisation: The Emergence of Domestic Human Rights 
Instruments in Britain’s Overseas Territories, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 104-5. Also see Kenneth 
Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law, London: Stevens & Sons, 1966. Roberts-Wray examines 
colonial laws under the British Commonwealth system. 
18
 Brendalyn P. Ambrose, Democratization and the Protection of Human Rights in Africa: Problems and 
Prospects, Santa Barbara, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1995; Abdullahi A. An-Naim, and Francis M. Deng, Human 
Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1990; Francis M. 
Deng and Terrence Lyons, African Reckoning: A Quest for Good Governance, Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institute, 1998; Malcolm D. Evans and Rachel Murray, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights: The System in Practice, 1986-2000, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; Ibhawoh; Charles 
M. Lichenstein, “Human Rights and Namibia” in World Affairs, Winter 1986/87: 151-56; Julia Maxted and 
Abebe Zegeye, “State Integration and Human Rights in Africa” in International Journal of Comparative 
Sociology 38, 1997; Kidane Mengisteab and Cyril Daddieh, State Building and Democratization in Africa: 
Faith, Hope, and Realities, Westport, Ct.: Praeger Publishers, 1999;  Samuel F. Ogundare, “Human Rights 
Orientation of Prospective Social Studies Teachers Nigeria” in Social Studies 84(6), 1993; George W. Shepherd, 
Jr. and Mark Anikpo, Emerging Human Rights: The African Political Economy Context, New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1990; George W. Shepherd, Jr. and Ved P. Nanda, eds., Human Rights and Third World Development,  
Westport, CT.: Greenport Press, 1985; Claude E. Welch Jr., C. E., Protecting Human Rights in Africa: Roles 
and Strategies of Non-Governmental Organizations, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995. 
19
 See, for example, Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, eds., Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological 
Perspectives, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979; Issa G. Shivji, The Concept of Human Rights in Africa, 
London: Codesria Book Series, 1989; Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Robert I. Meltzer, eds., Human Rights and 
Development in Africa, New York: New York University Press, 1984; Abdullahi A. An-Na’im and Francis M. 
Deng, eds., Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 
1990; Evelyn A. Ankumah, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Practice and Procedure 
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996; Cohen Ronald, Human Rights and Governance in Africa, 
Miami, Florida: Florida University Press, 1993; Obinna Okere, “The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comparative Analysis with European and American 
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theological discourses in Africa.
20
 The scholarship in this area has tended to exaggerate the 
abstract justification of rights over and above a critical exploration of the continuous 
interplay between universal human rights norms and the specific historical and political 
situations in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the literature has been eclipsed by the kind of 
narratives from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch about human rights 
violations without engaging with the complexity of competing agendas in post-colonial 
Africa. Since the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) entered into force 
in 1986, human rights values seem to have been accepted, or sometimes simply acculturated, 
in African states as legitimate and universal concerns or as a public relations gimmick. With 
the establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights in 2004, the discourse 
of human rights has taken on a broad and legally enforceable dimension.
21
 
In the first wave of the discourses on human rights in Africa, many of the scholars 
approached the gap between aspirations (as set out in the international standard-setting 
documents) and the reality on the ground in a curious way. For example, while Asante and 
Howard concentrated on the opposition between the rights of individuals and the entitlement 
of society as a whole, Donnelly highlighted the cultural relativism-universalism debate.
22
 In 
what could be termed a second wave, apologists of a specifically African human rights idea, 
such as Shivji and Rwiza, argued for a concept of rights that is in a continuous dialogue with 
changing cultural conditions.
23
 The entry into force of the ACHPR also inspired significant 
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amounts of writing on human rights in Africa, basically analysing the application of Africa’s 
regional system.
24
 Present scholarship on the human rights situation in Africa is more or less 
a renewed effort to strengthen and further push for the implementation of the body of human 
rights instruments that have been constructed on the foundations of the international bill of 
rights.
25
 This third ‘wave’ of human rights discourse engages with the universalism and 
cultural relativism debates, advocating obligations under international law to respect, protect 
and fulfil rights rather than the oft-overstated arguments regarding Africa’s unique cultural 
heritage. 
Because of the overlapping discussions on the subject, the construction of ‘the 
human’ in international human rights, including in the colonial Gold Coast context, remains 
under-researched.
26
 An approach that takes into account the link between international human 
rights and a non-essentialist approach to human rights studies in colonial Africa generally 
seems under-developed at present. There are various reasons for this hiatus. In seeking to 
respect the African cultural heritage, some scholars have approached human rights discourse 
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cautiously, fearing that the idea of human rights, as embodied in, for example, the UDHR, is 
a vestige of colonialism imposing an imperial worldview, ethos and ideology on post-colonial 
African states or, even worse, an idea which paradoxically permitted the exclusion of the 
‘African person’ under colonial domination in the 1940s and 1950s.27 Given this, my aim is 
to explore the African (Gold Coast) human rights discourses in a way which critically 
engages with the ideologies of ‘the human’ as well as the paradigmatic rights-holders in the 
concept of human rights in the UDHR. However, the literature on the Gold Coast is very 
limited indeed. Busia, Jr.’s article examining the structures and social forces of pre-colonial 
Africa and their role in shaping the protection and violation of human rights in post-
independent Africa speaks for itself, in the sense that it discusses the situation in pre-colonial 
Gold Coast.
28
  
What the academic literature reveals is the diversity of ways in which human rights is 
conceptualised, not least as a language that can be employed as a legitimising tool in law-
making in the colonial period but also as an idea that raises a certain amount of 
understandable scepticism.
29
 Also, the legal character of international human rights provided 
for the principle of justiciability in domestic law, which became a normative basis for 
articulating rights in, for example, the Gold Coast constitutions. Although it would be far-
fetched to talk about a clear ‘human rights culture’ at that time, the residuary discretionary 
powers of the British representatives in the Gold Coast in the 1940s and 1950s were counter-
balanced by the growing awareness about human rights norms among the nationalist 
movements.
30
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1.4. Collecting ‘the human rights texts’ for this research project: research methodology 
This case study has been conducted through researching primary and archival sources 
which have the potential to reveal how the idea of ‘human rights’ was deployed in the Gold 
Coast. The archival data provided the raw material for examining in detail how the human 
rights idea was used in the political discourse of the Gold Coast up to independence and a 
chance to witness, as it were, the actors and factors in the specific context of 1945 to 1957. It 
also proved an opportunity to scrutinise the effects of Western education on the nationalist 
movements, the impact of the debates about extending the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) to colonial territories on domestic politics in the Gold Coast, and the way the 
transition to political parties affected the discourse on incorporating a bill of rights into the 
Independence Constitution. 
The material I use in the research are ‘human rights texts,’ in the sense that they are 
documents of historical and legal character. These documents are of three kinds: domestic, 
international, and a hybrid of the former two. The domestic documents include legislative 
debates, post-World War II Gold Coast constitutions, official documents of nationalist 
movements such as the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and the Convention Peoples 
Party (CPP), and newspapers. The international documents are mainly the United Nations 
Charter (UN Charter) and the UDHR and the hybrid include policy/legal documents of the 
British colonial administration, jurisprudence on human rights law and those foreign 
newspapers that take up Gold Coast domestic issues. To my knowledge, this material has not 
hitherto been used to research the deployment of a human rights discourse in the Gold Coast.  
The selected documents meet the research criteria as identified by Scott, namely, 
authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning.
31
 Scott argues that the decision to 
use a document or a set of documents rests on whether or not  
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the document is a primary or secondary document..., accurateness of the 
documentation, the reliability of the producer of the document..., whether it is a 
typical document... [and] meaning can be distinguished into the intended meaning  
of the author of the document, the meaning intended for the reader ... and the social 
meaning for someone who is the object of that document.
32
 
  
The human rights texts are also historiographical and archival, in the sense that they come 
from a particular historical and political context.
33
 They are relevant for my research project 
not only because of their wealth of human rights information but also on account of the 
potential they offer me as a researcher in interrogating, for example, the role of human rights 
debates in the emancipatory politics of the Gold Coast. 
Because the research deals with events which occurred more than 50 years ago, many 
of the people who were key players in the independence politics in the Gold Coast have now 
died.
34
 I contacted two leaders from the pre-independence nationalist movements who are 
still alive, but discovered that due to poor health neither were in a position to grant an 
interview. This is probably related to the relatively short life expectancy of Africans born in 
the early to mid-twentieth century vis-à-vis people of the same generation, say, from Britain. 
The British who were serving in the Gold Coast colonial administration had taken up their 
positions after many years of work in other capacities and so were already well on in years by 
the time they were transferred to Accra. Key players in the post-World War II Gold Coast 
politics such as Alan Burns, Gerald Creasy or Charles Arden-Clarke have also passed away. 
I have undertaken more than twelve months of archival research in the Ghana Public 
Records and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD) in Accra and in Cape Coast; the 
British National Archives (Public Records Office, Kew) in London, the British Library in 
Kings Cross/St. Pancras, London and the British Library Newspaper Collection at Colindale; 
the Rhodes House Library (University of Oxford) in Oxford, the library of the Institute of 
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Commonwealth Studies and the library of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) 
both in London.  
There were some underlying assumptions to this research, which formed an integral 
part of the premises on which this project was initially conceived. Suffice it to acknowledge 
that the analysis of the research material has actually confirmed these assumptions. First, it is 
assumed that the international human rights regime developed an inclusive paradigm of the 
rights-holder when it reaffirmed in the preamble of the UN Charter “faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small [and, as further specified in the UDHR, that] all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity.”35 The system of international human rights 
protection historically came out of a need to provide effective and universal protection of the 
rights of all human beings following the atrocities of World War II. The core values 
delineated by the nascent UN Charter and UDHR affirmed the fact that all human beings are 
“entitled to all rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration without discrimination of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status”36 and set the stage for the universalisation of standards 
to include all human beings.  
 The second assumption is that awareness about fundamental human rights among the 
main actors in the Gold Coast, such as the colonial administration, the nationalist movements, 
women's groups and local chiefs, is one of the premises upon which the concept was 
appropriated and deployed in national discourses. Because specific ideas about what it means 
to be human beings informed colonisation, the UN human rights regime needed to make a 
paradigm shift in the conceptualisation of ‘the human’ in order for an inclusive idea of rights-
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holders to represent a meaningful discourse for people. In this early phase of the history of 
international human rights, conceptual clarity about what human rights means and/or who the 
holders of these rights are in a colonial environment must have been elusive both for the 
colonial administration and for the ‘British protected persons.’ Of course, the gap between 
the promise that human rights makes to societies and the reality of human rights protection on 
the ground would have been quite wide. 
It can further be assumed that the archival silence regarding gender equality, the rights 
of women or the rights of children reflects the historical situation of the Gold Coast in the 
period between 1945 and 1957. There were competing and overlapping discourses about 
human rights in the Gold Coast, leading sometimes to consensus-building, and sometimes to 
differences in interpretation or even conflict positions. This had implications on the way 
human rights could be a meaning-making tool in the lives of the subjects. These are reflected 
in debates on extending the ECHR to the Gold Coast and on whether or not to have the bill of 
rights in the Independence Constitution, these are taken up in detail in chapters 5 and 6 below 
of the thesis. These assumptions helped to narrow the focus for achieving the research 
objectives. 
 
1.5. The ‘human rights texts’ as a window into human rights discourse 
The human rights texts I have collected reflect ideas and practices about human rights 
which were embedded in a specific setting during a particular historical period. I have 
adopted a broad discourse approach for analysing them, as my data is both textual and 
contextual, allowing me to explore the various ways in which human rights were discussed, 
spoken about, written about or acted on in the Gold Coast between 1945 and 1957. A 
particular source of inspiration for my work has been Edward Saïd, a non-Western scholar 
who famously used the idea of discourse in order to analyse the relationship between the 
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coloniser and the colonised.
37
 Interestingly for my own work, Saïd confined himself to 
literary texts to discuss ways in which the imperialists construct the ‘Orient’ and maintains 
power over it and the people in it. His understanding of a discourse as something that is not 
free of the conditions of its social production and the context in which it is transmitted is 
relevant to my analysis of the human rights texts I have collected.
38
 So is his idea that the 
purpose of universal human rights is to put forward explanations using the same language 
employed by the dominant power to dispute its hierarchies and clarify what is obscured.
39
 
By engaging critically with the specific context and text of human rights in the Gold 
Coast, the activities of the nationalist movements and the colonial administration, and with 
the legislative debates, Gold Coast newspapers, the policies of the colonial administration and 
policy documents of the nationalist movements were analysed in their specific context. Ideas 
about human rights are also embedded in the context and the text of the UDHR and UN 
Charter as well as the underlying assumptions about who ‘the human being’ of rights is. It is 
through the analysis that the definition of human rights, as it were, is unearthed in the UDHR 
and serves as a heuristic device for evaluating other constructions of the human being, say, in 
a colonial territory.  
This approach also helped me to interrogate the categories of race, gender and 
ethnicity, and at the same time question the validity claims of imperialist or masculine 
binaries or the grounds for gender imbalances. The preoccupations of marginalised 
constituencies such as the women in the Gold Coast are, thus, allowed to come to the fore in 
the analysis and are assessed in relation to others in the country. In this way, the human rights 
texts open up what Keto describes as “a hermeneutic discourse… [that] unfolds vistas of new 
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information”40 in the research, situates the human rights idea in history as both timely and 
essential and serves as an axiological reference to engage with the idea of rights-holders in 
post-World War II Gold Coast. The range of meanings emerging from the text/context reveal 
an important dialectic about human rights, as a post-World War II idea that was shaped by 
complex forces but which also influenced discursive constructions of anti-colonial protest. It 
also helped to evaluate many of the shared perceptions, differences of opinion, collective 
actions and the diversity of ideologies based on the discourses embedded in the text/context. 
Human beings are free agents with the potential/power to shape the destiny of their societies, 
and the human rights discourse points to how human beings are capable of rising above their 
historical, political, cultural and social circumstances and transcending their specific group 
interests. 
Consequently, in choosing one method of analysing the human rights texts over 
another, the research is done against the background of engaging on the one hand with the 
interface between the theory and the application of human rights and of interrogating on the 
other hand the human, political and historical realities which were shaped by complex factors 
such as language, social practices and the power dynamics in the Gold Coast.
41
 By using this 
discourse approach in analysing the human rights texts, I draw attention to the way human 
rights is also a meaning-making device, appropriated by different actors for diverse purposes 
in the Gold Coast.
42
 Subsequent chapters of the thesis demonstrate the way this discourse 
approach of interrogating the human rights texts qua data revealed the discursive aspects of a 
complex historical situation, political circumstances and social practices. Indeed, this 
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approach to the analysis is both critical and dialectical, in the sense that it establishes the 
basis of human rights in context/text and engages in a dynamic process of gaining a deeper 
understanding of universal rights through the human rights texts. 
 
1.6. The outline of the thesis 
As I have pointed out above, the research will explore on the one hand the emergence 
of human rights in the Gold Coast after World War II and on the other hand its uses in the 
political discourse up to independence in 1957. This first chapter provides the theoretical and 
methodological framework of the thesis by explaining why the research is being done, how 
the thesis is located within the extant literature, what resources are used, where the data has 
been gathered, and how it is being approached and analysed.  
The second chapter offers an understanding of human rights as a ‘truth regime’ after 
critically engaging with different perspectives. The term, truth regime, is adopted as a frame 
of analysis for conceptualising the idea of human rights. It answers questions such as how 
international human rights express a specific idea of the human being as a rights-holder and 
what ways the idea of human rights represents a truth regime among the plethora of regimes 
of falsity that undermine the essence of being human. I demonstrate how human rights is a 
truth regime by highlighting how the idea is an emancipatory tool for people to make rights 
claims in unjust situations.  
The third chapter reviews the way the Gold Coast came to be institutionally 
constituted as a colonial territory of Britain. It examines how laws, policies and forms of 
imperial pragmatism discursively created the Gold Coast as a colonial territory between the 
1750s and the 1950s and how colonial rule, in turn, prepared the grounds for resistance 
nationalism.  
Chapter 4 discusses the way in which the colonial setting relied on highlighting and 
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inscribing differences between people to justify the imperial project. This raises questions as 
to how the colonisers understood the ‘humanity’ of the colonised and how the colonised 
understood and expressed their own ‘humanity’ in the politics of resistance and demands for 
education. This chapter also explores the significance of dignity and equality, which are at the 
heart of the meaning of human rights, and what they could denote in Gold Coast politics.  
At the core of the analysis in chapter 5 is the paradigm of rights-holder and the 
normative promise of the UDHR that one has rights by virtue of being human. This is 
examined by reference to the way debates about extending the ECHR to the Gold Coast 
shaped political discourses in general and the 1950s constitutional reforms in particular.  
Chapter 6 analyses the specific debates about incorporating a bill of rights into the 
Gold Coast Independence Constitution in 1957 and examines the positions of the main actors, 
the problem of ‘historicising’ human rights through a bill of rights, and the negotiation of 
meanings about fundamental rights.  
Chapter 7 examines the articulation of ideas about constitutional/statutory rights and 
the rhetoric of human rights in the politics for self-determination. This way the link between 
anti-colonial resistance, the post-World War II ‘new world order’ and the emergence of party 
politics is clarified. I argue that nationalism represented a nuanced discourse of rights in the 
Gold Coast.  
The gender question is taken up in every chapter of the thesis to underline the 
different ways in which gender imbalances shaped these historical and normative realities in 
human rights especially in the Gold Coast. The analysis around gender not only interrogates 
the validity claims of dominant discourses around race, sex and ethnicity but also puts in 
context strong, compelling reasons emanating from personal experience of discrimination 
against women and girls, including harmful traditional practices, gender-based violence, 
reproductive health inequalities and economic discrimination. Gender-based discrimination is 
19 
 
especially privileged over and above, for example, children’s rights because of a number of 
reasons. First, gender equality was not a central part of the human rights discourse in the 
period between 1945 and 1957 but it was nevertheless a major problem in the Gold Coast. 
Second, according to available census data on the period between 1945 and 1957, more than 
50% of the Gold Coast population was made up of women. Third, gender-based 
discrimination is still prevalent and persistent in contemporary Ghana even though Article 17 
of the 1992 Constitution provides for equality and freedom from gender-based discrimination 
and the state is party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW).   
The conclusion recapitulates the idea that human rights represents a specific truth 
about the human being qua human being who has dignity that ought to be respected and 
protected. This understanding has creative potential to bring about change in societies where 
discrimination and inequality form part of the value system. It also asserts that the potential is 
only that, a potential. However, it is when it is harnessed by visionary human agents that it 
challenges those regimes of falsity that undermine humanity and provides at least one of the 
bases for building proper legal institutions and a better world.
 
 
1.7. Note on spelling and terminology 
Because of the variance in spellings between English and African languages in the 
Gold Coast, terminologies and orthographies in the literature are sometimes a sticking point 
in scholarship. Even though attempts have been made to standardise much of the orthography 
in the last fifty years, it is preferable to retain some spellings from the source material 
because they form part of a specific historical discourse. Terms such as the Gold Coast rather 
than Ghana, Ashanti rather than Asante and the titles for the local chiefs (Nana, Na, Nene, 
Kabachewura or Nii) are therefore used in this work because they correspond with what is in 
the archival material and represent a key part of the discourse. 
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The expression ‘local chief’ is used in the thesis to refer to the traditional rulers whose 
authority was legitimate according to the customary law of their respective ethnic 
communities and also those appointed by the colonial administration as collaborators in 
government. The Gold Coast educated elite coined the term intelligentsia to distinguish 
themselves from the rest of the African community. According to Austin, the intelligentsia 
was a term coined within the Gold Coast  
to [mean] the small southern group of lawyers and businessmen who, from an early 
date, were active among the limited electorates of Cape Coast, Accra and Sekondi, 
forming proto-nationalist associations like the Aborigines Rights Protection Society 
(1897), the National Congress of British West Africa (1920), the Youth Conference 
Movement (1930), and a number of municipal party groups.
43
  
 
Apart from being both the leaders and gatekeepers of some of the political discourses by 
virtue of their exposure to Western education, relative degree of wealth or life in the urban 
areas, they formed the main bulwark of anti-colonial resistance in the country. I will use 
intelligentsia and educated elite interchangeably throughout this work. 
The term colonial administration is used in a restricted sense in the thesis to mean the 
configuration of political appointees of the British Crown as well as those civil servants, 
whether British or African, who governed the colony, protectorates and mandated territory. 
The civil service officials were mostly from the Colonial Office with a few technical staff 
coming from other UK government departments such as education, foreign affairs, transport 
and agriculture. However, the African civil servants straddled two conflicting positions in the 
colonial administration, neither enjoying British citizenship nor benefitting fully from the 
Crown’s public service. Moreover, many of them joined various waves of anti-colonial 
nationalism to resist colonial domination. Kofi Abrefa Busia, for example, went from being 
one of the first two Africans (along with A. L. Adu) to work in the colonial civil service in 
the Gold Coast as district commissioners between 1942 and 1949 to being at the forefront of 
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nationalism from 1951 onward. In instances where the term ‘Gold Coast government’ is used, 
it is always in relation to the colonial administration, which until 1951 comprised of British 
civil servants and political appointees and after the transition to an all-African legislature 
included a significant number of Africans. 
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Chapter 2 
Human rights as a truth regime 
“Where there is true justice, all are brothers and sisters.” 
Dagara proverb 
 
Human beings suffer, 
they torture one another, 
they get hurt and get hard... 
 
History says, Don’t hope 
on this side of the grave. 
But then, once in a lifetime 
the longed for tidal wave 
of justice can rise up, 
and hope and history rhyme.
44
 
    Seamus Heaney, Excerpt from The Cure at Troy 
  
2.1. Introduction 
Since the adoption of the UDHR, the idea of human rights is usually invoked in 
situations where human being’s inhumanity towards other human beings arises and the basic 
standards that uphold the dignity of the human being are under threat. One of the useful 
frames of reference for this tends to be the provision to respect and protect the dignity of all 
human beings “without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”45 In this 
way, the concept of human rights helps to form a specific picture of our shared humanity and 
communicates the idea that human beings possess dignity that ought both to be protected and 
respected. By making the undertaking that the rights provided for in the UDHR serve as “a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations,”46 something very important 
is emphasised, that human beings are less separated in reality than in imagination. Lessons of 
history and indignation toward the cruelty of one group of people dehumanising another 
contributed to the construction of the specific idea of human rights in the post-World War II 
context. 
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Every so often, problems arise when it comes to the application of human rights 
standards on the ground, sometimes with the state apparatus distorting meanings to suit their 
particular agendas. The idea of human rights may well be a victim of its own ambiguity in 
history, but this neither diminishes its normative power nor the fact that it is a truth regime 
specifying that every human being is a rights-holder.
47
 Added to this is the controversial 
question whether or not human rights, as we understand it today, has an enduring link with 
historical discourses of justice. While the conventional history of human rights tends to 
situate the subject in the Magna Carta Libertatum of 1215, the English Bill of Rights of 
1689, the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, at least one school of thought described these 
antecedents as representing “a politics of citizenship at home” 48 and not necessarily ideas of 
universal human rights. The UDHR makes, as it were, a fundamental promise that one has 
rights simply by virtue of being human,
49
 but the fact that these values neither created a 
strong enough symbolic embarrassment for governments that abused the rights of their 
citizens/subjects nor inspired a human rights culture acceptable to all people in all places 
raises, among other things, a question as to their receptivity. 
Chapter 2 examines how human rights expresses a specific idea of the human being as 
a rights-holder and the way in which it represents a truth regime among a surfeit of many 
false claims about the human being. The analysis will first be situated squarely in the 
conventional history of human rights discourse in order to draw out what I mean by a truth 
regime. Then the historicist thesis which argues that human rights only made it as an 
internationally accepted idea from the 1970s onward will be presented and critiqued before I 
respond to the rather common charge that human rights is a product of Western 
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ethnocentrism imposed progressively on the rest of the world.
50
 I will examine primarily 
those aspects of human rights history that bring out the relationship between the concept and 
specific ideas about rights-holders and the imbrications of rights in a state structure. I shall do 
all this in order to provide the context and background for explaining the understanding of 
human rights as an expression of certain core values about our shared humanity. 
 
2.2. The human rights idea as an expression of ‘the human’ 
The intimate link between human rights, as it is understood today, and the 
denunciation of human being’s inhumanity to human being cannot be denied. Even in its 
forerunners, the discourses of justice that served as precursors to human rights developed out 
of situations of injustice. While the precursors are not ‘the real thing,’ they provide a ‘usable 
past’51 for constructing a meaningful history of human rights. Without them the idea would 
not have developed into what it eventually became in contemporary times. But in this 
historical frame, human rights is also ambiguous, representing either an outcome of a 
progressive, incremental understanding of the idea over time or a departure from what was 
before as evidenced by the fact that human rights becomes only universally persuasive from 
the 1970s onward. These apparently paradoxical ideas are reconcilable because they also 
present a both/and rather than simply an either/or idea as this section 2.2. will demonstrate. 
Rights is an unstable concept in history. It has meant different things in different 
phases of history, depending sometimes on the context under which specific ideas of rights 
emerged. Even when the concept has significance for a community of human beings, the 
political circumstances may not necessarily be conducive for entrenching human rights 
norms. The argument that the notion of human rights is as old as civilisation itself has been 
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made by many scholars, among them Ishay, Lauren and Sellars.
52
 While such an argument is 
not really tenable from the way human rights is defined today, it alludes to the fact that 
human beings have long been travelling on the road to a more just society, “the milestones 
along its way formed by acts of individual heroism as well as by the great arguments of 
learned men [and women].”53 Many of the discourses of justice that have come to be accepted 
as the precursors of international human rights flag up principles of individual freedom or 
even inherent equality in specific historical contexts. Those ideals spoke to and about 
particular historical situations of injustice or oppression, but also sometimes possessed, as it 
were, the normative seed of an international scope.  
Scholars who argue that the Magna Carta, the Habeas Corpus Act, the English Bill of 
Rights, the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen represent antecedents to the idea of human rights buttress their 
point by drawing attention to the normative scope of the ideas of justice in these precursors.
54
 
They point out that these forerunners of human rights advocated, to different extents, limits to 
the absolute powers of the sovereign or tyranny of the state. Three examples put in context 
the extent to which these documents secured ‘rights’ for specific groups of people in history. 
First, the Magna Carta protected the rights of the English barons against the arbitrary powers 
of King John, but had very little to say about the rights of the man/woman in the street in the 
England of that period. Second, the American Declaration of Independence made the 
powerful claim “that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by the Creator with 
certain unalienable rights”55 while failing to end racial discrimination in the United States of 
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America (USA). Slaves were sold and bought like chattels partly because they were not 
constructed as ‘human’ in the same way that the buyers, for example, were. Third, even 
though the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen asserted that “men are 
born free and equal in rights,”56 this universal claim to freedom and equality excluded many 
of the common people. Indeed, there were calls in France for Olympe de Gouges,
 
an advocate 
of women’s rights, to be executed at the guillotine after she issued the Declaration of the 
Rights of Woman and Citizen in reaction to the use of the word ‘man’ in the 1789 
declaration.
57
 
At the level of individual contributions to these contextual ideas of rights three names 
are typically cited by this school of thought: Thomas Hobbes thought natural law was vague 
and therefore open to different interpretations, so he proposed positive law as the basis of 
rights, meaning that they could be given, taken away and modified by the sovereign in 
accordance with society’s needs. John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau took up in their 
writings the idea that human liberty ought to limit the absolute power of the sovereign or the 
arbitrary powers of the state.
58
 They advocated a ‘social contract’ in which the consent of the 
governed is one of the preconditions for the legitimate exercise of authority by the ruler. 
Hobbes did not conceive of natural rights for the common person because of the powers that 
were given to the ruler in the social contract; but the ruler, according to him, also had the 
obligation to exercise authority over the governed in a responsible manner.
59
 Locke, on the 
other hand, championed natural rights (especially the right to property) and the idea of the 
consent of the governed within the context of the social contract. The paradox of Locke’s 
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idea, as Bates has pointed out, is that “[h]e did not advocate universal suffrage and was, after 
all, writing in the seventeenth century when the right to vote remained a privilege of very few 
in England.”60 Rousseau extolled freedom as a value that derived from the general will or 
authority of the people, articulated in the laws of the land. While these thinkers or even the 
architects of the declarations were too radical in their beliefs to be children, as it were, of 
their time, they were nevertheless in many ways the products of their time even as they 
sowed the seeds of human rights through their writings. 
The most conventional view about human rights history tends to emphasise how the 
notion of rights, especially natural rights, was ridiculed in the nineteenth century by Bentham, 
who argued famously that the idea was really “simple nonsense… nonsense upon stilts”61 
without the protection of law and by Marx who pointed out that “the so-called rights of 
man… are nothing but the rights of the member of civil society, i.e., egoistic man, separated 
from other men and from the community.”62 Indeed, these two critiques were reinforced 
unwittingly by the nineteenth-century discriminatory practices against marginalised 
constituencies in many parts of the world, not least the USA where the rights of slaveholders 
to their ‘property’ was upheld in Dred Scott v Sandford in 1857.63 
The Enlightenment is another historical period upon which the conventional school of 
thought has drawn. The idea of rights, it argues, emerged out of the Enlightenment project, 
“as reason began to triumph… and the new sensibility embraced ideals of individual freedom 
and social equality.”64 This ‘new sensibility’ is said to have inspired discourses of justice in 
which the justification for trade of human beings was questioned in, for example, the R v 
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Knowles, ex parte Somersett case of 1772.
65
 This case, along with other political struggles, 
prepared the grounds for the eventual abolition of trade of human beings in the British 
Empire in 1807 and in the USA a year later but also constructed the human being as a 
potential rights-holder. It is important to note that the abolition of trade in human beings did 
not mean the outlawing of slavery in British territories. This happened later, and only 
gradually, with the Slavery Abolition Act, 1833.
66
 According to Bates, expressing an idea 
which is typical of this school of thought, the abolition of trade of human beings “was… one 
of the earliest, if not the first, human rights related British foreign policy initiatives.”67  
The abolition of trade in human beings generated a new notion of the human being as 
one who should not be treated as a chattel. If this was indeed the case, then it is a paradox in 
human rights discourse, that the trade of human beings was immediately replaced by 
colonization of the territories where many of the slaves originated. Even though the League 
of Nations attempted to protect the rights of minorities in certain regions of the Western 
‘world’, not only was the intervention in preventing the carnage of World War II too little, 
too late but it also paid no attention to the plight of colonised people around the world. 
As is rehearsed in human rights histories as a litany, it is of course in the context of 
the atrocities of World War II that the idea of human rights proper emerged. Already in 1941, 
Franklin Roosevelt had spoken about a new world order founded on ‘four essential human 
freedoms,’ i.e., freedom of speech and expression, freedom of every person to worship God 
in his/her own way, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.
68
 He disclosed to the United 
States’ Congress plans for a universal organisation to replace the weak League of Nations. 
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According to Hoopes and Brinkley, Roosevelt came up with the name, ‘United Nations,’69 
envisaging in it a body of nations that would guide the affairs of the world and would contain 
the possible violations of individual rights. The United Nations Conference on International 
Organization or the San Francisco Conference (April 25-June 26, 1945), which formally 
established the UN, was a decisive moment in international human rights discourse for three 
reasons. First, the atrocities of the war were formally acknowledged by the representatives of 
the newly-formed UN as a terrible scar on the conscience of humanity. Secondly, the UN 
Charter, which contained some building blocks for a new culture of rights, was adopted; and 
thirdly, the idea of setting up a body under the auspices of the UN to draft a separate bill of 
rights was debated and endorsed. From the inception of the UN, its charter reaffirmed inter 
alia “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small,”70 thus singling out the 
upholding of human rights as one of its key functions. The UN Human Rights Commission 
was formed to draft an international bill of rights for the protection of human rights. This was 
a step of immense significance. 
The representatives of the key players in the UN also had to negotiate, as it were, the 
meaning of human rights in such a way that it did not encroach upon their sovereignty and in 
some cases the possession of colonies.
71
 The issue of sovereignty also inevitability came up 
in Europe where colonial powers had to negotiate whether or not to extend the ECHR to their 
colonial territories. The debate about the suitability of extending the ECHR to colonial 
territories is taken up in some detail in chapter 5 below of this thesis. 
After eighty-five sessions of debates by the Third Committee, the draft UDHR was 
                                            
69
 Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the UN, New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2000, 207. According to Hoopes and Brinkley, Roosevelt was so pleased with the name United Nations 
that he burst into the room of Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, who was a White House visitor at 
the time, to get his approval. 
70
 Preamble of the UN Charter. 
71
 Sellars, 8. The fears about the doctrine of sovereignty led to the insertion of Article 15 in the UDHR, 
prohibiting the UN from intervening in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of member states. 
30 
 
adopted by the UN General Assembly at the Palais de Chaillot on December 10, 1948. Forty-
eight voted in support of the declaration, eight abstained, two countries were absent from the 
chamber at the time of the vote and no one voted against it. South Africa not only opposed 
Articles 13 and 21 (i.e. freedom of movement and the right to participation in government 
respectively) of the declaration but also on the day of the vote abstained along with seven 
other countries. (South Africa’s position on human rights at the time reflected the existing 
Apartheid policy.) 
From the Magna Carta’s discourse of justice in the thirteenth century to a social 
contract idea in the eighteenth century, there emerged an incremental understanding of the 
fundamental idea that the human being is a potential rights-holder and that, therefore, trade in 
human beings ought to be abolished. This prepared the grounds for affirming the idea that 
every person possesses inalienable rights in a universal declaration on human rights. The 
ideas of justice in, for example, Roosevelt’s four freedoms or in what came out of the 
revulsion to World War II atrocities were entrenched in a universal declaration to provide a 
normative framework of respect for every human being without distinction. In other words, 
the precursors to human rights represent historically specific ideas of justice while the UN 
human rights idea is theoretically universal in scope.  
One of the central points of this thesis is that successive generations built on the ideas 
of earlier ones, in the process refining discourses of justice to become the international 
standards for the protection of human rights. At the centre of this process was the human 
being or the attempt to construct a paradigm of common humanity. A diverse community of 
human beings participated in articulating ideas in reaction to specific historical situations, 
sometimes thinking outside the box and in the process defining human beings as rights-
holders. There is, thus, a tenuous inter-generational chain in the development of human 
rights’ ideas.  
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2.3. An alternative understanding of human rights history 
Moyn has recently proposed that each of the historical precursors represented a mere 
domestic struggle for the rights of citizens rather than an idea for all human beings to be 
protected by state law.
72
 He argues that human rights became an internationally accepted idea 
in the 1970s, as it captured the Western imagination. This accordingly is what allowed it to 
evolve into a global movement, becoming the standard discourse for engaging with situations 
of systematic injustice. Through the analysis of specific national and international situations, 
he concludes that a conceptual distinction could be made between those discourses that 
espoused citizenship rights under the state as the locus of rights and those about paradigmatic 
rights-holders, rights people have simply by virtue of being human. In his view, the 
precursors represent a “politics of citizenship at home”73 and in the post-1970s a “politics of 
suffering abroad”74 in which the state is also the source of the abuses. One has a domestic 
scope with a discourse of justice while the other is universal in latitude, international in 
outlook with a rather tenuous connection with the UN human rights idea.  
Moyn’s thesis has become prominent in human rights discourse but is, in my view, 
contentious. I will therefore take issue with some aspects of his idea, especially as they relate 
to the core arguments of this project. The distinction made between ‘politics of citizenship at 
home’ and ‘politics of suffering abroad’ creates a conceptual dichotomy, another of those 
taxonomies that rights discourse has historically been susceptible to since the 1940s.
75
 One of 
the problems with this kind of separation is a false dichotomy in which two alternatives are 
considered, when in fact there are shades of grey between the extremes. In actual situations of 
injustice, the need for human rights may be transcendent of collective or individual rights as 
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such and the demands are often for both. For example, colonial history follows the pattern of 
citizenship rights being extended through a series of constitutional reforms in the 1950s and 
that included the collective right to self-determination in some cases and individual rights 
such as the right to vote and the right to stand for election or the right to life, liberty and 
security of person. The reasons for collective and individual rights, at least in British 
colonies, ranged from the extension in 1953 of ECHR provisions with emphasis on first 
‘wave’ rights to the anti-colonial demands for self-rule. To ask for rights as citizens is a 
collective demand and to realise other rights that come with self-determination could be 
individualist experience. As Ibhawoh has pointed out in his study of human rights discourses 
in colonial Nigeria, the language of liberties or rights serve a complex array of purposes.
76
 
Some examples of abuse are also to be found in countries where there are well 
established cultures of citizenship rights, hence the idea of a ‘politics of suffering abroad’ is 
only partially accurate. When a USA government adopts the tenet of extraordinary rendition 
in order to abduct and transfer persons from nations where torture is prohibited to places 
where they could be tortured by proxy that is as much a violation of human rights as torture 
in a prison “abroad.” 77 Thus, the argument that international human rights represents a 
‘politics of suffering abroad’ is as insular as conflating the idea of human rights with 
awareness about individual rights. The distinction that is made between the idea of human 
rights and actual awareness about it in society is more polemical than practical. Moyn 
succeeded in constructing an argument around the a posteriori analysis of historical data. But 
in the development of human rights history a hypothetical case is made on the a priori basis, 
like that of Rorty’s, that violations of fundamental rights by themselves raise, among other 
things, moral questions.
78
 While this is a normative element of human rights, it is at the core 
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of the sensitivity of people to, say, the gross injustice of torture of Iraqi prisoners in Abu 
Ghraib or gender-based ‘honour killing’ in some societies. 
With regard to anti-colonial nationalism, Moyn maintains that “[a]ny attempt... to 
place anticolonialism in human rights history must face up to an era when human rights had 
no movement and anticolonialism, a powerful movement, typically took the new ‘human 
rights’ in the original, collectivist direction of earlier rights talk”79 Thus, he takes issue with 
Ibhawoh’s title, Imperialism and Human Rights: Colonial Discourses of Human Rights and 
Liberties in African History, arguing that it is misleading and pointing out that Parkinson’s 
Bills of Rights and Decolonisation is a misnomer.
80
 Nkrumah attended the Fifth Pan-African 
Congress held in Manchester in 1945 in his capacity as an anti-colonial nationalist where he 
made the famous ‘Declaration to the Colonial Peoples of the World,’ but Moyn’s assertion 
that Nkrumah claimed “only the ‘rights of all people to govern themselves’”81 but not human 
rights sounds like a fallacy of many questions. The right to self-determination was a 
precondition for the realisation of other human rights for people living under colonial 
subjugation. Moyn’s perspective also highlights part of the problem with some interpretations 
of Africa in history through a specifically Western monocle. By putting anti-colonial 
struggles for self-determination outside the human rights movement, he basically fails to 
acknowledge the historical evidence outside his particular purview on the way the nationalist 
movements, and in some cases the colonial administrations, in the post-World War II 
deployed the new-fangled idea of universal rights in the colonies. 
Nationalist movements picked through minefields of colonial policies and 
controversial practices, and so their struggles tended to focus on the immediate need for self-
determination as the basis for the realisation of other rights. The expression, bill of rights, 
was actually used frequently in Colonial Office documents when the suitability of extending 
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the ECHR British colonial territories was discussed in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
Parkinson’s book title is, therefore, not an inappropriate designation. (This issue of extending 
the ECHR to the Gold Coast is treated in some detail in chapter 5 below). As a general 
critique of his approach, I think Moyn conflates two very different ideas in human rights 
discourse, the universal nature of human rights with the ‘internationalisation’ of human 
rights. His generalizable idea about anti-colonial resistance and human rights is, therefore, 
partially accurate. 
Moyn enriches the understanding of the development of the human rights idea, but his 
alternative perspective does not fully emasculate the conventional history. Tracing human 
discourse prior to the 1970s is a project worth pursuing, because his argument that ‘any 
attempt to place anti-colonialism in human rights’ is not wholly valid. Indeed, the 
conventional history of human rights is still of value in the study of this important subject. 
How the idea is assimilated into discourses or deployed in activism is not limited to 
‘movements.’ Its discourse power lies sometimes in the fact that it is a heuristic device in 
negotiating justice and equality. Indeed, human rights in the post-World War II context is an 
example of a truth regime which specified how every human being is a rights-holder. 
 
2.4. The ethnocentric thesis 
One of the charges against human rights is that it is a product of Western 
ethnocentrism imposed progressively on the rest of the world
82
 or that as an idea it “took the 
suffering of whites to force the powers that be into action... [whereas] slavery and 
colonialism [had] left the world indifferent.”83 The American Anthropological Association 
(AAA) picked up on this issue even before the UDHR was adopted when they asked, 
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“[h]ow… the proposed Declaration [can] be applicable to all human beings and not be a 
statement of rights conceived only in terms of values prevalent in the countries of Western 
Europe and America?”84 The problem of the AAA is first about the difficulty of devising 
rights which will be relevant to the experiences of all human beings in all places and second 
about power. Indeed, the issue of how representative the UDHR drafting commission was has 
often been one of the reasons human rights is criticized as a foreign concept imposed on, for 
example, post-colonial African countries.
85
 
The distinction about the value of human rights for different environments was 
something that the AAA had raised when they took the UN Human Rights Commission to 
task for reifying ‘ethnocentric’ judgments into universal values, arguing that “what is held to 
be a human right in one society may be regarded as anti-social by another people, or by the 
same people in a different time of their history.”86 The broad discourses about culture would 
find their way into the discussions about fundamental rights in non-Western societies. The 
charge that human rights is a Western construct could be interpreted in two ways. First, that 
human rights originated from the West (the argument from origins), and second that human 
rights rationalise and endorse the power of Western countries over their former colonies (the 
argument from power). It is true that the concept of human rights, as we understand it today, 
originated in the West in the aftermath of World War II. But it is difficult to see what the 
origins of an idea have to do with validity. For example, the concept of Pythagoras Theory 
originated from Greece during Pythagoras’ life time (570-495 BC) but it is now an integral 
part of the Mathematics’ syllabus in many schools around the world. Where an idea first 
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comes up has no bearing on its truth or falsehood. The response to the argument from power 
is simple. History is full of examples of principles that were once reserved to the elite or only 
men and are now accepted as entitlements for every human being. Women’s right to vote and 
to run for office was only recognised in the early part of the twentieth century in some 
Western countries.  
At least two deductions could be made about the idea of rights-holders in 
universalism and cultural relativism from the above analysis. First, the ethnocentric argument 
is a slippery slope in human rights discourse and practice. It is true that culture is one of the 
keystones of public morality, but it can also be the cornerstone of human rights violations. 
History is full of examples where the argument of ‘culture’ is used to support abusive 
practices, especially towards people in marginal constituencies. For example, the facile 
condemnation of the rights of people with a homosexual orientation is typically framed along 
the lines of the culture argument. Also, culture has played a role in shaping patriarchal 
assumptions about women and in providing one of the metaphors of defence for human rights 
abuses in many societies. 
Second, the gap between universalism and cultural relativism is somewhat abstract, 
because the value of human rights is really grounded on inherent dignity and equality. As 
Kofi Annan asserted, “[i]t was never the people who complained of the universality of human 
rights... It was often their leaders who did so.”87 Notions such as inherent dignity, equality of 
esteem or equal worth expose particular cultural perceptions of the human being that justify 
discrimination. It is true that the lack of a common understanding of the concept influenced 
how human rights norms were constructed in the UDHR, but the scope of human rights has 
increased steadily over time as societies have developed more democratic cultures. As Sachs 
has pointed out, “the universalism of human rights comes not from the globalized imposition 
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of one set of values on all humanity. Human rights are not exported from one centre to the 
rest of the world. Rather they are the product of the unabating struggle and shared idealism 
throughout the world.”88 
The conventional history of human rights has tended to privilege the Western ‘world’ 
with the origins of the human rights’ idea. But the ethnocentric thesis does not diminish the 
way human rights is a heuristic tool for engaging with problems of systematic injustice or 
inequalities or questioning the basis of social wrongs. Indeed, human rights has historically 
shaped many a debate about freedom, justice, equality and non-discrimination around the 
world. The idea that one is entitled to certain fundamental freedoms by virtue of being human 
is a promise which people, especially those whose rights are violated, are likely to find very 
attractive. To totally dismiss the concept of human rights would be like throwing away the 
baby with the bath water. Human rights represent the never-ending human resistance to 
injustice and the shared idealism of human beings for a more just world. 
There were a number of discrepancies in the early history of the UN human rights 
regimes. For example, sub-Saharan Africa could not participate in negotiating the meaning of 
universal rights because they were still under colonial rule. The only African countries that 
were sovereign states during this period were Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and the Republic of 
South Africa.
89
 Even though Africa’s colonial powers such as Britain and France participated 
in the debates about human rights in the UN they turned a blind eye to the politics of 
inequality and discrimination in their own colonies. USA, another key player in the universal 
human rights debates, had its share of problems. For instance, Jim Crow laws were still 
operational and lynching of black people was not uncommon during this period. Indeed, the 
American representative and chair of the Human Rights Commission, Eleanor Roosevelt, 
prevented a petition from the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People 
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(NAACP)—‘An Appeal to the World’— from appearing on the UN agenda in October 
1947.
90
 Also, the USSR was trying to untangle itself from allegations of forced labour 
practices in the country. For example, Christopher Mayhew, Britain’s representative on the 
UN Third Committee, accused the USSR of having “instituted a slave system recruited from 
among its own citizens which in scope has no parallel in history.”91 What these examples 
illustrate is not only the issue of double standards of individual states but also the gap 
between the normative standards of protection and the actual implementation of universal 
rights principles. These problems have bedevilled human rights practice to this day. 
 
2.5. The human rights concept as a truth regime 
The concept of human rights is a truth regime, in the sense that it telescopes a 
universal quest of the human being to be treated with dignity and respect. This idea is 
captured by the UDHR as a promise that human beings have rights by virtue of being 
human.
92
 I adopt the idea of a truth regime as a frame of analysis in this thesis in a dialectic 
with Foucault’s pithy expression, ‘regime of truth,’ which was used only once in an interview 
in 1976 but was not really taken up in his subsequent writings.
93
 He describes how “[e]ach 
society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth—that is, the types of discourse it 
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accepts and makes function as true,”94 and the way in which these regimes are enforced by 
what he calls truth-generating apparatuses of society. Power/knowledge structures, for him, 
condense through institutions such as the laws, schools or hospitals of a society to frame the 
standards for behaviour and order, as it were, interactions within society. Truth here lacks 
objective quality, is embedded within power/knowledge structures and is, therefore, a 
problematic concept for Foucault. Foucault’s idea is important for understanding the 
pragmatic ways in which some actors in Gold Coast politics appropriated and employed the 
human rights language in the struggle for self-determination.
95
 To show how my use of the 
term truth regime is different from Foucault’s use of ‘regime of truth,’ I will show how the 
notion of a truth regime is instructive for analysing human rights as an aspirational set of 
values for a world and also as a standard for assessing political activity. Then I will draw 
attention to five characteristics of the idea of human rights as a truth regime.  
What gives human rights its real meaning is its universal significance and normative 
clout. While governments may distort the concept in order to discredit its power, its 
normative base is not diminished. The idea of human rights as a truth regime denotes that 
sense of correspondence between equality of dignity and a basic framework of respect for the 
sake of fairness and logic. The correspondence is a necessary requirement for the set of 
conditions, usually but not always of a political nature, to effectively regulate the actions of 
government or another institution in its interactions with society. The post-World War II idea 
of human rights underlined what Gearty describes as  
the simple insight that each of us counts, that we are each equally worthy of esteem. 
This esteem is not on account of what we do, or how we look, or how bright we are, 
or what colour we are, or where we come from, or our ethnic group: it is simply on 
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account of the fact that we are.”96  
 
Human rights belongs in a repertoire of abstract norms, but provides two unifying 
principles in the real world. One is that respect for human dignity is a unifying principle for 
society because it underpins a specific way in which the human being is a rights-holder by 
virtue of his/her humanity. To recognise the values of dignity, equality and freedom of the 
human being is to realise the meaning of our shared humanity—not to recognise these values 
is to diminish this sense of our shared humanity. This is the reason why violation of human 
rights dehumanises not only the victim but also the perpetrator. The second is that human 
rights exposes the falsity of ideologies, policies and practices that historically have justified 
human being’s inhumanity to other human beings. This is derived from an understanding of 
human dignity and is a unifying lesson for our time as well as for future generations. A 
characteristic common to regimes of falsity is a constructed idea of ‘the different other’ as 
less deserving, as it were, of respect for dignity, equality or freedom. Such regimes come in 
many guises, time and again as expressions of a state’s foreign policy, at other times as the 
benign resolve to impose a particular concept of civilisation or democracy or a culture of 
human rights upon ‘the different other’, and sometimes as ideologies. 
Against the above background, the idea that human rights is a truth regime both 
embodies and generates a number of characteristics. First, the idea that society creates 
‘regimes of truth’ through its values and belief systems can be applied to human rights, in the 
sense that the UN provided a platform on which specific meanings of human rights were 
negotiated.
97
 Article 2 of the UDHR stipulates that all human being are “entitled to all the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
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birth or other status.”98 This idea contested regimes of falsity’ around race, sex, colour and 
other grounds of discrimination and inequality.
99
 This is an opposite term to truth regime that 
helps to shed light on false and superficial claims about the human being around gender, race 
and other grounds. Such false claims have sometimes been exploited as the basis for 
rationalising the unfair or even cruel treatment of ‘the different other’ or even reinforced the 
‘creation’ of human hierarchies to justify atrocities.  
These ideas are relevant to the discussion about human rights, in the sense that a truth-
generating apparatus (i.e., the UN) constructed the idea of human rights as a specific ‘regime 
of truth.’ As a community of nation-states, the UN could suitably be understood as 
representing a ‘structure of power’ but not necessarily in a negative sense. The idea of human 
rights is situated in the dynamic process of specific discourses. As Moyn has pointed out, 
dominant ideologies such as imperialism or anti-colonial nationalism have towered over 
others at different times in history,
100
 becoming for extended periods the regimes of truth that 
shaped some of the major political changes around the world. Because of the values of 
inherent equality, human dignity and public morality that the discourse of human rights 
espoused, it posed a challenge to those ideologies that embodied a dubious moral character. 
The discourse of human rights could, thus, be said to be a ‘regime of truth’ for deconstructing 
bad ideologies, i.e., it provided a framework of meaning-making particularly in the face of 
various forms of systematic injustice, not least World War II atrocities. 
Second, as a specific regime of truth, human rights had both transformative and 
creative potential for changing situations of injustice both in revolutionary and evolutionary 
senses. However, the potential was only that: a potential which needed to be harnessed 
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through human agency.
101
 World War II had provided a particular context for appreciating 
the idea of universal rights and seeing beyond the external differences between human 
beings. In negotiating the meaning of this new discourse, other forms of abuses inevitably 
caught the attention of the drafting committee of the UDHR. The nascent discourse of human 
rights represented, at least in theory, a paradigm shift in the understanding of the ‘human 
being’ of rights. This, along with varying degrees of political pragmatism in individual 
countries, shaped the content and contours of the discourses around human rights issues. For 
example, the British colonial administration in considering the suitability of extending the 
ECHR to its colonies in a symbolic way acknowledged that colonial subjects are potential 
rights-holders too. 
Third, the human rights discourse was reality-constitutive,
102
 in the sense that it 
became like a mirror to the way states related to their citizens or subjects, and in the 
reflection offered the potential for transforming or re-creating reality. The consequences of 
this dimension of discourse are immense. People are given a voice to protest against 
domination
103
 by others and the public space to ‘reconstruct’ their distorted collective 
identity. While the discourses that shaped colonial rule were hegemonic the human rights 
discourse had the “capacity to recreate a historically better reality and experience, for 
example freed from domination, repression, prejudice or exclusion.”104 
As a discourse, human rights embodies ‘speech acts’ or what Shi-xu calls socially 
consequential meanings.
105
 In this case, speech acts are not de-contextualised statements but 
rather ways of speaking and acting with particular outcomes, intended or inadvertent, upon 
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society. Since discourse presents particular regimes of truth about a society, it is presupposed 
that the version of events would have certain effects on the recipients and change the 
situation for better or for worse. In other words, the power of human rights discourse is in the 
discursive practices that it produces in society. As Foucault has pointed out,  
in any society, there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize and 
constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be 
established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation and 
circulation and functioning of discourse.
106
  
 
Fourth, the human rights idea itself is a meaning-making tool through which people 
living under oppression can, for example, find an appropriate language of resistance to assert 
their claims to fair treatment or to negotiate justice. The truth of human rights lies in the 
recognition of ‘the human’ in human beings and in the way authentic respect for human 
dignity is both a unifying principle and a powerful norm for society. The power of human 
rights is normative, upholding the ethic that human beings are entitled to certain fundamental 
rights by virtue of being human, and also applicable, in the sense that entrenching human 
rights principles in a country’s constitution can provide a basic framework of respect for 
every human being without distinction. 
Fifth, human rights’ ideas passed through a complex set of filters in order to qualify as 
a ‘regime of truth.’ The UN Charter prepared the grounds for a comprehensive declaration of 
universal human rights by contesting the binaries of the nobles/common people, male/female, 
colonised/coloniser or oppressor/oppressed that had come to be accepted as the norm. None 
of these filters was value-free or a homogeneous whole. Indeed, some of them embodied 
varying degrees of regimes of falsity about the ‘other’ which the UN idea of human rights 
questioned. Others too were linked with ideas of truth about the dignity of the human person 
or the need for fairness in society. When members of the UN Human Rights Commission 
attempted to dismantle, as it were, existing inequalities or structural injustices or 
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discrimination on grounds of differences they did so from specific conceptual standpoints. 
Although the UDHR did not lend itself to wholesale application in colonial territories, its 
impact reinforced to a limited extent democratic processes in which colonial subjects could 
become rights-bearing citizens.  
Of course, there were other forces at play besides human rights, but the rights’ 
discourse was a very important way of legitimising the demands of the Africans to be 
recognised as rights-holding citizens in an independent country. These filters impacted in 
varying degrees on the knowledge about human rights or the understanding of the rights-
holders, and indeed in some cases were replaced by others. As one scholar has asserted, the 
discourse that a group produces always has a history but also the potential to be appropriated 
for uses in institutions, in communities or by groups.
107
 
 
2.6. The UDHR as a fundamentally ambiguous proclamation and Cold War politics 
Human rights was not only a truth regime, with the inevitable potential of denouncing 
false propositions, it was also a fundamentally ambiguous proclamation. On the one hand, the 
language of human rights is itself a structured system of meanings in which what emerged as 
a truth regime was based on an understanding that the human being of rights is every human 
being. Human rights is constructed on the basic assumption that because every human being 
has inherent dignity he/she ought to be treated as a rights-holder whether the person is male 
or female, white or black, able-bodied or disabled, Jew or Gentile. The unfair treatment of 
others based on their “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status”108 is viewed as an antithesis of this ‘truth.’ 
Thus, human rights identifies discrimination on grounds of race, sex, gender, national or 
social origin as part of a regime of falsity and cannot but advocate a fresh basis for 
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recognising the inherent dignity of the human person. In a sense, the idea that human beings 
have a shared inherent dignity questions the basis of, for example, colonial domination.  
But there is a contradiction here, in the sense that a specific regime of truth stipulates 
all human beings as being rights-holders and yet three-fourths of the world was under 
colonial rule at the time the UDHR was drafted. The use of the term ‘universal’ was 
especially significant in the UDHR discourse because of this three-fourths section of the 
human family that still lived under colonial rule at the time that the declaration was adopted. 
Therefore, to contest ideologies of domination was to contest regimes of falsity. By initiating 
the discourse of human rights, the UN proffered to the world community a new way of 
viewing the human being, as one who had certain fundamental rights by virtue of being 
human, and opened up in a new way debates about human dignity.  
The affirmation of dignity or equality or universality in the UDHR is fundamentally 
ambiguous because of the gap between theory and practice, or even theory and theory. For 
example, many of the states that were at the forefront of drafting the UDHR defended their 
sovereignty and did not really address themselves to the glaring contradiction of colonialism, 
among other contradictions. The principle of sovereignty and the concept of human rights 
were viewed as fundamentally opposed to each other, one had to do with the rights of states 
and the other the rights of individuals. Also, as Morsink points out in his seminal study of the 
drafting of the UDHR, the work of the Human Rights Commission was not free of the 
underlying Cold War struggles over what rights to include and which ones to leave out.
109
 
Cold War politics polarised human rights into a dual system: the socialist groups championed 
a social justice agenda in the name of equality while the liberals pushed for individual rights 
and fundamental freedoms in the name of liberty. There are documents from this period that 
attest to the fact that the British colonies were already “part of the theatre of superpower 
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ideological rivalries and attendant proxy conflicts.”110  
The gap between theory and theory was especially manifested in the way the idea of 
state sovereignty was used during the Cold War period. Sovereignty basically defined the 
conditions under which states have rights and duties as recognised under international law, 
but after World War II this did not mean unlimited powers of the state to act willy-nilly. The 
UN Charter, for example, restricts the powers of states by emphasising their obligations to 
protect and respect human rights.
111
 At the same, human rights instruments had a diverse 
binding nature, meaning that some were optional while others were binding only to a state 
that has ratified them. Even in ratifying a particular instrument a state could make a 
reservation to one or more provisions as long as that is not in contravention of the spirit of the 
instrument. During the Cold War period, the argument of sovereignty was used not only to 
distort the meaning of human rights but also to justify violations of human rights.  
Cold War politics polarised the understanding and weakened the application of human 
rights standards in more ways than one, and went on to shape the contours of the discourse of 
human rights for the next forty or so years, deflecting from the universal power of 
fundamental rights and resulting to some extent in the categorisation of rights into civil and 
political liberties; social, economic and cultural rights; and environmental rights. Civil and 
political liberties reflected the notion of liberty, second generation rights meant the idea of 
equality and third generation implied the rights of the community. The term came to be used 
more or less as a synonym for taxonomy or classification. Klug has taken issue with the idea 
of generations by criticising it as a misnomer because, according to her, it creates too rigid a 
distinction between rights, creates an artificial sequential order, and exaggerates the external 
characteristics of rights over their universality, inalienability, indivisibility, interdependence 
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and interrelatedness.
112
 She adopted the term ‘waves’ from feminist literature and used it to 
analyse the emergence of the notion of human rights.
113
 I prefer the expression ‘waves’ to the 
term ‘generations’ because it brings out the dynamism of the human rights idea, especially 
the incremental understanding over several generations into what Moyn described recently as 
“the last utopia.”114 
From the above analysis, it could be said that the fundamental ambiguity of human 
rights is not in the normative idea per se but rather in the way Cold War politics reinforced 
state sovereignty and provided some of the arsenal for assaulting ideas of fundamental rights, 
including in post-independent Africa. One of the reasons human rights was able to withstand 
the attacks for so many years is because it offers the human family a specific ‘truth’ about the 
human being as a rights-holders and an ethic to respect for human dignity, equality and 
freedom. 
 
2.7. Human dignity as a central reference point 
At the heart of the UN idea of human rights is the notion of human dignity. The 
preamble of the UDHR asserted “the inherent dignity and ... the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family [as] the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world.”115 Between the UN Charter and UDHR, the term ‘dignity’ is used at least half a 
dozen times—once in the former and five times in the latter. The idea of equality is at the 
heart of the scope and application of fundamental rights. The link between human dignity and 
“the equal rights of men and women”116 is quite explicit in the preamble of the UN Charter. 
Both the UN Charter and the UDHR presented the concept of dignity as the frame of 
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reference for which every human being has rights.
117
 However, because neither the UN 
Charter nor the UDHR defined the terms, they were at the mercy of the agents of rights 
discourses.  
By not defining the term, human dignity, in the UN Charter and UDHR, the drafters 
of the two documents perhaps assumed that the human family would appreciate how 
"disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts”118 and that way 
recognize the value of rights in unjust situations. This turned out not to be the case in many 
places in the world, but the idea of equality remains a heuristic device, serving as a guide in 
resolving the kind of inequalities that characterised life under unjust situations. The notion 
ties in well the Aristotelian idea of treating like cases as like,
119
 assuming that the subjects of 
equality are equal ‘in relevant respects.’ In other words, they share some objective quality—
human dignity—that elicits the fairness and impartiality in the way they ought to be treated.  
Kant’s ideas may be relevant to the understanding of the idea of dignity in the concept 
of human rights as having universal applicability: 
Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human beings 
and is in turn bound to respect every other. Humanity itself is dignity; for a human 
being cannot be used merely as a means by any human being (either by others or even 
by himself) but must always be used at the same time as an end. It is just in this that 
his dignity (personality) consists, by which he raises himself above all other beings in 
the world that are not human beings and yet can be used, and so over all  things. But 
just as he cannot give himself away at any price (this would conflict with his duty of 
self esteem), so neither can he act contrary to the equally necessary self-esteem of 
others, as human being, that is he is under obligation to acknowledge, in a practical 
way, the dignity of humanity in every other human being. Hence there rests on him a 
duty regarding the respect that must be shown to every other human being.
120
 
 
These thoughts are helpful in at least two ways. First, human rights derive from a shared 
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understanding of dignity as a basis of equality and non-discrimination. Second, even though 
Kant does not state this specifically a broad reading of the quote points to the concept of 
dignity as the essential characteristic of being human and therefore providing the basis of 
respect and protection for universal rights. 
Another interpretation of dignity that would be of interest to people living in unjust 
circumstances where the idea of rights-holders would particularly have practical import is 
Fukuyama’s idea that  
when we strip all of a person’s contingent... away, there remains some essential 
human quality underneath that is worthy of a certain minimal level of respect—call it 
Factor X. Skin, color, looks, social class and wealth, gender, cultural background, and 
even one’s natural talents are all accidents of birth relegated to the class nonessential 
characteristics... we are required to respect people equally on the basis of their 
possession of Factor X.
121
 
 
In theory, the language of human rights highlights human dignity, what Fukuyama calls 
‘Factor X,’ as the basis of universal rights. In statements such as, “all human beings are 
born… equal in dignity [and all human beings…] are endowed with reason and 
conscience,”122 it could be inferred that ‘the human being’ of rights is every human being 
irrespective of race, colour, sex, gender or ethnicity. Indeed, the lexical meaning of dignity is 
intrinsic worth. Thus, when the UN Charter uses ‘dignity and worth’ of the human being at 
the same time, it seems to be employing synonyms perhaps on purpose. Henkin’s argument 
that “[t]he human rights idea and ideology begin with ur value or principle... the principle of 
human dignity. Human Rights discourse has rooted itself entirely in human dignity and finds 
its complete justification in that idea”123 can help in the understanding of the contours of 
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human rights. But it is Brownsword’s distinction of human dignity “in one case acting in 
support of individual autonomy (human dignity as empowerment) and, in the other case, 
acting as a constraint on autonomy (human dignity as constraint)”124 that really emphasise the 
importance of recognising both rights and responsibilities in the scope and application of 
human rights principles. 
The state is the duty bearer with regard to respect and protection of the dignity of the 
rights-holders. In other words, the relationship between the rights-holders and duty bearer is 
so important that any disparity of understanding between the two inevitably leads to the 
dearth of a human rights culture. If the above is juxtaposed with the UDHR idea that all 
human beings are rights-bearers, then the protection of rights is not contingent on whether the 
people are British ‘citizens’ in the United Kingdom or colonial ‘subjects’ in a British colony. 
This may be a simplistic way of putting it but it expresses the universal significance of human 
rights. To place this point in its proper context, it is important to draw attention to the fact 
that the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 1933 still held sway over the 
declaratory theory of statehood in the post-World War II period. The state is identified “as… 
possessing the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; 
(c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.”125 Until 1957, the 
Gold Coast did not meet this criterion for statehood and therefore could not fulfil the 
obligation of upholding the dignity of ‘rights-holders’.  
The idea that everyone has rights by virtue of being a human being (i.e., irrespective 
of race, gender, skin colour, religious belonging, political affiliation, disability or social 
standing in society)
126
 not only questioned the premises upon which colonial rule was 
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legitimised but also contested the racialised or gendered identities that had justified excessive 
colonial or patriarchal practices.  
 
2.8. Conclusion 
Human rights is really about people and not just principles, and about inter-human 
relationships and not just laws. While principles and laws are important, in themselves they 
are not powerful enough to build a world where people can thrive in a human rights culture. 
The drafters of the UDHR built on an edifice which had been started by the framers of the 
Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and the 
other ‘usable past’ of international human rights. They, along with countless other people, 
championed different domestic discourses of justice in history, culminating eventually in the 
UDHR idea that one has rights simply by virtue of being human. Although situations of 
injustice inspired the discourse of human rights, to me the real driving force was the 
community of human beings with goodwill.  
As a truth regime, human rights had the potential to help people articulate their claims 
to be treated fairly and also the power to transform unjust structures in society. The 
understanding of human rights in the UDHR also shaped other human rights ‘texts’ such as 
the ECHR and the official documents of the Colonial Office concerning the extension of the 
ECHR to some British dominions. It is from the plethora of early UN treaties that meanings 
about human rights were extrapolated. The discourse power of human rights lay in the fact 
that societies adopted and deployed it in debates regarding justice, equality, non-
discrimination and freedom. In this way, the unremitting struggle of human beings in 
situations of injustice produced a discourse of human rights. 
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Chapter 3 
Discursive creation of the Gold Coast as colony, protectorate and mandated territory 
“We cannot trample upon the humanity of others without devaluing our own. The Igbo, always 
practical, put it concretely in their proverb Onye ji onye n’ani ji onwe ya: ‘He who will hold another 
down in the mud must stay in the mud to keep him down.’”127 
     Chinua Achebe, The Education of a British Protected Child 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Having examined the conventional debates in human rights discourse, engaged with 
Moyn’s trend-bucking thesis and proposed that the UN idea of human rights is a truth regime 
among regimes of falsity, the objective of this chapter is two-fold: to provide the kind of 
historical framework that is necessary for understanding the discussions that come in 
subsequent chapters, and to situate the debate about the meaning of ‘the human being’ of 
rights within the specific political context of the Gold Coast. The narratives for the analysis in 
this chapter reflect the underlying struggles between the dogma of imperialism and the 
politics of anti-colonial resistance in a region that came to be known as the Gold Coast. Even 
though expressions of European imperialism in the Gold Coast go back to treaties such as the 
Bond of 1844, it was the series of pacts in Britain from 1874 onward and the 1884-5 General 
Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa that wholly legitimised colonial rule. The term 
‘Gold Coast’ is used in a historically specific and legally restricted sense to mean the four 
territorial entities in the West Coast of Africa that came under British jurisdiction between 
1844 and 1914, viz., the Gold Coast Colony, the Ashanti Protectorate, the Northern 
Protectorate and the Trans-Volta Togoland.
128
 The colonial administration governed these 
separate entities as a single administrative unit with a governor at the top, thus preparing 
unwittingly the grounds for a more or less unified nationalist front for the Africans in the 
struggle for independence. 
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3.2. Discursive ‘creation’ of the Gold Coast 
In order to situate the ‘creation’ of the Gold Coast within its proper historical context, 
it is important to go back to specific legal and policy practices through which the British 
Crown created progressively territorial entities on which she exercised jurisdiction for over 
hundred years. Some of these processes, initiated between 1821 and 1914, had a legal 
character while many were more or less policy decisions driven by contingency. They were 
discursive insofar as they represented ideas and actions that had negotiated meanings among 
their users as well as political and legal significance at various levels.
129
 Apart from the 
discourse power they embodied they were also context-based, having to do with relations 
between an emerging colonial power and the people who were discursively being created as 
‘British protected persons’ in the Gold Coast. 
Contact between Europeans and the people in the Guinea littoral region, the region 
that came to be known as the Gold Coast, go back to 1434 when explorers under the direction 
of Prince Henry the Navigator ventured down the coastline. A number of Portuguese 
merchants, not least Fernão Gomes, with permits for trading in the region, did business with 
the Africans in the Gold Coast from the 1470s onward, and in 1482 built the São Jorge Castle 
in a town they named El Mina, the mine.
130
 Over time, the region gained a reputation as “the 
white man's grave”131 because of the prevalence of malaria. Many European explorers and 
merchants came here mainly for commercial reasons without a vision of eventual 
colonisation. In the intervening centuries, especially between the sixteenth and the nineteenth 
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centuries, explorers from Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Prussia and Britain built half a dozen 
forts along the Gold Coast coastline. The rivalries and conflicts that ensued were more about 
control over commerce or territorial rights and less about questions of colonisation as such. 
William Hawkins undertook the first British trading expedition on the West Coast of 
Africa in the 1530s, returning to the United Kingdom with more information about these 
regions. However, Thomas Windham was the first British man to reach the area that came to 
be known as the Gold Coast in 1553.
132
 News of the commercial potential of the area spread 
in Elizabethan England, inspiring John Hawkins, William Hawkins’ son, to pioneer what 
came to be known as the ‘triangular trade’ through the region in the 1560s. Two British 
chartered companies, the Royal African Company and later the African Company of 
Merchants, monopolised trade along this coastal region between the 1550s and 1750s.
133
 The 
Glorious Revolution in England brought an end to the monopoly by the Royal African 
Company in the region, opening up trade in human beings (the slave trade) to all British 
citizens. British forts in the Gold Coast were maintained by the Royal African Company with 
government subsidies until 1750 when the African Company of Merchants took over the 
responsibility, but relinquished it in the 1800s.
134
 The African Company of Merchants was a 
regulated company in which members paid a 40-shilling fee to a central body in order to trade 
as individuals along this coastline.
135
 
The eighteenth century marked a turning point in new discourses of justice, inspiring 
the anti-slavery movement in Britain and in particular the Abolition of Slavery Act, 1807, 
which led to the abolition of trade in human beings in all British possessions, and an 
agreement to a settlement at Sierra Leone for freed slaves. With the abolition of the trade in 
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human beings, the African Company of Merchants lost its mainstay in trade within the 
region. It must be noted that the demise of the African Company of Merchants in 1821 
triggered a transfer of their forts and settlements in ‘the Gold Coast’ fully to the British 
Crown. The Governor of Sierra Leone was authorised to administer them from Freetown until 
1828 when the African Company of Merchants was converted into the Committee of London 
and given some authority over British settlements.  
Britain’s decision not to abandon trade in the Gold Coast marked a shift in position 
regarding colonisation, a new phase in asserting jurisdiction over the area and therefore 
another discursive process of negotiating meanings with African chiefs and other Europeans. 
Captain George Maclean, a British army officer, who was employed as the first governor 
(1828-1843) of the Gold Coast, negotiated a treaty, the Bond of 1844, with a number of 
African chiefs in the coast. Through the Bond the British Crown assumed the power of 
jurisdiction over the Gold Coast colony.
136
 Maclean is credited with "laying the foundation of 
[the Gold Coast] colony, which he accomplished with the paltry subsidy of £4,000 a year."
137
 
This Bond is significant as one of the first discursive practices in delineating the boundaries 
of the Gold Coast and redefining the identities of the diverse ethnic groups who occupied the 
area. In theory, the Bond also allowed the British limited judicial powers to try, for example, 
murder and robbery cases in what became technically a ‘British protected territory.’ It 
provided one of the first legal frameworks for the exercise of British jurisdiction over the 
people in the Gold Coast and prepared the grounds for subsequent colonial rule. It also gave 
Maclean’s regime jurisdiction mainly over the lands around the British forts and castles. 
Among other things, the Bond also delineated the land rights of the local people against 
limited infringement by the British and prohibited the British administration from acquiring 
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further rights over land and judicial powers without the explicit consent of the signatories (the 
local chiefs).  
From 1844 until 1914, the British further initiated a number of noteworthy practices 
with representatives of other European nations, some African chiefs in the coastal region and 
the League of Nations in the ‘creation’ of the Gold Coast as colony, protectorates and 
mandated territory (after World War II as a trust territory).
138
 The House of Commons was 
drawn into the emerging politics over jurisdiction in the new British dominion and appointed 
two Parliamentary Select Committees to look into the situation and make recommendations 
to the British government. These committees inquired into the conditions of the British 
Settlements on the West Coast of Africa, and in 1865 drew attention to the fact that:    
No protectorate, however, was proclaimed nor was there any mention of a territorial 
session. This treaty [Bond of 1844] is of importance in Gold Coast history as it was to 
have some influence on the subsequent relations of the British and the Africans. Since 
the chiefs were not conquered, but had voluntarily submitted to British power, they 
continued during later years to speak of their inherent rights and to maintain an 
attitude of independence towards unpopular British legislation.
139
 
 
Besides maintaining that British interest in the region did not require whole or immediate 
withdrawal, the Committee discouraged “all further extension of territory or assumption of 
government”140 and proposed that the purpose of British policy  
should be to encourage in the natives the exercise of those qualities which may render 
it possible for us more and more to transfer power to them the administration of all the 
governments [sic], with the view to our ultimate withdrawal from all, except, 
probably Sierra Leone.
141
 
 
The House of Commons’ Select Committee, 1865, also recommended to the British Crown 
that another treaty be negotiated with the coastal chiefs in order to define more clearly British 
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jurisdiction over some coastal ‘protected areas.’142 One of the immediate results of the 
recommendations was the British Crown’s decision to assume control of the Gold Coast. The 
recommendation for eventual withdrawal was, however, not carried out until 1957.
143
 
Another phase of discursive practices in the creation of the Gold Coast as a colony, 
protectorates and mandated territory were initiated in 1874 and sustained through a number 
of legal frameworks, including the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 and the League of Nations 
mandate in 1914. Through the British Settlements Act, 1874, the Gold Coast was annexed as 
a colony and administered separately from Sierra Leone.
144
 A new charter was then granted 
to the Royal Niger Company in 1886, separating the Gold Coast administratively from 
Nigeria. There remained some confusion over the meaning of ‘British protected territories’ 
and ‘British settlements’ in 1895, and Chief Justice Sir Joseph Hutchinson ruled that there 
ought to be no distinction between the two. However, the law officers in the Colonial Office 
overruled him, arguing that local government could not alter the status of Her Majesty’s 
possessions.
145
  
The latter viewpoint basically echoed the two Crown Orders, the Ashanti Territory 
Order in Council and the Northern Territories Order in Council, which were signed into law 
creating the Ashanti Protectorate and the Northern Protectorate under an existing Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act, 1890. Article 1 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act stipulated the kind of 
authority Britain wielded over the Gold Coast colony and protectorates: 
It is and shall be lawful for His Majesty the King to hold, exercise, and enjoy any 
jurisdiction which His Majesty now has or may at any time hereafter have within a 
foreign country in the same and as ample a manner as if His Majesty had acquired that 
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jurisdiction by the cession or conquest of territory.
146
 
 
This Act was indeed instrument in the annexation of Ashanti and the Northern Territories in 
1901 as ‘protectorates.’ 
Britain’s ratification of the Berlin Act of 1884-5 provided an international legal 
framework for the ‘creation’ of the Gold Coast as a colony and, to consolidate jurisdiction 
over the area, the first census was undertaken in 1891. The General Act of the Berlin 
Conference on West Africa was constructed on a particular idea of international law by what 
Crawford calls ‘the Great Powers of Europe’ setting out provisions relative to the partition, 
justifying the process of colonisation and determining the terms of trade and navigation.
147
 
The General Act outlined the rules for the partition, inter alia “to regulate the conditions most 
favourable to the development of trade and civilisation in certain regions of Africa,”148 thus 
preventing conflicts from arising between European states in their joint colonisation of 
Africa. Indeed, the Berlin Conference represents a part of the corpus of international law that 
advanced the argument of civilization as a justification for colonisation and endorsed a 
‘trustee’ role for the colonising countries, a role that was eventually superseded by the post-
World War II UN trusteeship system. As a result, some scholars have argued that 
international law became the parent, rather than the child, of African colonies such as the 
Gold Coast.
149
 Indeed, colonisation was shaped by both evolving British foreign policies 
towards West African coastal regions and an international process legitimised especially 
through the Berlin Conference as a far-reaching discursive practice. 
The final phase of the discursive creation of the Gold Coast had an international 
character. The League of Nations mandated territory of Togoland fell to the British in 1914 
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after Germany’s defeat in World War I, thus completing, as it were, the boundaries of the 
Gold Coast. The other half of Togoland went to the French and became the sovereign nation-
state of Togo in 1960.
150
 In theory, these Acts, along with the treaties the British government 
signed with other European nation-states, determined the boundaries of British jurisdiction in 
the Gold Coast as well as legitimised the process of colonisation.
151
 For example, the treaties 
entered into with France in 1889, 1893, and 1898, defined the frontier between La Côte 
D’Ivoire and the Gold Coast, and set the eleventh parallel as the extreme north boundary with 
the French in Haute Voltaire. Also, in the Heligoland Treaty of 1890 and again in 1899, a 
dividing line between the English and the Germans in Togoland to the east was agreed.
152
 
The treaties also formed part of a process of legitimising control over the Gold Coast 
in an emerging discourse of jurisdiction. A Eurocentric international law stamp on 
colonisation in sub-Saharan Africa was employed, in a process that Antonio Cassese calls 
imposing the “judicial conscience of the civilised world”153 on others. The conditions that 
were taken into account included common institutions of government and justice that are 
suitable for the inhabitants and sufficient for the protection of the foreigners among them.
154
 
European nation-states such as Britain had developed a clear sense of sovereignty as an 
exclusive and inalienable concept.
155
 
The Gold Coast was constructed against a complex legal and practical background. 
The colony comprised Accra, Cape Coast and Sekondi-Takoradi municipalities with 
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populations that benefited from a relatively long history of contact with European explorers 
and mission education. While the Ashanti Protectorate covered the area inhabited by the 
Akan-speaking Ashanti, Bono and Ahafo groups, the Northern Protectorate embraced the 
Mole-Dagbane communities in the savanna grasslands bordering the French colony of Haute 
Voltaire to the north. It was administered broadly as one colony under a governor appointed 
by the British Crown with subordinate administrators stationed in the colony, the two 
protectorates and the mandated territory.  
 
3.3. The Gold Coast colonial administration 
Once jurisdiction was established over a 70-year period in the Gold Coast, the policy 
of indirect rule was adopted on the assumption that a policy of direct rule such as the French 
policy of assimilation would not be realistic in the administration of the colony, the two 
protectorates and the mandated territory. As a concept, the policy of indirect rule had 
theoretical roots in Edmund Burke’s speech at the impeachment of Warren Hastings in 1788. 
Burke had argued that “[i]f we undertake to govern the inhabitants of India we must govern 
them upon their own principles and maxims and not upon our ideas; we must extend ours to 
take in their system of opinions and rites,”156 suggesting that the commonly held idea that 
Frederick Lugard, Governor-General of Nigeria from 1914 to 1919, is originator of the 
concept of indirect rule is not entirely accurate. Besides, already in the 1880s the idea of 
indirect rule was mooted by Samuel Rowe, who was the governor of the Gold Coast from 
1881-1884. When he adopted this policy in 1883, his argument was that “I think the proper 
way to administer the Gold Coast Colony is by acting through the Chiefs.”157 He enacted the 
Native Ordinance of 1883 with sweeping powers over all people “other than those commonly 
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known as Europeans.”158 
Undoubtedly, Lugard did apply the idea of “ruling native peoples on native lines”159 
as the suitable modus operandi in a territorially vast, culturally diverse Nigeria where he was 
governor. Instead of relying exclusively on the few trained British personnel, he decided that 
traditional rulers in the colonies should be co-opted into the administrative structure. The 
result was a system of indirect rule whereby the political, economic and social relations with 
their subjects could be regulated. Certain aspects of native law and custom were espoused 
while those that more or less undermined the colonial processes of administration were 
prohibited. Lugard went on to publish The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa in 1922, where 
he justified colonisation as part of a wider European process of civilising Africans and where 
he outlined the methods that could be employed in administering the colonies in order to 
protect British interests from internal and foreign aggression. He also articulated “the policy 
of ‘trusteeship’ [which was based on the idea of] dual responsibilities and reciprocal benefits. 
Britain was to be a trustee to civilisation for the development of resources, and to the natives 
for their welfare, with indirect rule”160 serving both groups. 
These ideas about indirect rule were adopted in those places in the colony where 
chieftaincy already formed an integral part of existing traditional governance and imposed in 
acephalous societies within the Gold Coast. Where the institution of chieftaincy did not exist 
‘chiefs’ were appointed and imposed on the communities to serve as conduits of the colonial 
administration.
161
 For example, the Dagara of the Northern Protectorate ruled through a 
council of elders until 1901 when the colonial administration appointed men to serve as 
chiefs in their communities. In communities where ‘chiefs’ were not appointed to serve as 
conduits of colonial rule, interactions between the local communities and the British 
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administration soon led to the evolution of chieftaincy. In Great Things Happen, McCoy 
describes in some detail the evolution of chieftaincy in Jirapa, a town in the Northern 
Protectorate: 
Prior to the coming of the white men, the Gbare people kidnapped a woman from 
Jirapa. An expedition of warriors, led by one Ganaa, was sent out in pursuit and 
succeeded in rescuing her and restoring her to her family. When the British [colonial 
administrator of the area] arrived, intent on dealing with someone in authority, they 
inquired: ‘who is the chief here?’ At first there was no response. Then Ganaa stepped 
forward. ‘I am,’ he said, and no one moved to dispute it. Ganaa [was] still reigning [as 
the chief of Jirapa] at the time of the missionaries’ arrival in 1929.162 
 
The imposition of chiefs by the colonial administration was significant at three levels. By 
constructing what essentially had been a traditional institution to aid the implementation of 
the indirect rule policy, the British administration used a discursive contingency to alter an 
egalitarian aspect of some ethnic groups, ‘created’ new categories of political leadership and 
degrees of belonging within the ethnic communities, and disrupted existing historical 
continuities within those ethnic groups. In the pre-colonial period, chiefs were the custodians 
of culture, in the sense that they tended to be occupants of sacred 'skins' or 'stools', while in 
areas without the institution of chieftaincy councils of elders were the guardians of the 
community’s tradition and culture. 
A legislative council was first inaugurated in the ‘Gold Coast colony’163 in 1850. As 
part of the policy of indirect rule, the executive council was separated from the legislative 
arm of government from the 1880s onward to aid the internal governance of the colony, 
protectorates and mandated territory. The two councils evolved progressively first in the 
colony and then later in all four territorial entities with membership in the executive council 
being eleven official members and nine ex-officio members between 1916 and 1920. Among 
the ex-officio members were three native chiefs, three educated Africans from Cape Coast, 
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Accra and Sekondi and three Europeans representing commercial interest appointed by the 
governor.
164
 
When the two Crown Orders were passed establishing the Ashanti Protectorate and 
the Northern Protectorate in 1901, the policy of indirect rule was formally adopted as the 
method of administration there as well. Authority was exercised through the medium of the 
local chiefs in the villages and towns under the supervision of European district 
commissioners. However, it was during the governorship of Gordon Guggisberg (1919-27) 
that the administrative structure in all four territorial entities was systematised and the Gold 
Coast (Constitution) Order in Council, 1925, passed.
165
 The 1925 Constitution provided for 
the creation of provincial councils of chiefs in the Gold Coast colony, the Ashanti 
Protectorate and Trans-Volta Togoland. The Northern Protectorate was, however, excluded 
from this constitutional provision. These changes were significant in reinforcing the 
discourses of greater participation of the Africans in government. For example, the number of 
Africans in the twenty-two member Legislative Council went from one appointed member in 
1888 to six appointed members in 1916 to nine elected members in 1925. 
Because the Gold Coast comprised three types of dependent areas, the different 
territories were neither equally represented in the law-making bodies nor were their special 
policy concerns fairly taken on board at every stage. Of course, the configuration of the 
entities was not without administrative and legislative difficulties. Legislations for the 
colonies were passed in Britain and supplementary laws within the colony; legislation for the 
protectorates was enacted by the colony. The League of Nations agreement regarding 
mandate territories stipulated that Trans-Volta Togoland should have elected and appointed 
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members in the legislative arm of the Gold Coast. This provision met the underlying principle 
that “the wellbeing and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation.”166 
The first four ordinances in the Gold Coast spelling out the way the policy of indirect 
rule would operate focused on the role of the chiefs and the local councils. For example, the 
Native Administration Ordinance, 1883, regulated the position of the chiefs in the colonial 
administration and clarified the areas of jurisdiction of the newly-established local councils. 
The Chiefs Ordinance, 1904 and Native Jurisdiction Bill, 1906 basically strengthened 
colonial jurisdiction over the different territories. While the Native Administration 
Ordinance, 1927, further shed light on the supervisory role of the colonial administration over 
local chiefs, the Native Authorities Ordinance, 1935, brought the central government and the 
local authorities into a single governing council with the governor at the helm of affairs. The 
Native Treasuries Ordinance, 1939, focused on the issue of taxation in native governance. 
The Crown colony government had the governor as the chief executive authority for 
the Gold Coast, who was responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies to whom he 
referred all important matters.
167
 The typical structure of indirect rule was pyramidal, with the 
Governor at the top, the Territorial Commissioners under him, the District Commissioners 
under them, and of course the traditional rulers at the local level. The Governor appointed his 
subordinates to positions of responsibility. Executive, legislative and judicial powers of 
government resided in the British officials and in varying degrees in the chiefs who served as 
the managers of the ‘African’ apparatus of government. Judicial matters in the different 
territorial entities were handled by the same people who constituted the executive and 
legislative arms of government. Lugard described the structure of the judicial system under 
indirect rule as comprising of Resident Officers with no legal training as the judges in the 
Provincial Courts. He pointed out that he was unhampered by legal technicality because he 
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brought to bear a strong common sense point of view, setting aside the Attorney General’s 
recommendations.
168
  
The executive, legislative and judicial powers were exercised by some traditional 
rulers and/or the British resident officers without regard for principles of the separation of 
powers.
169
 Lugard’s assessment of the indirect rule as a form of ‘rule of law’ bears no 
resemblance to the way the rule of law actually worked in Britain at the time that he was 
Governor of Nigeria. The binary logic of colonizer/colonized is clearly evident in Lugard’s 
understanding of indirect rule. His claim to ‘long African experience and knowledge of native 
custom’ and his idea of ‘substantial justice’ would have been entirely contrary to the legal 
conventions operating in Britain in the early part of the twentieth century. Also, the judicial 
procedure he presented as the ‘rule of law’ might well have been viewed as somewhat 
tyrannical in Europe at that time. More importantly, African communities had their own long 
tradition of judicial systems before the advent of colonialism. These were either changed to 
suit the colonial administrative structures or gradually abolished. 
The nature of indirect rule required a high level of co-operation between the British 
administration and the local chiefs in spite of the intrinsic injustice of colonialism. The chiefs 
were a mixed group, including some who inherited the position because it formed part of the 
social and cultural organisation of their ethnic groups and others who were appointed by the 
colonial administration.
170
 Among the chiefs who formed part of the colonial administration 
were influential traditional rulers of the Akan and Ga-Adangme ethnic groups, some leaders 
of the Mole-Dagbane chiefdoms and some ‘elected’ chiefs of the colony. For example, the 
1945 Legislative Council comprised of the following chiefs: Nana Tsibu Darku IX 
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(Omanhene of Assin Atandasu and Provincial Member for Central Province), Nene Nuer 
Ologo V (Konor of Yilo Krobo and Provincial Member for the Ga-Adangme Section of the 
Eastern Province), Nana Amanfi III (Omanhene of Asebu and Provincial Member for Central 
Province), Nana Annor Adjaye II (Omanhene of Western Nzima and Provincial Member for 
the Western Province), Nana Kwame Fori (Omanhene of Akwapim and Provincial Member 
for the Akan Section of Eastern Province).
171
  
There were no female chiefs among the traditional rulers co-opted into the colonial 
administration even though some Akan communities had women chiefs. The reasons for the 
absence of women in the colonial administration are not entirely surprising. The process of 
colonisation was dominated by men and the colonial administration in the Gold Coast 
comprised mainly of men, with the spouses of colonial officials constructed, according to 
Whitlock, as wombs of the empire rather than equal partners in the imperial project.
172
 By 
virtue of their race and gender, African women in the Gold Coast were rendered all the more 
subordinate subjects in the colonial regime and in their ethnic communities. The subjugation 
was located in many of the value systems that informed the practices of discrimination, 
exclusion and inequality at all levels of colonial society. 
Thus, colonial policies, cultural practices and later nationalist discourses 
complemented each other in shaping the understanding of women’s specific claims. Gender 
was at the interstices of colonial politics, culture and the nationalism discourse in the Gold 
Coast. For example, women were not absent from Gold Coast nationalism as such but the 
leaders of opinions did not always take specific gender interests and rights into account. 
While gender equality should ordinarily be part of a trajectory of human rights discourse, 
women in colonies, as Holst-Petersen and Rutherford have pointed out, were subject to a 
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‘double colonization,’ colonial domination and patriarchal domination.173 The issue of gender 
will be taken up in greater detail in subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
Although an educated class of Africans gradually emerged in the Gold Coast, they 
were not really brought on board in governance until the late 1940s. As a result, abiding 
tensions developed between the chiefs and the educated classes over control of political 
power on the one hand and between the latter group and the colonial administrators on the 
other. Caseley Hayford points out in his writings that the educated Africans argued for the 
kind of freedoms that the Europeans enjoyed in the Gold Coast and demanded not to be 
subjected to Native Jurisdiction.
174
 As more and more Africans returned to the Gold Coast 
from Britain and the USA armed with university education, there was an increasing 
awareness of the injustice of colonial rule and the need for greater African participation in 
government. Among the nationalist leaders were Joseph Boakye Danquah and Kwame 
Nkrumah about whom there exists extensive literature. I will therefore use as illustrations of 
nationalist figures three people—viz., Kofi Asante Ofori Atta, Archie Casely-Hayford and 
Ebenezer Ako Adjei—about whom very little is written. 
Kofi Asante Ofori Atta was the son of Nana Sir Ofori Atta II (1881-1943), the 
influential chief of Akyem Abuakwa who was the first African member of the Legislative 
Council in 1916 to represent the Gold Coast Africans. According to Rathbone, Nana Ofori 
Atta II charted two paths in his life, “one firmly rooted in a concern for binding the state to 
the traditionally sanctioned method of multiple marriage and the other rooted in his strong 
case for ‘modernisation’ and progress.”175 This son undertook his early education in England 
and then went back to the Gold Coast to head Abuakwa State College in his father’s 
chiefdom. He studied for a law degree at University College, Dublin. After he was called to 
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the English Bar in 1950, he returned to the Gold Coast in 1951, joining the CPP and thus 
throwing  
away, once and for all, the security and position his family connection would 
otherwise have given him but, in the same way as Archie Casely-Hayford, he was 
convinced that national independence could never be won by the conventional and 
constitutional methods which had been attempted and failed in the past. Kofi Asante 
Ofori Atta had no faith in the ability or integrity of the old style chiefs. National 
independence to him could only be secured by removing them from any real sphere of 
political influence.
176
 
 
Archie Casely-Hayford was born into the Casely-Hayford family. His grandfather, 
Joseph Hayford, had been a cabinet member of the Fanti Confederation who was arrested by 
the colonial administration in 1874. His father, Joseph Casely-Hayford, became the founder 
of the National Congress of British West Africa in 1920. Archie was given a typical British 
education—secondary school at Dulwich College after which he studied for degrees in law 
and economics at Clare College, Cambridge University, finishing with an MA from Oxford 
University and being called to the English Bar. He returned to the Gold Coast in 1947, taking 
up the position of a Senior Magistrate, which he later relinquished to join the UGCC, 
eventually regrouping with Nkrumah to found the CPP in 1949. Someone who knew him 
well notes that “[a]bout one thing only he was certain, the colonial system was bad and must 
be destroyed and he would, if necessary, sacrifice prestige, position and fortune to achieve 
it.”177  
Ebenezer Ako Adjei was born in 1916 and studied Political Science and Philosophy at 
Hampton University, graduating with a bachelor’s degree in 1942. A scholarship helped him 
to study at the Graduate School of Journalism, Columbia University, where he obtained an 
MSc in 1943. He also studied for the MSc in Political Science at the London School of 
Economics, and after being called to the English Bar at the Inner Temple in 1946 he served 
briefly as the President of the West African Students’ Union before returning to the Gold 
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Coast in 1947. Although he declined a paid job as UGCC’s Secretary-General he became a 
member, was imprisoned by Governor Gerald Creasy along with five other leaders of the 
party in the aftermath of the 1948 boycotts and joined the CPP in 1954. 
The educated Africans such as the three described above formed a significant group 
of actors in the Gold Coast, becoming gatekeepers of various discourses and sometimes 
contesting colonial policies. In the post-World War II nationalist movements especially, there 
was no rapprochement between them and the chiefs, indeed they wanted to replace the chiefs 
as partners of the colonial administration although it was not always clear that they desired 
this as a first step toward self-rule for the Gold Coast or as partners of the chiefs, as the 
debates regarding the form of government to adopt after independence showed. This issue is 
taken up in chapter 6 of the thesis. 
Although it is generally agreed that the system of government of the Gold Coast was 
indirect rule through local chiefs, there were aspects of direct rule by central government 
through the British colonial administrators stationed in major centres such as Cape Coast, 
Accra, Takoradi and Kumasi. Thus, entities were directly administered by a governor assisted 
by district administrators, staff with political and technical expertise, and executive as well as 
legislative councils. Even though the four territorial units were disparate, they were 
connected by a common administrative thread. As I emphasise in chapter 7 below, the 
administrative structure of the Gold Coast provided a national narrative of shared boundaries 
within which the nationalist movements could disseminate their discourse of independence, 
one nation and one destiny. 
 
3.4. The issue of British ‘protected personhood’ 
British colonial rule in the Gold Coast occurred against the background of a politics of 
difference that affected every facet of administration in the colony, protectorates and 
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mandated territory, not least citizenship laws that distinguished between rights-bearing 
British citizens working for the colonial administration and disenfranchised African subjects. 
Already during the process of colonisation in the 1890s, the status of the Africans vis-à-vis 
citizenship came up with regard to whether or not the areas under British jurisdiction were 
‘protected territories’ or ‘settlements,’ an issue which had to be decided to undertake the first 
census in the Gold Coast. The Colonial Office lawyers, overturning a ruling of Chief Justice 
Sir Joseph Hutchinson, pointed out that the colonial administration had no power to change 
the status of Her Majesty’s possessions.178 For example, the notion of ‘protected personhood’ 
was constructed legally to correspond with the indirect rule practices. This was entrenched in 
the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, reinforced in the British Nationality 
Act, 1948 and applied in the Gold Coast.
179
 The British Nationality Act, 1948 conferred on 
the African people within the Gold Coast Colony, the Ashanti Protectorate, Northern 
Protectorate and Trans-Volta Togoland, British ‘protected persons’ or subjects without 
citizenship, meaning that they could not enjoy the status of citizen and citizenship rights.
180
 
Part 1 (section 1) of the Act stipulates that 
Every person who under this Act is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or 
who under any enactment for the time being in force in any country mentioned in 
subsection (3) of this reason is a citizen of that country shall by virtue of that 
citizenship have the status of a British subject.
181
 
 
The countries listed under Part 1 section (1) subsection (3) were Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Newfoundland, India, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia and 
Ceylon. Under Part III section (32) subsection (1) of the Act, the following categories (that 
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would have applied directly to the Gold Coast) were defined as follows: 
‘British protected person’ means a person who is a member of a class of persons 
declared by Order in Council made in relation to any protectorate, protected state, 
mandated territory or trust territory to be for the purposes of this Act British protected 
persons by virtue of their connection with that protectorate, state or territory.
182
 
 
One of the caveats of this Act was that ‘colony’ was qualified “not [to] include any country 
mentioned in subsection (3) of section one of this Act.”183 In the politics of citizenship, 
therefore, British citizens and African subjects were two distinct groups with the former 
acting as caretakers of the British Empire while the latter lacked the wherewithal to be active 
participants in the exercise of their land, democratic and fundamental rights. By 
distinguishing between British citizens and African subjects in the British Nationality Act, 
1948, the Africans in the Gold Coast were classified as ‘British protected persons’ and 
therefore bereft of citizenship rights.
184
 The notion of ‘protected personhood’ corresponded 
with the existing colonial practice of exclusion.  
I have reviewed the provisions of the British Nationality Act, 1948 in some detail 
because it was passed in the aftermath of World War II when the rhetoric of equality had 
already been creeping into the discourse of the new international order. The gap between 
citizenship rights and the protection of citizenship rights was in the lack of appropriate 
judicial or institutional mechanisms in the Gold Coast. Entitlements to citizenship rights 
presuppose that the people live not only within the ambit of a state but also of a state that 
takes its human rights obligations seriously. This point flags up one aspect of the ambiguity 
of human rights in the ambit of international law.  
When the Ghana Independence Act was passed in 1957, ‘Gold Coast’ was replaced in 
the British Nationality Act, 1948 with ‘Ghana’ in section 1(3), so that Ghana citizens would 
continue to be recognised in UK law as British subjects until the newly-independent state 
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passed its own citizenship laws. Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
explained this legal technicality around citizenship by pointing out with the change “no one 
will be rendered stateless [because of independence], and they [Ghana ‘citizens’] will all be 
British subjects.”185 In the existing laws, those who were neither British citizens nor British 
subjects/protected persons but lived in the colonies were considered aliens. Although they 
owed allegiance to the Monarch and enjoyed some form of entitlement to protection of their 
person and property under the law, they could not enjoy the full array of ‘benefits’ of 
belonging to one of the two groups. 
As Mamdani and Englund have argued, the distinction between rights-bearing citizens 
and subjects was significant, because the latter were instrumental in the success of colonial 
rule but without having the attendant rights.
186
 In the Gold Coast situation, the idea of 
‘protected person’ or subject became a double-edged sword, perforating what little allegiance 
there was among the Africans toward British colonial rule and cutting loose an introspective 
anti-colonial nationalism. These ‘subjects’ found what Bhabha calls unifying myths such as 
racial belonging, colonial domination, a common cause for self-determination, and a lingua 
franca that bridged the language barriers.
187
 Significantly, the Gold Coast (Constitution) 
Council in Order 1946 had failed to respond to many of the demands of the nationalist 
movements, not least the question of citizenship even though the White Paper of the British 
government had stated that “[t]he 1946 Constitution was not a belated recognition of long 
standing demands, but a necessary and accepted step in constitutional advancement.”188 
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3.5. Nationalism as a discourse against colonial rule 
 The discourse of nationalism is discussed in greater detail in chapter 7 of the thesis, 
but it should already be stressed how colonial rule in the Gold Coast provoked anti-colonial 
nationalism and the struggle especially for the collective right to self-determination. The 
politics around citizenship, for example, alienated especially the educated Africans who 
wanted to work in the civil service. Behind the nationalist movements were Western educated 
Africans and local chiefs. The robust awakening of nationalist consciousness over time must 
be viewed against the background of the unfair colonial policies, specific domestic resistance 
to colonial rule in the Gold Coast and incremental changes in the international world order. 
This had been long in the making.  
The contours of anti-colonial resistance were shaped more by consciousness regarding 
statutory, land and constitutional rights rather than ‘human rights’ as such. One example of 
the earliest resistance was in the Ashanti-British war of 1865 and again in 1873-74, which led 
to calls for British withdrawal from the area. African nationalism grew out of the desire of the 
Africans in the Gold Coast to be treated fairly and as rights-bearing citizens in their own 
lands. For example, once the colonial administration established itself, the Crown Lands Bill 
(1896) and Lands Bill (1897) were passed, transferring land possession from the African 
people to the British Crown under a concession arrangement. A group of local chiefs and 
educated Africans in the colony formed the Aborigines’ Rights Protection Society (ARPS) in 
1897 to oppose the colonial legislation on land that threatened the traditional land tenure 
system.
189
 They also sent a deputation to London, leading to the withdrawal of the bills and 
the introduction of a Concessions Ordinance (1900) instead. The new bill stipulated that the 
indigenous people would retain their land and could make concessions in the customary 
courts as well as in the nascent colonial lands department if they had any grievances. 
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Like earlier anti-colonial movements, the ARPS founders tended to be the aristocratic 
coastal intelligentsia and traditional rulers. The ARPS is credited with founding the first 
indigenous, independent newspaper in the Gold Coast, The Gold Coast Aborigines, on 
January 1, 1898 with the motto “for the safety of the public and the welfare of the race.”190 
The first editorial stressed the fact that the newspaper would fulfil a desire to have a 
mouthpiece “[f]or… the members of the Gold Coast Aborigines Rights Protection Society, to 
have an organ of their own and the appearance of this paper before the public today is 
nothing else, but that wish, after all taking a practical shape.”191 In an article entitled ‘Female 
Education and its Bearing Upon the Improvement of the Race,’ Samuel Henry Brew Jr., an 
African from the coastal region, pointed out that “long years of unfair and unequal treatment 
at the hands of man has to some extent lowered the mental stamina of women, but this does 
not in the least affect the general question of the intellectual equality of the sexes.”192 The 
article raised the issue of education for the Africans as well as anticipated gender equality as 
an important issue, something that would be tangential to the nationalism discourse even in 
the post-World War II years. The politics of difference inherent to colonial rule produced an 
administrative structure in which chieftaincy became a tool in the hands of the British 
administration for controlling the diverse ethnic groups and polarising assertions for self-
determination. 
Nationalism took on a broader dimension when the National Congress of British West 
Africa (the Congress) was founded in March 1920 by Joseph Casely-Hayford, one of the 
Gold Coast African members of the Legislative Council. The Congress brought together 
representatives from the Gold Coast, Nigeria, the Gambia and Sierra Leone colonies to 
campaign for franchise and greater African representation in government. According to its 
constitution, its main objective was, 
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to maintain strictly and inviolate the connection of the British West African 
dependencies with the British Empire and to maintain unreservedly all and every right 
of free citizenship of the Empire and the fundamental principle that taxation goes with 
effective representation.
193
 
 
The Congress authorised a delegation of West African students in London to deliver a 
petition to Lord Alfred Milner, the Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1919 to 1921, on 
the principle of elected representation.
194
 Although Milner did not think the West African 
colonies were ready for franchise, Guggisberg, while he was governor, wrote that the “time 
had come for giving Africans greater and better representation”195 in government. Guggisberg 
went on to introduce the Municipal Corporations Bill (1924) which provided for limited 
franchise to adults who owned and/or occupied a house of £5.00 value.
196
 The bill was 
opposed in the urban areas, because of the fear that it would exclude a majority of the 
Africans in the electoral process who did not meet the set conditions, and so the Town 
Council Ordinance (1927) replaced it, providing for the inclusion of four elected Africans in 
the legislative organ of government apart from the five all-British official and five unofficial 
members appointed by the Governor.  
The Congress did not possess an overarching ‘national ideology’ whereby the four 
very diverse colonies were coming together to demand ‘effective representation’ in 
government. Changes in government such as those initiated by Guggisberg came at the level 
of an individual colony. The Governors exercised separate jurisdictions over the different 
colonies and policy decisions varied significantly. The lifespan of the Congress was transient, 
but one can surmise that the seeds for future regional co-operation may have been sown 
through its activities. 
One corollary to anti-colonial nationalist activities was the use of emergency 
measures by the administration. The British government had used such measures in its older 
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colonies and the Gold Coast was not going to be different. For example, the Emergency 
Powers Act 1920, Emergency Powers Act (Northern Ireland) 1926, Emergency Powers 
(Defence) Act 1939, and Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1940 were used in Ireland and in 
some of the Asian colonies in the run-up to independence.
197
 These measures were not fully 
applied in the first phase of colonial rule in the Gold Coast when nationalism was not 
particularly forceful. However, between 1948 and 1951, the colonial administration used 
emergency powers’ legislations and tight sedition laws to deal with many of the major 
nationalist activities. The most significant use of these powers was in the Emergency Powers 
Order, Regulation 29 of the Emergency (General) Amendment No. 2 which provided the 
legal basis for detaining without trial the ‘Big Six’ in 1948. One Gold Coast government 
report has drawn a comparison between ‘Positive Action’ in the Gold Coast with ‘the General 
Strike of 1926’ in Britain and the way emergency powers ought to be employed to deal with 
the two events.
198
 The comparison is significant in bridging the gap between treatment of 
citizens and subjects by the British government. 
According to the minutes of the Session 1 of the 1950 Legislative Council Debates, 
two ordinances on Emergency Powers were passed, the first was to provide for the imposition 
of curfews in the interest of public safety and the maintenance of public order and the second 
was an amendment to the Newspaper Registration Ordinance.
199
 An example of the use of 
emergency measures is the debate on the Suipe shooting incident. A detachment of the Gold 
Coast Mobile Force, about 130 armed men, was sent by the colonial administration to Suipe 
on November 5, 1950. A number of people were killed, others wounded and many arrested. 
A one-man enquiry constituted by Ffouldkes Crabbe investigated the matter, and it came up 
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for debate because there was some concern that neither due process nor the democratic rights 
of the victims were respected, to which Governor Arden-Clarke responded that  
[t]he Leader of Government Business and other Ministers have represented to me that 
these men, however misguided, performed these acts in pursuance of ‘Positive 
Action’ campaign, the leaders of which have been released… I decided to remit the 
remainder of the sentences imposed on these men.
200
 
 
While it was an internally accepted standard, the realisation of the right to a fair trial raises 
questions about the scope and context of human rights. 
 One of the problems with emergency powers is that it erodes human rights. 
Emergency regulations not only affected existing laws that allowed government to detain, for 
example, anti-colonial nationalists for lengthy periods without trial. The nature of colonial 
laws meant that the ‘British protected persons’ already had very limited rights and liberties. 
But with emergency measures, the sweeping powers granted the government contributed to 
even greater disregard for the few due process provisions in the colonial laws.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated how the Gold Coast was created discursively through 
processes of law, policies and pragmatism, and ways in which colonisation inspired particular 
assertions from the ‘British protected person’ for their statutory, constitutional and group 
rights. Anti-colonial nationalism provided a counter discursive practice to colonial policies. 
The underlying domestic struggles brought up a number of issues, not least the place of 
chieftaincy in society, the possibilities for discourse that Western education offers, the use of 
emergency powers by the colonial administration and the subject of gender inequality. The 
politics of difference inherent to colonial rule produced an administrative structure in which 
chieftaincy became a tool in the hands of the British administration for controlling the diverse 
ethnic groups and polarising assertions for self-determination. The absence of women was 
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not limited to the colonial project but extended to anti-colonial nationalist movements as 
well. These issues flag up, among other things, questions about who ‘the human being’ of 
rights is in the post-World War II emerging human rights regime in a colonial territory and 
also the binaries of coloniser/colonised, chiefs/ordinary people, men/women and 
intelligentsia/ordinary people. One of the things that the analysis above highlights is the 
heuristic nature of discourses of justice in situations of subjugation. 
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Chapter 4 
The ‘human being’ of human rights in the politics of difference 
 
“Human dignity is like a baobab tree in the village; no single clan can claim it as their own.”  
A Dagara proverb 
 
I am a Jew. Hath 
not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, 
dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Fed with 
the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject 
to the same diseases, healed by the same means, 
warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as 
a Christian is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? 
If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison 
us, do we not die?
201
 
   William Shakespeare in Merchant of Venice, Act 3 Scene 3 
 
4.1. Introduction 
At the heart of the politics of colonial rule in the Gold Coast was the way the 
colonisers understood the ‘humanity’ of the colonised—and the colonised their own 
‘humanity.’ Among the diverse African communities themselves, the understanding of their 
shared ‘humanity’ did not necessarily preclude discrimination on grounds of ethnicity or 
gender. The understandings came out of a mishmash of ideas in history, philosophy and 
culture that contributed to the construction of race or gender identities. Colonisation 
reinforced, as it were, the identities of both the colonisers and the colonised in relationships 
that oscillated between dominance, resistance and negotiation. In the Gold Coast, rights-
bearing British citizens determined what colonial practices should be adopted and policies 
implemented in the administration of the colony, protectorates and mandated territory.
202
 
Their African ‘subjects’ found ways of asserting, for example, their right to self-
determination because their self-understanding did not tally with the identity projected on 
them by the colonial administration. 
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The main discourses that form the basis for the analysis in this chapter reflect the 
agenda of the nationalist movements, the policies and practices of the colonial administration, 
the concerns of the traditional rulers, the UN Charter and UDHR and the preoccupations of 
the marginalised constituencies such as the groups in the Northern Territories or the 
Mandated Territory of Trans-Volta Togoland, and also the women. The narratives from these 
diverse groups about who ‘the human being’ is, or ought to be, were often a subject of 
contention in Gold Coast politics. In the legislative debates, rhetoric of the nationalist 
movements, policies of the colonial administration and the print media, questions about the 
meaning of the ‘human’ in human rights were debated more indirectly than directly. In those 
situations where they formed an integral part of the discourse, the conditions of social 
production were sometimes elitist and those who shaped the debates appeared as self-
interested agents in some of the struggles. Thus, for example, both the colonial administration 
and the nationalist movements deployed the UN language of universal human rights in 
negotiating whether or not to incorporate a bill of rights into the 1957 Independence 
Constitution.
203
 
 
4.2. Rights-bearing citizens in the politics of difference in the Gold Coast 
As I have argued in chapter 3 above, practices such as the redrawing of boundaries, 
renaming of territories and redefining of existing communities in symbolic acts of domination 
characterised the beginnings of colonial rule in the Gold Coast. This process of re-labelling 
whole communities to fit colonial archetypes also puts in context the nature and scope of 
colonial administration, the type of educational policies that were made for the Africans, and 
the colonial administration’s attitudes towards Africans who were asserting their ‘humanity’ 
as rights-bearing citizens in the country. The paradox of colonial rule, as Mamdani has 
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pointed out, is that while it had a legal framework, it eclipsed the rights claims of the people 
who were being colonised.
204
  
Indeed, colonial rule gave expression to the belief in the superiority of one group of 
human beings over others, and therefore their subjugation by the ‘superior other’ as part of a 
broader civilizing enterprise. Marks and Clapham’s idea that the logics of racism, practices of 
racism and context of racism
205
 are significant for appreciating how race, or even gender, is 
sometimes a barrier to equality and is important for understanding why the ‘human’ in human 
rights is a riddle in the variety of discourses in Gold Coast even after the emergence of the 
UN human rights regime. Even though their idea does not answer the question why human 
beings often fall into the trap of defining themselves in opposition to the racialised other, 
gendered other, national other or ethnic other, it puts in context ways racial difference was 
historically a barrier to equality in the Gold Coast during colonial rule. According to Marks 
and Clapham, biologically-determined differences were at first the basis for a human 
hierarchy that unfairly disadvantaged others. Then a shift to a cultural idea of race led to 
cultural determinism,
206
 or what Žižek termed a ‘reflexive racism,’207 where a group projects 
racism on others while claiming for itself multiculturalism and cultural pluralism. They point 
out how the shifts in the logics of racism, i.e., from the biological to the culturalist premise of 
race dynamics, absorb each other’s critiques while at the same time revealing nuanced forms 
of dynamic tension. An important characteristic of the change was the way ‘race’ was cast in 
a legally-sanctioned framework of colonial rule in the Gold Coast and then was redefined for 
the Africans in nationalism as part of an anti-racial initiative or ideology. The ever-expanding 
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judicial powers of Britain over the territories that came to be called the Gold Coast Colony, 
Ashanti Protectorate, Northern Protectorate and the Mandated Territory of Trans-Volta 
Togoland actualised a specific legal framework. 
The third change that Marks and Clapham note is the context of racism in which racist 
and anti-racist discourses are encoded in domestic policies, written into legislation, and in 
some cases slipped into constitutions through an equality clause of one form or another. For 
example, some of the nationality acts conferred citizenship on white settler populations in 
British dominions while excluding the African ‘subjects.’ Administrative changes in the Gold 
Coast brought about and reinforced shifts in a complex process that actually concealed ethnic 
or gender discrimination both during colonial rule and in the decolonisation process. The 
‘bigger’ struggle for self-determination in turn eclipsed the problem of gender, ethnic or 
sectional discrimination. 
Nineteenth century colonisation of the Gold Coast paid very little attention to 
questions of inherent and equal dignity of human beings. The complex politics around the 
issue of race at the time justified to some extent the colonisation process itself. Thinkers such 
as Hume, Kant or even Mill made claims about racial differences that seemed to rationalise 
defining the racialised other as inferior. For example, Hume maintained that “the negroes and 
in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be 
naturally inferior to the whites.”208 Kant took this idea further by arguing that 
In the hot countries the human being matures in all aspects earlier, but does not, 
however, reach the perfection of those in the temperate zones. Humanity is at its 
perfection in the race of the whites. The yellow Indians do have a meagre talent. The 
Negroes are far below them at the lowest point as are a part of the American 
peoples.
209
 
 
Mill’s assertion that “[e]xperience proves that it is possible for one nationality to merge and 
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be absorbed in another: and when it is originally an inferior and more backward portion of the 
human race the absorption is greatly to its advantage”210 seems to justify colonialism as a 
civilising mission. Johann Friedrich Blumenbach reinforced the ‘othering’ of non-white 
people by asserting that “the white color holds the first place.”211  
It was an extreme form of racial profiling that led to the World War II atrocities. 
Hitler had said that “the value of man [or woman] is determined in the first place by his [or 
her] inner racial virtues.”212 In Mein Kampf, for example, he argued that the Aryans were “the 
highest race... the master people.”213 He went on to express his intention to suppress “the 
Marxist idea that men [and women] are equal [and he announced that] he was willing to draw 
the ultimate consequence of recognising the importance of blood.”214 While the context of 
Hitler’s views is different from those of Hume, Kant and Mill they all ‘constructed’ a basis 
for a human hierarchy with varying implications for different groups of people. The idea of 
universal rights, as I have noted in chapter 1 above, was a reaction to Nazi atrocities but its 
influence extended to other forms of injustice. The idea that dignity is the essential 
characteristic of the human being, and therefore the underlying principle for universal human 
rights, serves a practical purpose of untangling inequality and unravelling discrimination. 
The discourse on race identities assigned meanings to the racialised other against a 
binary of white/black, civilized/primitive, colonizer/colonized. In particular, the African 
continent was presented as a “[m]useum of Barbarism whose populations had stayed outside 
the laws of human growth and change through some natural failing or inferiority.”215 As 
Lugard pointed out, 
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As Roman imperialism laid the foundation of modern civilisation and led the wild 
barbarians of these islands [Britain] along the path of progress, so in Africa today we 
are repaying the debt, and bringing to the dark places of the earth—the abode of 
barbarism and cruelty—the torch of culture and progress... we hold these countries 
because it is the genius of our race to colonise, to trade and to govern.
216
 
 
The specious understanding of the racialised other, gendered other or ethnicised other in the 
Gold Coast distorted the understanding of the ‘human being’ qua human being. British 
colonisation of the Gold Coast could also be said to have occurred against the background of 
what Marks and Clapham termed “the logics of racism.”217 Citizenship laws, as I pointed out 
in chapter 3 above, was characterised by this logic. 
 
4.3. The ‘racialised other’ in the politics of education and anti-colonial resistance 
Defining the racialised other differently had implications on the philosophy of 
education and educational policies for the African subjects in the Gold Coast. The evolution 
of educational institutions went hand in hand with developments in the colonial 
administrative edifice. The objective of educating the African subjects under the broad policy 
of ‘native education’ vacillated between the integration of subjects into the colonial system in 
a way that they could retain their cultures and simply educating them for citizenship in the 
British Empire. This was done through the policy of native education. What did ‘native 
education’ really mean? Writing in The Journal of the Royal African Society in 1921 about 
‘native education,’ Africanus noted that he “failed to find a real policy clearly defined by 
anyone; and in the outlines which have been suggested in a sketchy manner the tendency 
appears to me to be to insist on advanced twentieth century methods, which are not so suited 
to Africans.”218 For example, the lack of a clearly defined concept of ‘native education’ 
opened it up to adaptations in the different colonies, which in some places meant ‘advanced 
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twentieth century method’ and in others the barest minimum. An editorial of 30 November 
1929 issue of Nature situated ‘native education’ within the broad understanding of the 
Africans during colonial rule thus: “native peoples can profit only by primary education, ... 
they reach a phase of mental stupidity or ‘saturation’ by the time they are adolescent.”219 
However, some of the early colonial administrators believed that ‘native education’ would 
aid colonial rule in more ways than one. 
‘Native education’ was the philosophy of education that shaped both the content and 
context of education for the Africans in British colonies. The aim of ‘native education’ was to 
help create complementary political and economic units for the Africans and guide them to 
the clerical jobs in the civil services. It created a racially segregated system of education for 
children in the Gold Coast. There was one school system for the children of the British 
colonial administrators and another for the ‘other’ children. African families such as the 
Casely-Hayfords or the Doves or the Ofori-Attas who could afford it sent their children to 
schools in Britain or in Sierra Leone. At the practical level in the Gold Coast, ‘native 
education’ was divided into religious and moral which was left to the Christian missionaries; 
clerical, and industrial and agricultural which were preserved for the colonial 
administration
220
 either through the public schools or the government-assisted mission 
schools. 
Native educational policies began with the first Education Ordinance in the Gold 
Coast in 1852. This gave legal sanction to the provision of education for the inhabitants of 
Her Majesty’s forts and settlements along the coast.221 A second ordinance, passed in 1882, 
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introduced the categories of ‘government’ and ‘government-assisted mission’ schools in the 
British settlements.
222
 These ordinances did not immediately affect educational policies in 
Ashanti and the Northern Territories even after both territories were annexed in 1901.  
After the hiatus in legislations on education in the period between 1882 and 1919, the 
idea of ‘native education’ took a definite shape in the Gold Coast from the 1920s onwards. 
Governor Guggisberg set up the Prince of Wales School and College (later renamed 
Achimota College) in 1924 for both boys and girls. In a speech at the formal opening of the 
school, the Prince of Wales (Edward VIII) pointed out that “[t]he Achimota College will be 
run largely on our [English] Public School lines and its whole system of education will have 
for its primary aim the development of character.”223 There is a contradiction here. On the 
one hand, ‘native education’ presupposed that Africans ‘can profit only by primary 
education’ because, as the editorial of Nature stated, “they reach a phase of mental stupidity 
or saturation by the time they are adolescent.”224 Yet a college was being set up to educate 
Africans beyond the basic level. A quote from the school’s prospectus at its inception 
described it as  
West Africa’s great co-educational boarding school, where 600 West African boys 
and girls receive as complete an education as European and American children. It is a 
secondary school, teacher’s training college and university rolled into one, and in 
planning, design and equipment it bears comparison with any education institution 
anywhere.
225
 
 
On the other hand, if this was the case, then why did the children of those who worked in the 
colonial administration not receive their education from there? The school took as its motto, 
Ut Omnes Unum Sint (That All May be One) and as its emblem the black and white keys of a 
piano, to emphasise the idea of harmony of different groups of people. The idea of educating 
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girls as well as boys in the college was radical in the 1920s context. This is an example of 
individual governors having different attitudes to their African subjects in the same colony. 
Guggisberg’s vision of accelerated development in the Gold Coast encompassed an 
innovative policy on education for the Africans. The objective of the Prince of Wales College 
included inter alia 
to produce the type of student who is Western in his intellectual attitude toward life, 
with a respect for science and capacity for systematic thought, but remains African in 
sympathy and desirous of preserving and developing what is deserving of respect in 
tribal life, custom, rule and law.
226
 
 
The philosophy of education that had inspired the establishment of this college transcended 
narrow colonial interests, even if its admissions policy did not fully break away from aspects 
of the binary characteristic of colonial rule in the Gold Coast. The school accepted African 
children from the colony and the Ashanti Protectorate, with a token coming from the 
Northern Protectorate and Trans-Volta Togoland. As Bing remarks in his analysis of the 
unequal opportunities for education in the Gold Coast, 
The segregation of the North [Northern Territories] from the rest of the country, 
socially and educationally, was carried to the extent that it was considered a 
remarkable concession when the Government allowed three boys a year to be sent 
from the North to be schooled at Achimota [College] and trained as teachers. At the 
time of the Watson Commission [1949], throughout the North there were only 3,950 
pupils enrolled in primary schools and only 80 receiving secondary education.
 227
  
  
Another example of ‘native education’ taking a definite shape in the 1920s was the 
setting up of an Education Committee by the Colonial Office. This Committee produced the 
1925 Education Policy in British Tropical Africa report. The report pointed out, among other 
things, that the education of Africans should be adapted to their “mentality, aptitude, 
occupation and traditions”228 and that 
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Education should strengthen the feeling of responsibility to the tribal community… 
since contact with civilisation—and even education itself—must necessarily tend to 
weaken tribal authority and the sanction of existing beliefs… teaching must be related 
to the conditions of life and daily experience of the pupils. It should find expression in 
habits of self-discipline and loyalty to the community. With such safeguards contact 
with civilisation may not be injurious, or the introduction of new religious ideas have 
a disruptive influence antagonistic to constituted secular authority.
229
 
 
The vision of education proposed in the report was two-fold, to reinforce the traditional 
system through which British colonial rule was conducted and to produce people who will 
not be ‘antagonistic to constituted secular authority,’ what Paulo Freire in his philosophy of 
education would term a banking concept of education.
230
 ‘Native’ educational policies were 
not free from the philosophy of colonial rule as a ‘civilising’ enterprise. By pushing such a 
vision on the colonies, the report was not introducing a new idea as such—the existing 
education system in the colonies already fulfilled this vision. 
Demands for the establishment of educational institutions formed an integral part of 
the nationalist agenda from as far back as the 1920s. For example, the Congress of British 
West Africa appealed to the British government “to found a British West African University 
on such lines as would preserve in the student a sense of African nationality.”231 Even though 
this was said by the colonial administration in the Gold Coast to be “premature… and too 
expensive,”232 the idea of setting up a university in Tropical Africa was later endorsed by the 
Lord Lugard Committee on Education in 1933.
233
 The Gold Coast Government’s response to 
that proposal three years later stated that the existing educational institutions were adequate 
for their purposes and that a university would only result in “an over production of 
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graduates.”234 
The Gold Coast Education Committee noted that Western education had captured the 
imagination of the Africans in spite of severe reduction in the amount of supervision from 
colonial officials during the World War II years.
235
 The demand for schools was so high that 
hundreds of non-assistant primary schools were opened, with nominal supervision from the 
Education Department. The Committee’s report went on to emphasise that “the majority of 
[the schools] were ill-housed and almost without exception staffed with untrained 
teachers.”236 Three deductions could be made from the above, viz., interest in education was 
high among the Africans; African initiative overtook the colonial administration in the setting 
up of educational institutions; and the absence of supervision and checks on the curriculum or 
even the qualifications of the teachers impacted on the quality of schools especially in the 
rural areas. 
Indeed, there was an acknowledgment that the concept of ‘native education’ had 
failed to produce a mass of literate Africans. Thus, the Colonial Office needed to set up an 
Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies to review the situation. In the 1943 
Hansard of the House of Commons, Oliver Lyttleton, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
is quoted as saying that  
In many Colonies we see first a mass of illiteracy among adults and secondly an all 
too small percentage of present day school population giving therefore little hope on 
present lines of reducing that mass of adult illiteracy. I believe if we are to get full 
advantage from the various reforms which we propose in the Colonial Empire that 
position has to be altered radically and it has to be altered urgently.
237
   
 
Apart from noting the deficiency of the ‘native education’ policy, the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies is also pointing out the urgency of education in the colonies. The ‘Mass 
Education’ report drew attention to four areas for improving ‘native education:’ extension of 
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schooling for children with the objective of reaching as many as possible; spread of literacy 
for adults through development of literature and libraries; mass education of communities, 
including local community involvement; and effective co-ordination of welfare plans and 
comprehensive mass education plans.
238
 This report was followed by ‘Education for 
Citizenship in Africa’ in 1948, which had as its purpose to “study the technique needed to 
prepare people for responsibility, tolerance and objectivity in discussion and practice, and an 
appreciation of political institutions, their evolution and progress.”239 The changes during this 
period resulted in a rethink about higher education for the Africans in the Gold Coast. Arthur 
Creech Jones, for example, reflected a great deal on the question of education for the 
Africans when he served as the Secretary of State for the Colonial Office and the issue is 
taken up in other official documents.
240
 The Elliot Commission proposed that “there should 
now be set up a university college in Nigeria and a university college in the Gold Coast... the 
university college in the Gold Coast to include facilities of arts and science and an institute of 
education.”241 
The demand for education for the Africans came up very strongly in the work of the 
Watson Commission in the Gold Coast. The Commission noted that “[n]othing impressed us 
more than the interest of the people of the Gold Coast in education. Practically every African 
who sent in a memorandum or who appeared in person before us sooner or later started to 
discuss education.”242 Even though the interest in education for the Africans seemed so 
palpable in the 1940s, the colonial regime’s efforts in developing educational policies to 
respond to the demands appear minimal, at least from a human rights texts’ point of view. 
The issue of education was closely linked to greater involvement of Africans in the colonial 
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civil service, which in itself was a positive development. As Governor Alan Burns pointed 
out,  
it gives those ... educated persons, apart from the traditional rulers, an opportunity for 
more direct participation in the administration of their country and it provides useful 
outlets for the constructive energies of responsible men who might otherwise take up 
an attitude of irresponsible opposition to the traditions of native administration.
243
 
 
This is an important point because a precondition for employment in the civil service or 
involvement in domestic politics was literacy. Tachie-Menson, the Municipal Member for 
Sekondi, reflected the mood of the educated Africans in post-World War II Gold Coast when 
he pointed out the need “to review the position [of the colonial administration] as regards the 
Africanisation of the civil service... It is time that the training of sufficient Africans to fill 
vacancies should be seriously considered.”244 
Through the negotiations between the Colonial Office, the nationalist movements and 
other interest groups, educational policies in the Gold Coast continued to improve. For 
example, Governor Creasy announced at the 1948 Legislative Council session that 31 
Africans were on scholarship in United Kingdom institutions.
245
 The Asquith Commission for 
Colonial Universities (1943-44) and the Elliot Commission for West Africa (1943-45) were 
also set up to review the educational needs of the Africans in the colonies.
246
 However, not 
only did these Commissions fail to read meaningfully the signs of the time, especially 
regarding the changes occurring all over the world as a result of post-World War II 
international politics and the growing influence of the domestic intelligentsia in the Gold 
Coast but they also overlooked genuine demands raised by the local populations to the 
Watson Commission. Both the Asquith Commission and Elliot Commission Reports pointed 
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out that independence from colonial rule seemed at least twenty to thirty years ahead, which 
would have translated to self-rule in the Gold Coast either in 1965 or in 1975. Perhaps that 
explains why the Asquith Commission advocated the idea of a university as a place where the 
colonies would train their future rulers: 
In the state preparatory to self-government universities have an important role to play; 
indeed they may be said to be indispensable. To them we must look for the production 
of men and women with the standards of public service and capacity for leadership 
which self rule requires.
247
  
 
As it turned out, Ghana became independent twelve years after the two commissions fulfilled 
their mandates and handed in their findings to the Colonial Office. The idea that self-rule for 
the Gold Coast, for example, was a far-flung goal that turned out to be erroneous. Thus, the 
politics of nationalism was dominated by people such as Casely-Hayford, Danquah and 
Nkrumah who were educated in British and American universities. The Asquith Commission 
proposed the establishment of the University College Gold Coast, positioning university 
education within 
the double purpose of refining and maintaining all that is best in local traditions and 
cultures and at the same time of providing means whereby those brought up under the 
influence of these conditions and cultures may enter on a footing of equality into the 
world-wide community of intellect.
248
 
 
By an ordinance of August 1948, the University College of the Gold Coast was established in 
the outskirts of Accra ‘for the purpose of providing university education and promoting 
learning and research.’ The Secretary of State for the Colonies appointed Prof. David 
Mowbray Balme, a Cambridge Classical scholar, as first principal. While Balme did not fit 
the colonial administration civil servant mould, his views were in some ways representative 
of commonly held views about Africa at the time. Asked by one of his African students about 
non-European civilisations in a lecture, he pointed out that 
The whole issue has been bedevilled by our careless use of the phrase ‘European 
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civilisation.’ It may be justifiable that the things which are studied at universities… 
are themselves the instruments of civilisation. If so, then it follows that there is only 
one modern civilisation. It happens to have started in Greece… and spread first 
through Europe. But it is high time we stopped calling it European as though there 
were some other from which to distinguish it.
249
 
 
On another occasion, he argued that “I don’t think we need weep when national traditions 
go… it’s only a matter of pride in superficial things.”250 The paradox of Balme’s statements 
is that, as ‘a matter of pride in superficial things’ he introduced many of the medieval 
practices of Cambridge University such as the wearing of academic gown, a College 
Manciple, recitation of grace in Latin and the circulation of the port in the proper direction at 
High Table in the new university college in the Gold Coast.
251
  
As Gold Coast became internally self-governing in 1951, an Accelerated 
Development Plan for Education (ADPE) was drawn up while Kojo Botsio was Minister of 
Education. The ADPE stated as its aim “to provide as soon as possible a six-year primary 
course for all children at public expense”252 and recommended, among other things, the 
introduction of universal free education and an increase in the number of teacher training 
colleges and technical schools. 
The above analyses are related to the central argument that the politics of difference 
shaped colonial rule in the Gold Coast and in the attempts of the colonial administration to 
suppress Africans’ from asserting their ‘humanity’ and claims to being rights-bearing citizens 
in their own land. This is an issue that will be discussed in some detail in chapter 5. Such 
assertions were sometimes met with force or the use of emergency powers or even 
incarceration of the ‘ringleaders.’ Their quest for rule of law in the country could be 
described as something fundamental to their humanity. Examples of suppression include the 
use of fire arms on a group of demonstrators on February 28, 1948 (in the process killing 
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Sergeant Adjetey, Private Lamptey and Corporal Attipoe) and the use of Emergency Powers 
Order, Regulation 29 of the Emergency (General) Amendment to arrest and detain the leaders 
of the UGCC following the 1948 Accra riots. The Africans asserted their humanity in at least 
three ways. First, they employed ideas of nationalism from the onset of colonial rule by 
resisting the colonial infringement agenda. Second, the collective desire for greater 
representation in government and for exercise of the right to self-determination became the 
wellsprings of nationalism in the Gold Coast. Third, extreme forms of resistance such as 
strikes, boycotts and demonstrations were gradually integrated into the activities of the 
nationalist movements after attempts at suppression had failed.
253
 
What the nationalist activities really expressed was an assertion of ‘humanity’ which 
the philosophy of colonialism had systematically denigrated. For example, the editorial of the 
Gold Coast Independent of January 13, 1945 discusses the reluctance of the colonial 
administration to “provide responsible posts for Africans, and there is almost a complete 
refusal to give Africans the same facilities as Europeans holding identical qualifications and 
possessing equal merits.”254 In the years leading up to independence, Nkrumah expressed the 
rationale for the politics of resistance thus:  
Whatever camouflage colonial governments may decide upon, be it in the form of 
appeasements cloaked in 'constitutional reforms' or the 'Pan-Africanism' of Jan Smut, 
there is only one road, the road of the national liberation movement, to colonial 
independence. It cannot come through delegations, gifts, charity, paternalism, grants, 
concessions, proclamations, charters or reformism, but only through the complete 
change of the colonial system, a united effort to unscramble the whole colonial egg of 
the last hundred years, a complete break of the colonial dependencies from their 
'mother countries' and the establishment of their complete independence.
 255
 
 
At least three conclusions about rights claims in the politics of difference could be 
drawn from the above analysis. First, through formal education a shared language was 
acquired and new networks created. One of the skills formal education offered to the African 
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people was the foundation of basic skills, the so-called three Rs of reading, writing and 
arithmetic. The English language in particular played an important role in reconfiguring 
identities and shifting the positions of the opinion leaders in the discourses in the Gold Coast. 
Meanings about the ‘human’ in universal rights could be articulated both directly and 
indirectly through the legislative debates, rhetoric of the nationalist movements, policies of 
the colonial administration and the domestic media mainly through the medium of English 
Language. Education became a weapon in the hands of the intelligentsia in particular to 
contest the race constructions that had characterised colonial practices, thus re-creating an 
enabling environment in which they could assert a shared ‘humanity.’ Second, education was 
one of the important ways of legitimising the Africans’ demands to be recognised as rights-
bearing citizens. English could no longer be an instrument of domination only for the colonial 
administration as an intelligentsia class emerged from a crop of educated Africans. But this 
also introduced a new politics of exclusion with consequences for some of the marginal 
constituencies.  
Third, the use of English as the lingua franca in the country created a language of 
power negotiations from which those with limited or no literacy skills were, for the most part, 
excluded. With an education system that was unfavourable to women, English language 
reinforced patriarchy and gender inequality. Men, for example, remained traditionally the key 
agents of gender construction in mainstream politics. The exclusion of the majority of 
Africans added another dimension to the politics of difference around race, gender and 
ethnicity. These categories also served as new grounds for inequality and discrimination in 
Ghana even after independence. 
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4.4. Marginalised constituencies in the politics of rights 
The rights of women in the Gold Coast were at the complex intersection of cultural 
and colonial domination. Although nationalist movements employed the language of rights 
for an agenda of realising democratic rights and the right to self-determination, there was no 
specific regard for the rights of women in a context where gender imbalances formed part of 
society. In one of the Legislative Council debates, Danquah argued that:  
I would like to say, Sir, that I believe the time has come when some of the funds of 
the country should be used to establish a ladies college or a girls’ secondary school 
apart from Achimota [College]. I do not think that any serious reflection can be 
published against the female products of Achimota [College], but I believe it has been 
the general rule for the women of Achimota [College] to strive to be like men. Now 
that, Sir, is not very healthy and a very welcome development in a country like this. 
We would like to see a happy educated female section of the population being 
produced, but the product must be a true female type, a true lady type, not women 
who are trying to be like men but women who are really women.
256
 
 
As Saïd has remarked a discourse is not free of the conditions of its social production and the 
context in which it is transmitted.
257
 Danquah’s point of view illustrates masculine 
perceptions of self-empowerment and gender equality. But the disclaimer in an otherwise 
good intervention in favour of girl-child education reflects the dominant discourse on gender 
and equality at the time. As a British colony, the Gold Coast women could only enjoy the 
crumbs that fell from the table of the gender struggles in Britain. The suffragettes’ struggle 
for the right of British women to vote in general elections in the United Kingdom was only 
conceded in 1918;
258
 in the Gold Coast it would be granted in 1950 and the first woman 
(Mabel Dove) would be elected to the Legislative Assembly four years later. 
Of course, there were varying levels of awareness about human rights principles in the 
nationalist movements because of different levels of education and degrees of exposure. 
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Busia, for example, could wax lyrical about the UN human rights discourse because of his 
education at Oxford University while Edusei, another Gold Coast legislator and one of the 
verandah boys in the nationalist movement, hardly engaged meaningfully in the human rights 
debates in parliament. Writing in the 1970s following his overthrow from power, Busia 
recalled his exposure to the concept of human rights while he was a student at Oxford 
University in the 1940s: 
I recall that during the early years of the Second World War when the rest of Europe 
was made aware of the atrocities that had been suffered by minorities under the 
tyranny of Hitler, general interest was aroused in the question of Human Rights. The 
question which excited much discussion and controversy concerned the definition of 
Human Rights which would apply to all countries, and which all countries should 
endeavour to secure and protect for their citizens. It was considered an essential 
foundation for world peace and international relations that there should be a 
declaration of such rights... I remember at the time, in the summer of 1941, attending 
a conference at New College, Oxford, where this matter was discussed.
259
 
 
His exposure to the intellectual discourses about human rights informed some of his 
interventions in the legislature. When he remarked that “we demand the right to tell you [the 
colonial administration] what we want. That seems to me to be democracy”260 he reflected a 
profound understanding of rights. He developed the link between human rights and 
democracy in an article several years later by arguing that, 
There are, however, certain principles which would be regarded as essential criteria 
[for a democratic society]. Among these are... the recognition of the essential dignity 
of the individual and the equality of all men; the acceptance of the principle of free 
and fair elections with the offer of genuine choice; the deprival [sic] of the just 
powers of government from the consent of the governed; the accountability of these 
governments to their electorate and the acceptance of the right of genuine opposition; 
the principle of justice and equity before the law; and the cherished freedoms of 
speech, association, movement, conscience and religion.
261
 
 
To some extent, education was really like a double-edged sword that empowered many 
leaders of the nationalism movements but at the same time created a quasi-politics of 
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exclusion in which the marginalised constituencies such as women or illiterates were 
disadvantaged. This way education was an emancipatory tool in the hand of those Africans 
who were educated but it could also be a source of enchainment to Western values. The 
nationalist figures who were educated in Britain or in the USA had the skill to translate issues 
of rights into clear discourses for the colonial administration and fellow African subjects.
262
 It 
is this internal resistance to colonial oppression that poked holes in racial ‘science’ locally, 
but at the same time gender inequality did not exert the same force on patriarchal structures. 
Ideas around race gradually came to be accepted as dangerous and embarrassing, but gender 
inequality was neither shaped by the same ideological drive in the colonial policies nor taken 
up expressly in the nationalist movements. 
Furthermore, the politics of race and the dynamics of gender inequality came to 
represent two sides of the same coin, in the sense that they both elicited a search for equity in 
the colony. In one of the 1952 Legislative Assembly debates, Ampadu who was then the 
Ministerial Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs pointed out that: 
I have noticed in the press some criticism of the absence of any reference to Women 
Police. I would remind Honourable Members that they have already made financial 
provision for three women NCOs and nine women constables in the current 
Estimates. No women recruits have yet been enlisted, the reason being that Mr. 
Collens, the Commissioner of Police, who is at present on leave is studying the 
organisation and duties of women police in London.
263
 
 
In the September 2, 1952 issue of the Daily Graphic the enlistment of the first batch of 
women to the police service was also reported. Also in the September 12, 1952 edition of the 
same newspaper there was an advertisement inviting one woman to serve in an 11-member 
national vernacular board. As Gadzekpo has argued eloquently, Gold Coast women countered 
patriarchy as well as colonialism through gendered discourses in the local newspapers.
264
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The emergence of human rights offered at least one way out of gender inequality. Just 
like the category of race, gender was conceptualised in biological idiom and determinants. 
One’s race or gender label determined whether or not one qualified as a rights-bearing 
citizen, and women in the Gold Coast were generally marginalised as a constituency. Gender 
inequality became a subject of debate many times in the Legislative Council. For example, 
Rev. Taylor, a Nominated Unofficial Member, drew attention to the problem of gender 
inequality: 
I noticed from [the Director of Medical Services’] answer to my question that among 
the students who are at present studying in the United Kingdom or overseas are four 
female nurses, all of whom are undergoing nursing training privately, but that, at the 
same time, no Government scholarship has been provided for a similar purpose. I am 
wondering whether the Honourable ... Director of Medical Services would consider 
further the policy of providing training for nurses overseas as an addition to what is 
being given in this country.
265
 
 
At the time Rev. Taylor made the intervention in the Legislative Council, the first Gold Coast 
woman was eight years away from being elected to the legislature. Marjorie Mensah, a Gold 
Coast woman columnist in the West African Times, criticised the limited access women had 
in the job market, and went on to argue that “I would like to see our girls filling some of the 
posts of the men also. I think it is about time that some institutions were established for the 
purpose of teaching such subjects that would enable candidates to qualify, be they women or 
men.”266 There is a recognition in Mensah’s words that a gender-sensitive education could aid 
the realisation of equality.  
Another dimension of the inequality was the lack of opportunities for the benefit of 
the subjects in the Northern Territory or Trans-Volta Togoland. This ties in well with the 
thesis of Marks and Clapham that historical changes such as those in a racialised Gold Coast 
bring about and reinforce processes that conceal other forms inequality; in this case, it was 
hidden behind a seemingly more urgent struggle against colonialism. Variations in policies in 
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the Gold Coast into a colony, Ashanti Protectorate, Northern Protectorate and Trans-Volta 
Togoland resulted from the administrative configuration. This arrangement created a 
disparity of opportunities. The members of the Northern Protectorate and the Trans-Volta 
Togoland constituted marginalised groups with limited opportunities to challenge both 
dominant oppressive groups among the African communities and unfair colonial policies. 
The Northern Territories had a fifth of the Gold Coast population, but it was largely neglected 
by the colonial government. As an article in the Ashanti Pioneer argued regarding people in 
the Northern Territories,  
These are the products of a policy, the policy [italics author’s] that has recently denied 
the peoples of the NT the best that Africa needs if its people are to take a deserving 
place in the family of Man [and Woman]; education not only of the hands but [also] 
of the heart, nay mind—the intellect.267 
 
E. Norton Jones, the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories, had cause to reclaim 
for the ‘northerners’ their full human identity when he said that: 
I should like to nail in its coffin a misconception about the intellectual capabilities of 
the people whose interests I represent. The misconception has arisen from a two-way 
traffic over many years, the migration southwards in vast hosts of the Northerner in 
search of manual labour and the temporary transfer northwards of the Southerner to 
fill the supervisory and executive posts in the Government service and in Commerce. 
It is true that the Northerner is not ashamed of manual work... But as attributes to a 
robust frame he is gifted with boundless energy, acute perception and, when his 
mental faculties have been stimulated by education, an astonishing intellectual 
capacity.
268
 
 
Jones’ intervention in the legislature emphasised the perception of one group of people by 
another. But more than the identity of the ‘Northerners’ is the nuanced way he underscored 
the lop-sidedness in opportunities for education and, by extension, in employment, thus 
raising the question of rights, equality and fairness. 
The UN human rights regime presented a discourse that drew attention to the 
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principles of dignity and equality in a new way in the Gold Coast.
269
 For the colonial 
administration it may have been a source of symbolic embarrassment for Britain to play such 
an important role in the founding of the UN, the drafting of the UN Charter, the UDHR and 
the ECHR, and not apply the universal rights’ principles in one of their colonies. This was 
more about Britain’s public image rather than real guilt. However, for those sectors of the 
anti-colonial movements in the Gold Coast that knew about the human rights idea from the 
UN Charter and the UDHR the human rights language on occasion served as a political 
weapon to aid their demands for entitlements to freedoms of association, assembly, the right 
to vote and to be voted for, and other democratic rights. Just as the citizens of Britain could 
exercise their democratic rights through elected representatives in government, so the people 
of the Gold Coast could exercise similar rights within their domestic context if the colonial 
restrictions were removed. While it is within the context of states that human beings are 
recognised as citizens with duties and rights, the UN human rights concept was presented, at 
least in the treaties, as transcending citizenship, nationality and ethnicity. The rights-bearer is 
every human being. 
In other words, post-World War II human rights politics inspired a new thinking about 
‘the human being’ as one with fundamental rights “without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.”270 This idea theoretically signified a paradigm shift 
everywhere the binaries of coloniser/colonised, male/female or white/black affected the 
policy decisions or state practices. Even though in itself the normative idea of human rights 
did not stop violations of democratic, land or fundamental rights in the Gold Coast, the 
discourse, for those who knew about the UN Charter and the UDHR, became an ideological 
tool for the nationalist to challenge colonialism and a counteractive measure to the racial and 
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patriarchal remnants of history. But they also deployed an aspirational idea of their rights to 
be treated as human beings in a situation that denigrated their humanity. 
The different voices in the legislature or in the nationalist movements or in the media 
not only reflected the quest for equity but also produced a variety of discourses, sometimes to 
do with questions of rights. Several strands of identity politics were articulated in the 
discourses generated by the UN human rights regime, the policies and practices of the 
colonial administration, the agenda of the nationalist movements, the concerns of the 
traditional rulers, and the preoccupations of marginalised constituencies in the Gold Coast. 
While some of the discourses were obvious, others remained quite ambiguous. The UN 
human rights discourse, for example, was unequivocal. By affirming that “[a]ll human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity,”271 the UDHR basically clarified the fact that the human 
being of rights is every human being, and not only those from the hegemonic race or gender 
or colour or ethnic group. Such an idea had a wide scope and held up a promise for those 
“members of the human family”272 whose human rights were being violated.  
Without formal education, many people from the marginalised constituencies in the 
Gold Coast lacked the capacity to participate fairly in shaping the discourses of anti-colonial 
nationalism and the formal space to articulate the issue of rights.
273
 Those who were illiterate, 
for example, had insights into their life situations, but could not articulate them directly in the 
media or in the legislative debates. Even though the people in the Northern Territories 
asserted their right to be treated fairly and challenged the dominant oppressive forces in the 
Gold Coast, much of their contribution to the rights’ discourse can only be found in oral 
tradition or in someone else’s voice, because of illiteracy. Jones became the voice of the 
people in the Northern Protectorate. The lack of formal or written records of the discourses of 
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the marginalised constituencies (illiterates) about human rights in the 1940-50s poses a great 
challenge to researchers like me. 
 
4.5. Negotiating the meaning of dignity and equality in the Gold Coast 
For the majority of the marginal constituencies, such as women’s groups and the 
subjects of the Northern Protectorate their human rights claims comprised general issues of 
injustice that directly affected them in the country. Sometimes a class of educated people 
spearheaded their debates about the injustices of colonial rule, but at other times too the 
illiterate folks also expressed their dissatisfaction through demonstrations. Gendered 
discourses, as I have pointed out above, formed part of the debates in the media as well as the 
legislature. While these constituencies may have been ignorant about the UN idea of ‘human 
rights’ because of illiteracy or lack of awareness about the politics of the new world order, 
the issues they raised were nonetheless about violations of fundamental rights.  
Terms such as dignity and equality may not have entered into everyday usage in the 
emancipatory politics of the Gold Coast, but their rights claims had everything to do with 
violations of human rights under a colonial dispensation. Human beings recognise an 
injustice when they experience it and with a bit of courage are willing to do something about 
it. The ethnic groups that occupied the territories that came to be known as the Gold Coast 
during the colonial period had their own conceptual understanding about the human being.
274
 
As I have pointed out above, the Africans’ self-understanding was not always in tandem with 
that of the colonial administrators.  
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Some analysis of one ethnic group’s self-understanding could serve as an illustration 
of the way at least one African community in the Gold Coast ‘constructed’ themselves and 
also put in context the problem of inter-ethnic discrimination. The Dagara inhabited a part of 
what came to be known as the Northern Protectorate under British rule. For the Dagara,
275
 the 
defining characteristic of the concept of the human being is the possession of sie, transcripted 
as inherent dignity. This idea of dignity, along with yan (rationality), normatively reflects the 
human being as an individual entity with moral and metaphysical qualities within 
community. While equality in dignity is derived from human beings’ nirsaalu (i.e., shared 
humanity, what in Bantu is called ubuntu, and not accidental characteristics such as clan 
belonging, ethnic group, disability, height or social status), the dynamic interaction between 
individuals on the one hand and the proper relationship between the individual and the 
community on the other is expressed in their nirsaalu. Indeed, this idea presupposes that 
equality of dignity between human beings is universal and not just something only for the 
Dagara people. Every human being has the same nirsaalu which has to be matched 
normatively by a baseline level of equal respect through positive rights (yangfo) that sustain 
life, and negative rights (kyiiru) that forbid, for example, the taking away of life or discourage 
discriminating against others on grounds of difference.
276
 Yangfo and kyiiru are regulated 
more by an internal law of morality, reason and Naamwin (the divine) than written laws as 
such. It is this lack of written tradition, however, that the colonial administration capitalised 
on as one of the bases of domination. The Dagara proverb that, ‘human dignity is like a 
baobab tree in the village, and no single clan can claim it as their own’ expresses the idea of 
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equality in dignity and the universality attached to the notion of nirsaalu. In defining the 
Dagara notion of nirsaalu in the English language, the richness of the terms may be lost in 
the transcription but it brings out one core meaning of Dagara anthropology.  
It is important to note that yan (rationality), yangfo (positive rights) and kyiiru 
(negative rights) establish the egalitarian chain of interaction within the community in 
dynamic tension with individual differences such as age, gender, clan or status. These 
differences were sometimes grounds of discrimination in Dagara society, especially toward 
women and children.
277
 While this anthropological outlook is not synonymous with a perfect 
society, the idea of nirsaalu or equality in dignity normatively provided the underlying basis 
for the obligations of the community as well as the individuals. Of course, it must be noted 
that the conception of human relationships among the Dagara and with other people is very 
important and not just the words. The colonial administration discounted the self-
understanding of African ethnic groups for a number of reasons, not least the absence of 
written tradition engaging with concepts such as dignity, rationality, equality, morality, or 
relations between individuals. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated how the understanding of the ‘humanity’ of the 
Africans influenced the scope, policies and practices of colonial rule on the one hand, 
educational policies and how the Africans’ own self- understanding inspired a politics of 
resistance against colonial domination in the Gold Coast on the other. The construction of the 
racialised other was refused steadily by the Africans through processes of resistance. People 
consider the simple right to vote as something fundamental to their humanity. However, in 
the nationalist agitations colonial rule still impacted on the way resistance was expressed, in 
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the sense that some colonial subjects oscillated between an understanding that the interest of 
the dominant group was synonymous with ‘the common good’ and the awareness that 
colonial rule, by its very nature, disenfranchised the African communities from exercising 
many of their basic rights.  
While the demands for equity and autonomy in the country were rooted in several 
discourses, specific unjust situations shaped the negotiations for democratic rights and self-
rule alongside the emerging language of human rights after World War II. The 1945-57 
emancipatory politics anticipated some of the ordering principles that the UN later provided 
for in, for example, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples, 1960.
278
 In the interaction of ideas about race, gender, ethnicity, equality and 
dignity, new identities evolved in which relations of dominance and resistance were 
negotiated in tandem with some acknowledgment of human rights principles. In any case, the 
UN Charter and the UDHR made a promise that every human being is ‘the human being’ of 
fundamental rights and freedoms; that one’s race, sex, gender, ethnicity, colour or religion 
does not exclude one from being a rights-bearer; and that states have obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfil these human rights. Such a promise had an appeal for the nationalist 
movements, and also for the marginal constituencies who may not have had a comprehensive 
knowledge of international human rights politics. The issues of injustice and inequality that 
they raised reflected the need for fundamental rights in the Gold Coast. 
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Chapter 5 
International human rights instruments in the politics of Gold Coast 
“A tree that grows in the shade of a bigger tree may remain a small tree.” 
Dagara proverb 
 
“We the peoples of the United Nations, determined to reaffirm faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women 
and of nations large and small...”279 
       Preamble of the United Nations Charter 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 Ideas about human rights took on a normative character after World War II, resulting 
in the UN Charter and the UDHR with varying symbolic implications for different parts of 
the world. The UN human rights regime had some ripple effects on regional politics 
especially in post-World War II Europe. A year after the adoption of the UDHR, ten Western 
European countries came together to found the Council of Europe and initiate the drafting of 
a regional human rights instrument, which became the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The idea of ‘British protected personhood’ in the 
colonies was considered as potentially having a stake in the provisions of this human rights 
instrument. For example, Article 63 contains a provision for the extension of ECHR to 
dependent territories specified the territorial scope of human rights. 
Chapter 5 engages critically with the normative promise of the UDHR that one has 
rights simply by virtue of being human,
280
 analyses the problems in the extension of the 
ECHR to the Gold Coast, and examines the constitutional reforms that the debates generated 
in the 1950s. The analysis will be situated within the specific debates about extending the 
ECHR to the British protected persons in the Gold Coast and
 
the key narratives for the 
analysis come from two sources: the Colonial Office documents on the negotiation about 
extending ECHR provisions to colonial subjects and the official response of the Gold Coast 
                                            
279
 Preamble of UN Charter.  
280
 Art 1 of UDHR. 
108 
 
administration. References will also be made to the ways in which human rights issues 
captured the imagination of some gatekeepers of discourses in the legislative arm of 
government and in the domestic media. These discourses illustrate some of the ways the 
rhetoric of human rights resonated with nationalist demands for collective rights and reflect 
the extent of awareness about human rights norms among the Africans. 
 
5.2. The debates about extending ECHR provisions to the Gold Coast 
The question of extending the ECHR to dependent territories of contracting states 
came up early on in the drafting process, and under Article 63 the states undertook to “extend 
[the Convention] to all or any of the territories for whose international relations it is 
responsible.”281 Read in tandem with Article 1 inter alia that “contracting parties shall secure 
to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms”282 meant that by default the 
dependent territories included the Gold Coast. The general jurisdiction clause, however, had a 
caveat that “[t]he provisions of this Convention shall be applied in such territories with due 
regard, however, to local circumstances.”283 It is important to note here that Britain had 
“opposed the inclusion of a clause on [the right to] self-determination”284 in the instrument. 
Indeed, Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary (1945-51), expressed some misgivings 
about the idea of human rights at the drafting stages of the ECHR, pointing out that “If you 
open that Pandora’s Box you never know what Trojan ’orses will jump out.”285 But once 
Britain ratified the instrument in 1950 it engaged the Colonial Office and colonial 
governments in a somewhat lengthy debate about the suitability of extending the ECHR to its 
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overseas territories. 
Colonial Office documents corroborate in useful detail the shifting position of the 
British government regarding the suitability of extending the ECHR to the colonial 
territories.
286
 The process of negotiations with colonial administrations was fraught initially 
with conceptual and institutional difficulties but by 1953 some of these were more or less 
resolved with decisions either for, or against, incorporating aspects of the ECHR provisions 
into domestic legislations. For example, the colonial administrations in Brunei, Hong Kong, 
Aden, Southern Rhodesia and Tonga decided to reject outright the idea of extending the 
ECHR to their territories while the administrations in the Gold Coast and four other British 
dominions (viz., Aden, Southern Rhodesia, Hong Kong and Brunei) wavered for some time 
before the Gold Coast administration accepted some convention rights for their subjects in 
1953.
287
 
In the specific case of the Gold Coast, the negotiations took place during the 
governorship of Charles Arden-Clarke (1949-57) while Arthur Creech Jones (Labour, 1946-
1950), James Griffiths (Labour, 1950-51) and Oliver Lyttleton (Conservative, 1951-54) were 
Secretaries of State for the Colonial Office. The position of the Colonial Office was 
somewhat nuanced, because it took seriously Article 63(3) undertaking of “due regard... to 
local circumstances”288 in the negotiation process. In addition to that consideration, factors 
such as political pragmatism with regard to effective control over the colonies, the 
propaganda value of extending ECHR provisions, and the advice of the respective colonial 
administrations served as focal points in the way the British government dealt with the 
Article 63 stipulation. Indeed, these factors shaped both the negotiation and the outcome in 
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the case of the Gold Coast. 
The Colonial Office first dispatched a confidential memo to Arden-Clarke’s 
government to find out their willingness to have the convention extended to the colonial 
subjects there in 1949.
289
 Behind this dispatch presumably was a provision made for ‘a 
colonial clause’ under Article 63. At the same time, Colonial Office deliberations also saw in 
the extension of the ECHR to colonial territories an underlying propaganda value. For 
example, the Colonial Office reiterated the position that “one of the main objects in inducing 
colonial territories to apply the convention was for publicity purposes at the United Nations 
in connection with the draft Convention on Human Rights.”290 A 1951 document quoted a 
member of the Colonial Office staff as drawing attention to the fact that: 
an important number of the signatories (France, Belgium, UK, Denmark) are powers 
with responsibilities for non-self-governing territories and with a lively understanding 
that what may be a reasonable provision in Europe does not necessarily make sense 
here and now for Africa. The outcome has been a document which, by virtue of 
provisos and careful phrasing, most states should be able to accept but which the 
adverse critic might attack as being too much hedged with restrictions to have real 
value. It has, however, propaganda value, and can at least be pointed to as something 
achieved, legally sound and ratifiable, in contrast to the dissension and unrealism 
which are so far the chief characteristic associated with the draft of the U.N. 
Covenant.
291
 
 
Another document points out that, “[i]t is obviously desirable that as many as possible, 
preferably all, territories should have this convention extended to them. It is a much more 
sensible and workable document than the UN Covenant.”292 This preference for the ECHR 
over the UN human rights regime seems paradoxical since literally all the ‘first generation’ 
rights provided for in the ECHR were modifications from the UDHR. Minutes from the same 
ministerial meeting held on February 13, 1951 expressed the view that “[i]t would not be 
desirable to treat the Convention as applicable only to Europe and to invite the Colonies to 
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adhere to the United Nations Convention if it were eventually approved. This view was 
approved by Ministers.”293  
The reasoning from the above not only reinforces the issue of publicity but also points 
to an argument about symbolic embarrassment: that there ought to be consistency in 
applying, as it were, both the UN human rights principles and the European regional 
instrument; and that the Colonial Office wanted to avoid the double-standards that not 
extending convention rights to the colonies could imply. Extending human rights to the 
colonies could well be a face-saving measure against criticisms of colonial practices from 
home and abroad. The officials were invoking human rights principles in the colonies to 
neutralise attacks on its colonial practices in the UN, appease the minority intelligentsia 
making demands for fairer governance, and pacify critics at home.
294
 By arguing for the 
extension of the convention to its colonial territories, the British position on human rights 
was being clarified in at least two ways. As a key player in the fledgling human rights project 
Britain needed at least to follow ‘the rules’ it was helping to write for other states. Jim 
Griffiths recommended that “the Government should accept the Council of Europe 
Convention... If we did so, it was in his view essential that the Colonial Governments should 
then be consulted and encouraged to adhere to the Convention.”295 His words express well 
the claim that Britain was trying to walk its own talk. The idea of extending the ECHR 
reconciled conceptually the two identities of Britain, as a key player in the drafting of this 
convention and at the same time as a colonial power, even though at a practical level British 
colonial policies/practices only changed gradually in the Gold Coast. 
By contrast, the brutal treatment of George Grivas and the Ethnikē Organōs 
Kupriakou Agōnos or the National Organisation of Cypriot Combatants (EOKA), a Greek 
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Cypriots’ nationalist grouping, in the 1950s, led to Greece complaining to the European 
Commission at least twice, the second time accusing Britain of torturing some nationalists.
296
 
Also, the clubbing to death of eleven Mau Mau prisoners who had refused to dig irrigation 
ditches in Kenya on March 3, 1959 raised the question of interpretation and application of 
universal rights. When the issue came up for debate in the House of Commons, Alan Lennox-
Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, defended the brutality of the prison officials by 
arguing that:  
Experience has shown, time after time, that unless hard core detainees can be got to 
start working, their rehabilitation is impossible. Once they have started working, there 
is a psychological break-through and astonishing results are then achieved.
297
 
 
To this, Sydney Silverman, the Labour MP for Nelson and Colne, is said to have asked him, 
“Who told the right hon. Gentlemen that? Stalin?”298 At the time of these atrocities the 
colonial administration in Kenya had not consented to having the ECHR extended there 
mainly because of the Mau Mau uprising. The debate reveals another nuance in human rights 
discourse, the disjuncture between the understanding of the concept (universal nature of 
human rights) and of the application (actual application of its norms). Silverman’s 
intervention underlines an earlier assertion I made in chapter 2 above that human beings have 
long been travelling on the road to a more just society, “the milestones along its way formed 
by acts of individual heroism as well as by the great arguments of learned men [and 
women].”299 
On the argument of political pragmatism, the Colonial Office took a number of 
practical steps to retain control over its colonies while negotiating the feasibility of ECHR 
provisions for the people there. For example, the Colonial Office clarified the issue of 
reservations by asserting that the colonial administrations “will have to forgo… reservations 
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and that we shall have to content ourselves with extending the Covenant only to those 
territories which can accept it without reservations.”300 This assertion was made against the 
background that the Article 15 provision for derogation in times of public emergencies and 
Article 63(3) allowance for a state to act “with due regard… to local circumstances 
requirements”301 meant that the colonial administrations could use a margin of appreciation to 
circumvent convention provisions in those colonies where it was extended. 
The response of the Gold Coast administration demonstrates a number of things, not 
least the fact that Arden-Clarke’s government took into account the specific context of the 
colony, protectorates and mandated territory before making their recommendations to the 
Colonial Office.
302
 Indeed, the proposals determined the Colonial Office’s policy decisions 
regarding human rights norms for ‘British protected persons’ in 1953. According to Arden-
Clarke’s unfinished autobiography, he had written to the Secretary for the Colonies during 
these negotiations informing him that “the country [was] on the edge of revolution”303 
because of nationalist activities and influences from Cold War politics. The domestic 
resistance had elicited the attention of Earl Winterton in the late 1940s, who asked Rees 
Williams, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in the House of Commons if “dupes of the 
Third International including Communists in this country”304 were involved in organizing the 
1948 nationwide boycotts, to which he replied that there “was certainly Communist 
incitement in this case.”305 Suspicions about Cold War influences in the colonies were rife in 
the British government and the colonial administration. 
Arden-Clarke’s administration raised three main concerns. Firstly, the colonial 
                                            
300
 Minute of S. M. Black of 12 Feb. 1951 in Archives of Miscellaneous Commissions in FO 317/95866/US 
733/19. 
301
 Article 63(3) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Sellars 
highlights Cyprus to illustrate the way Britain extended the European Convention on Human Rights with one 
hand and took it back with the other in chapter 5 of The Rise and Rise of Human Rights, 86-113. 
302
 See, for example, Replies of the Colonial Administrations in CO 936/156, CO 537/7157. 
303
 Unpublished and unfinished draft for an autobiography by Charles Arden-Clarke. It was written shortly 
before his death in 1962. 
304
 Parliamentary Debates, fifth series, House of Commons, No. 448, 1 March, 1948. 
305
 Parliamentary Debates, fifth series, House of Commons, No. 448, 1 March, 1948. 
114 
 
administration underlined the lack of compliance between ECHR provisions and existing 
domestic laws. Institutional mechanisms in the country were too weak to support the judicial 
application of human rights laws at the domestic level or to pursue remedies at the 
international level. In the Legislative Assembly debates of 1952, the Minister of Justice noted 
the lack of institutional mechanisms for fundamental freedoms by stating inter alia that “[t]he 
first signs of curbing freedom of speech were in the legislation, Order by the Governor in 
Council No. 34 of 1952 entitled the ‘Book and Newspaper Registration (Exclusion) Order, 
1952.’”306 Arden-Clarke had passed this emergency measure to regulate the circulation of 
subversive literature. George Padmore’s Africa, Britain’s Third Empire became an easy 
target of this particular emergency measure. It had been tagged as seditious and the author 
described as a communist, which in Cold War politics raised serious suspicions in a British 
dominion. 
Secondly, the administration was amenable to having the convention extended but 
with a caveat that reservations be made especially with regard to Article 2 on the right to life, 
Article 11 on freedom of movement and assembly, and Article 13 on due process because of 
existing emergency power laws.
307
 Accordingly, the convention could be extended but 
“without accepting the right to individual petition, or the jurisdiction of the court. In practice 
it made no difference to life… though it was appreciated that an independent Ghana could not 
be party to it.”308 In theory, the colonial government agreed for a limited number of rights 
such as non-discrimination and due process rights to be introduced into the 1954 
constitution.
309
 This line of thinking, while withholding the exercise of the right to petition 
the ECHR institutions from Gold Coast subjects, puts in context the Europe-centred nature of 
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the treaty and also the fact that at independence there is an automatic lapse under Article 
65(4). In practice, the European Commission of Human Rights did not have the competence 
to receive petitions in respect of dependent territories until a declaration under Article 63(4) 
was made by the metropolitan state. 
Thirdly, the country did not have enough lawyers to aid the process of implementing 
common law remedies or the principles of ECHR, especially with regard to remedies, once 
these were incorporated into domestic legislation. Bing, who served as the Constitutional 
Advisor to Nkrumah’s government between 1955 and 1956 and as the first Attorney-General 
of post-independent Ghana, confirmed this line of argument when he pointed out that at 
independence, “Ghanaian lawyers could not be obtained for the Attorney-General’s 
department partly because they were, in any case, in short supply.”310 Edsman, in his seminal 
study of the role of African lawyers in Gold Coast politics, asserted that a limited number of 
Africans lawyers practised law mainly in the colony and in the Ashanti Protectorate and drew 
attention to the way they were agents of change, shaping the contours of debates about 
emancipatory politics.
311
 According to the Roll of Court, 69 Africans lawyers practised law in 
the Colony in 1929, and with a new legislation passed allowing lawyers to practise law in the 
Ashanti Protectorate in 1932, 13 worked there while 48 were in the Colony in 1936. In the 
1940s the number went up marginally to the 50s in the Colony and 20s in Ashanti.
312
 
An important corollary of the negotiation process was the degree of awareness about 
human rights norms in the Gold Coast. The introduction of universal adult suffrage in the 
1950 Constitution had initiated the first broad-based elections in 1951 through which the first 
all-African Legislative Assembly was formed. The right to vote and to stand for election, as 
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Sachs has rightly argued, touches “deeply on the dignity of all human beings, voting united 
the highest and the humblest in a single polity, and declared quite literally that every person 
counted.”313 The Gold Coast had effectively gained an internally self-governing status in 
1951, meaning that Nkrumah as the Prime Minister was consulted on all major matters in the 
country. There is, however, no documentary evidence of Nkrumah’s exact position on 
extending the ECHR to the Gold Coast at this time of the negotiation, but as head of the 
parliamentary majority in government his party in the years leading up to independence 
vacillated between accepting and rejecting the idea of a bill of rights in the Independence 
Constitution.
314
 The reason could be that Arden-Clarke’s government did not really consult 
Nkrumah on the specific question of extending the ECHR to the Gold Coast since it was a 
matter between his government and the Colonial Office. Even though Nkrumah’s critique of 
the 1950 Constitution as establishing “a very poor substitute for self-government”315 cannot 
be interpreted as a statement on the negotiation process as such, it draws attention to the 
dissatisfaction with the pace of political change in this period. 
However, in the Legislative Council debates and the domestic media of the time, 
human rights issues caught the attention of some colonial subjects in the Gold Coast. Plange, 
an African elected member of the legislature, called for a revision of the laws “in order to 
bring them in line with modern developments in the UN Charter, Universal Declaration and 
European Convention.”316 He may have been a solitary voice in the legislature but the fact 
that the issue is raised and is linked to the fledgling human rights instruments at this time in 
the human rights history is very significant. The issue of emergency measures also elicited a 
lengthy discourse in the Legislative Council debates in July 1950, with Plange pointing out 
that: 
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In every country we have got what is known as liberty of speech or freedom of 
speech… Free criticism is the measure of democracy… It is therefore very 
disappointing to find that in the Gold Coast we have got a Sedition Ordinance or Bill 
which has made it very difficult for people to express their views, opinions and 
criticism on the actions of the Government, because the Sedition Bill in its elasticity 
does not very well define what is sedition and what is not sedition.
317
 
 
Plange may, or may not, have been aware of the UDHR Article 19 (or ECHR Article 10) 
provision for the right to freedom of opinion and expression; but his intervention reflects 
some understanding of the right to freedom of expression as a right of producers of discourse, 
a right of audiences who read these materials, the right to seek as well as receive information, 
and the right to impart the same to others. Danquah intervened on the issue of existing 
sedition laws by underlining how some colonial policies and practices actually infantilise the 
subjects, and pointed out that   
That book [Padmore’s Africa, Britain’s Third Empire] has been forbidden by the 
Government in Council, and we feel strongly… that the situation created makes us 
look silly in the Gold Coast… The point is this: this George Padmore is a very clever 
person. He wrote a book about two years ago about Russia and the Gold Coast 
Government had the book prohibited and banned from being imported… We ought to 
be given the right of judging for ourselves unless a book is particularly obnoxious… 
We ask Government to withdraw the ban.
318
 
 
But the recognition that these situations were unfair clarifies why anti-colonial resistance was 
so robust in the post-World War II context. Embedded within these debates was also an 
evolving democratic process that was fostered by, as well as reinforced, the self-
understanding of the Africans vis-à-vis the colonial administration. 
Members of the Legislative Council such as Plange or Danquah who participated in 
the debate did so from the vantage point of exposure to Western education and being part of 
the intelligentsia. In more ways than one, their views, while not representative of many of the 
marginalised constituencies, did echo the shared concerns of the British protected persons. 
They could access the discourse, but the majority of Africans in the Gold Coast could not 
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participate in the political debates or even deepen their awareness about the plethora of rights 
they were said to be ‘entitled to’ by virtue of being British protected persons.  
Sections of the local media drew attention to the relevance of fundamental rights for 
the Gold Coast people. The December 6, 1951 issue of the Ashanti Pioneer called attention to 
Article 6(2) of the draft ECHR on the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and 
went on to point out that “throughout legal history, there are many examples of people being 
involved in charges of which they were guiltless.”319 In addition, the December 27, 1951 
issue of the same newspaper culled an article by Jose de Benito of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) analyzing Article 11 of the 
UDHR on the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.
320
 This was especially relevant 
to the detention of the six nationalist leaders without trial under the Emergency Powers 
Order, Regulation 29 of the Emergency (General) Amendment No. 2 in 1948 or the Suipe 
shooting incident in which a detachment of about 130 armed men from the Gold Coast 
Mobile Force to quell nationalist resistance on November 5, 1950 led to the killing, wounding 
and arrest of several people.
321
 
Women’s participation in the negotiation process and the gender question in the 
debate is of importance here. From the Colonial Office documents at least, there is no 
evidence that specific women’s rights and freedoms featured in any particular way in the 
debates. The idea of sex as one of the illustrative grounds of discrimination is ironically 
reflected in the absence of women in the process. Apart from Edith Mercer who wrote some 
of the minutes of the Colonial Office minutes, there is no other woman in the negotiation. In 
the colonial administration, no woman was involved in the process. What featured throughout 
the correspondence between the Colonial Office and the Gold Coast administration is the 
broad idea of human rights rather than women’s rights. Gender-based discrimination already 
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existed in the colonies, in situations where women were at the intersection of a dual side-
lining as women within patriarchal systems and as black women within colonial territories. 
But this was less of a colonial or cultural problem than a manifestation of the larger issue of 
gender-based inequalities around the world. As Englund argued concerning the understanding 
of human rights among marginalised constituencies in, for example, Malawi, such groups end 
up as “prisoners of a very specified idea of human rights.”322  
In applying a hermeneutic of feminist theory which examines perspectives that have 
developed outside the established ways women are excluded or side-lined, it is worth noting 
that Gold Coast women were absent from the negotiations and their specific human rights’ 
concerns were neglected in the constitutional provisions following the decision to extend 
ECHR to the country. This state of affairs reveals something of the politics around gender in 
colonial rule, in negotiating the ECHR in Europe and in debating the suitability of extending 
convention rights for colonial subjects in the Gold Coast. Even though the head and some 
members of the UN Human Rights Commission were women, the human rights idea is not 
free of longstanding gender inequalities or notions of masculinity. Charlesworth and Chinkin 
highlight ways in which the absence of women in the development of international human 
rights legitimated gender inequalities in rights discourses around the world.
323
 
 
5.3. Problems in the application of ECHR to the Gold Coast 
It is against the above background that the ECHR was extended to the Gold Coast in 
1953 in accordance with the Article 63 provisions. Three distinct but interrelated issues could 
be said to be implicit in the negotiations and the Colonial Office’s decision: the idea of the 
rights-holder (or who the ‘human being’ of rights is), the question of application (the 
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implementation of human rights principles) and the territorial limits of ECHR. The first is a 
prima facie basis of respect for human rights while the second meant improving the legal 
framework and institutional mechanisms to meet ‘human rights standards’ in the country. 
Second, the way the Colonial Office presented the idea to the Gold Coast administration 
assumed belonging to a state, or in the specific context a British colonial territory, in order for 
these two elements to come together. This recognition was at two levels—through the ECHR 
provisions that applied specifically to the colonial territory and the human rights principles 
that were incorporated in the 1954 and 1957 constitutions. Third, by asking the Gold Coast 
administration to consider the suitability of convention rights for the Africans in the colony, 
protectorates and mandated territory the Colonial Office theoretically recognised that the 
people there were, or could be, rights-holders, i.e., people who are entitled specifically to the 
rights set out in the ECHR.  
In human rights parlance, the state has obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human 
rights. The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 1933 still held sway over 
the declaratory theory of statehood in this period. The state is identified “as… possessing the 
following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; 
and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.”324 At the time of the negotiations, 
the Gold Coast was a colonial territory that lacked the legal personality to negotiate 
legitimately human rights for the colonial subjects, which is the reason for the Article 63 
undertaking. The Gold Coast did not meet the requirements for statehood, and so relied on 
Britain as the metropolitan to exercise authority legitimately and to serve as the ratifying 
party to the ECHR. What this meant, in theory at least, was that Britain ‘owed’ these 
obligations to its subjects in all four entities within the Gold Coast. 
The Colonial Office documents referred to above make it clear that the state, at this 
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stage in the history of human rights, was pivotal in the application of human rights norms. In 
other words, “[m]embership as civil status appears, therefore, more crucial than bare 
humanity.”325 This is a very significant argument because the Colonial Office interpreted 
human rights principles as applicable to those people who were British citizens or, in the case 
of the Gold Coast, British protected persons. The fact that the colonial administration needed 
to be consulted about suitability illustrates the strength of membership in this particular 
British dominion for enjoying human rights. Such distinctions had implications on the way 
convention rights were applied in different colonies. 
The idea of entitlement, as Englund argues, presumes “membership in a political 
society, institutional arrangements that ensure historically specific standards of life.”326 This 
produces a dialectic of bearer of human rights obligations (the state) on the one hand and 
holders of fundamental rights assumes entitlements and duty (groups and individuals) on the 
other. By distinguishing between British citizens and African subjects in the British 
Nationality Act, 1948, the Africans in the Gold Coast were classified as British protected 
persons and therefore bereft of ordinary citizenship rights.
327
 The notion of ‘protected 
personhood’ corresponded with the existing colonial practice of exclusion. If the above is 
juxtaposed with the UDHR idea that all human beings are rights-bearers, then the protection 
of rights is not contingent on whether the people are British ‘citizens’ in the United Kingdom 
or colonial ‘subjects’ in the Gold Coast. While the UDHR idea expresses the universal 
significance of human rights, the need to extend the ECHR to the colonies highlights one of 
the gaps between theory and practice. 
On the face of it, the Colonial Office’s undertaking to extend the ECHR to the Gold 
Coast seemed somewhat dubious because the policy of indirect rule was not like the French 
policy of assimilation whereby colonies were theoretically an extension of France and the 
                                            
325
 Englund, 28. 
326
 Englund, 27-8. 
327
 The British Nationality Act, 1948, Part III Section 32 subsection (1). 
122 
 
‘colonial subjects’ notionally French citizens. For a convention that was conceived primarily 
for Europe and drafted for people under the jurisdiction of the countries that ratified it, the 
debate about extending the ECHR to colonial territories raises a number of questions about 
territorial limits and Cold War ideological struggles. Apart from demands within the UN for 
an inclusive human rights instrument, questions were being raised about the relevance of 
colonial rule in the new world order. These situations all impacted on the way a colonial 
territory such as the Gold Coast was at the intersection of many of the historical and political 
contingencies occurring in the new international order.  
At the same time, the idea of extending human rights principles to British protected 
persons signified one way in which ‘colonial subjects’ could become rights-bearing citizens. 
It was also a bridging of the gap between the legitimacy and jurisdiction in human rights 
discourse. Since the judicial interpretation/protection of rights depends on particular 
institutional frameworks, attempts were made to introduce some fundamental rights norms 
into the 1954 and 1957 constitutions in varying degrees. The disjuncture between a normative 
idea and its application potential is also visible from the way the colonial administration gave 
the convention rights with one hand and took many of them away with the other hand in 
emergency measures through the power of Article 63(3). The Emergency Powers Order, 
Regulation 29 of the Emergency (General) Amendment was not expunged from existing laws 
even after the ECHR was introduced. Emergency Regulation 29 gave the governor powers to 
arrest and to detain anyone who was deemed a threat to security. These powers allowed for 
detention without trial, banishment, imprisonment without following due process. Human 
rights violations were rationalised in relation to the provision in Article 15 allowing for 
derogation in times of emergency and Article 63(3) on local circumstances.  
Of significance too is the fact that at the height of the ‘Positive Action’ non-violent 
protests and non-cooperation in January 1950. Governor Arden-Clarke declared a state of 
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emergency in which a dawn to dusk curfew was imposed—and the Evening News newspaper 
offices were closed down and Nkrumah and some leaders of the CPP imprisoned. Even 
though the emergency laws entered into force before convention rights were extended to the 
Gold Coast, the fact that their passage coincided with the negotiation about extending the 
ECHR is of some interest here. By making reservations to provisions for individual petition, 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the court and inter-state complaint system the colonial 
administration was basically responding to a potential risk in extending the ECHR to the 
Gold Coast. Indeed, the rights provided for in the ECHR were the type of rights claims that 
the nationalist movements were making on the colonial administration in the 1940s-50s 
period. 
 
5.4. Gold Coast constitutional reforms, 1949-1957  
The debate about the extension of the ECHR to the Gold Coast and the subsequent 
provision of some fundamental rights in the constitution draws attention to the process of 
vernacularising human rights.
328
 Human rights language, in this case, moved from the 
universal to the national to the local. For example, in the debates about the suitability of 
extending ECHR the intermediaries in the process were the staff of the Colonial Office as 
well as the opinion leaders in the Gold Coast. These served as translators of a universal 
language of rights, speaking, as it were, to a particular colonial context and nationalist 
demands through constitutional provisions. Their political affiliations shaped both the 
translation process and the outcome of the vernacularisation while the depth of appreciation 
of the idea influenced how it was translated. In some cases, double or even triple meanings 
came out of the process with consequences on the application of human rights norms, for 
better and for worse. 
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Coterminous with external influences such as the extension of the ECHR to the Gold 
Coast, was post-World War II nationalism which championed demands for greater 
participation in government before independence and the collective right to self-
determination in the medium to long term. Expressions of discontent toward colonial rule led 
to the arrest and incarceration of a number of nationalist leaders in 1948. Gerald Creasy, who 
was governor briefly in the Gold Coast, reacted to the expressions of anti-colonial sentiments 
by issuing Removal Orders, 1948 to arrest and detain indefinitely the leaders of these 
movements without trial.
329
 The Colonial Office, however, responded to the situation 
differently by appointing a Commission of Inquiry with a mandate to investigate the reasons 
for the disturbance and make recommendations for continuing administration of the colony. 
The Commission was chaired by Justice Aikens Watson, a Recorder of Bury St. Edmunds, 
who along with Dr. Keith Murray, Mr. Andrew Dalgleish and Mr. E. G. Hanrott 
recommended that as a prelude to self-government a new constitution should be drafted. 
Thus, the Colonial Office endorsed the idea of an all-African Constitutional Committee, and 
Justice Henley Coussey of the Gold Coast High Court was appointed to chair it in 1949.
330
 
The Coussey Committee on Constitutional Reforms, 1949 recommended a radical review of 
the 1946 Constitution. The Committee’s recommendations led to the introduction of the 
universal adult suffrage principle in the 1950 Constitution, a principle that changed the face 
of anti-colonial resistance politics in the Gold Coast. The draft constitution was passed on 
November 26, 1949 and entered into effect on January 26, 1950. This constitution, which 
only applied to the Colony and the Ashanti Protectorate, was significant because it provided 
for the right to equality, the right to freedom, the right to freedom from exploitation, the right 
to freedom of religion, cultural and educational rights, the right to constitutional remedies, the 
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right to property and introduced democratic rights into the country.
331
 To provide for 
democratic rights was to offer the subjects non-discriminatory guarantees of a plethora of 
rights such as freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression and 
freedom of movement. The rights provided for in the 1950 Constitution, while crucial to 
popular control in politics on the basis of equality, were only implied in the democratic rights 
but not provided for specifically. Provisions were made for an elected legislature and a 
racially mixed executive arm of government as part of the first tentative steps being taken 
toward self-governance in the Gold Coast.  
The CPP described this constitution as “fraudulent and bogus but we want to give it a 
trial at this present stage”332 but also threatened mass exercise of ‘Positive Action’ if the 
colonial administration went ahead with what it had presented to the rest of the world as ‘a 
carefully planned democratic experiment.’ ‘Positive Action’ agitations and a number of 
newspaper articles had led to the prosecution and imprisonment of Nkrumah and some of the 
CPP leaders in 1950. In the elections that year, the harmony of popular aspiration for political 
reform was unequivocal. The 1950 Constitution had stipulated that the new Legislative 
Council would have thirty-eight elected and forty-two nominated members, and the CPP 
were in a majority of sixteen.
333
 Hence, Arden-Clarke signed the ‘Bill of Release’ on 
February 15, 1951 liberating Nkrumah and the other CPP leaders from prison. Nkrumah who 
had won a seat in his Accra constituency was asked by the colonial administration to form the 
government and become Leader of Government Business in a Westminster-model legislature. 
Nkrumah announced the first inter-racial cabinet of 7 Africans and 4 Europeans, and with 
that the Gold Coast entered a new phase of internal self-government. The Colonial Office 
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accepted Arden-Clarke’s view that  
We have only one dog in our kennel and the whole question is whether the tail (i.e., 
Nkrumah’s supporters) will wag the dog or the dog the tail. It has a very big tail and 
not much guts. All we can do is to build it up and feed it vitamins and cod liver oil; 
and, as soon as the opportunity offers, some of that tail must be docked.
334
 
 
The patronising tone of Arden-Clarke’s analysis of the political situation betrays something 
of the colonial administration’s view of the Africans in the Gold Coast, which contradicts his 
declaration—‘that of one partner handing over the management of a business to another.’ 
Perhaps this is another rendering of “the United Kingdom [being] the elder and more 
experienced partner”335 of the two countries. As an official of the British imperial 
establishment he is a carrier of particular narratives about colonial ‘subjects,’ and especially 
of colonial subjects turned rights-bearing citizens. The pet metaphor is not only curious but 
also raises questions about the way the governor understood the humanity of the Africans 
who had become his ‘partners’ in the administration of the Gold Coast. To paraphrase the 
words of Saïd on the purpose of universal human rights, it is to put forward explanations 
using the same language employed by the dominant power to dispute its hierarchies, to 
clarify what is hidden and to pronounce what has been silenced or rendered 
unpronounceable.
336
  
Indeed, the wording of Arden-Clarke’s memo may well be a symptom of the 
paternalism of colonial rule and issues of injustice, inequality and discrimination on grounds 
of race. The paternalism and inequality inspired the Africans to question, and where 
necessary to overpower, colonial rule. Indeed, the thirty articles of the UDHR gave vent to 
the outrage toward injustice and also offered the inspiration to act for change. A plan to 
manipulate the process towards independence is implied in “[a]ll we can do is build it up and 
feed it vitamins and cod liver oil; and, as soon as the opportunity offers, some of that tail 
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must be docked.”337 Was the ‘building up of this dog’ and ‘docking of the tail’ intended to 
suit a particular Colonial Office agenda? It is beyond the scope of this chapter to speculate on 
what the agenda must have been. But see chapter 6 of this thesis on the way the Colonial 
Office stage-managed the Independence Constitution drafting process. 
The introduction of an electoral culture created the first all-African elected Legislative 
Assembly. For the first time in Gold Coast history, the leader of the majority party in the 
Legislative Council assumed the mantle of Leader of Government Business. This title was 
changed to that of Prime Minister on March 5, 1952 
in the light of the working of the present Constitution and on the advice of the 
Governor, Her Majesty’s Government have decided that the Leader of Government 
Business in the Legislative Assembly should disappear from the Constitution and the 
Office of Prime Minister should be formally recognised.
338
  
 
The change was in accordance with the provision of Section 7(a) 22 of the 1950 Constitution, 
allowing for a review of the constitution. The constitutional developments in this period 
altered political culture in important ways. The gradualism that had characterised 
constitutional reforms in the Gold Coast altered after 1953.  
For example, a constitutional review led to the 1954 Constitution and three years later 
the Independence Constitution which came out of processes of negotiation between the 
colonial administration and diverse nationalist parties for more democratic practices and the 
realisation of the right to self-determination in 1957. A Westminster model constitution was 
bequeathed to the Gold Coast, but with procedural limitations and substantive limitations. It 
did not provide for an independent judiciary arm of government, and thus enforced colonial 
legislations without constitutional restraints. As one legal scholar points out,  
its members were active in the formulation of colonial policy and legislation; they 
depended for career advancement on reports of the colonial bureaucracy; and many of 
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their members as District, Provincial and Chief Commissioners performed at the same 
time judicial, executive and police roles.
 339
  
 
The 1954 Constitution did provide for freedom from discrimination (UDHR Article 2) under 
section 36(2) and became the structural foundation of the constitutional system constructed 
by Ghana at independence. Other fundamental rights such as equality in dignity and rights 
(UDHR Article 1) or freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
(UDHR Article 5) were, however, not provided for in the constitution. Article 31(5) vested 
both the power of judicial review and original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court on matters 
concerning the validity of legislation. Under Article 32 of the constitution the legislature 
could not pass legislation to alter the boundaries of the regions or alter the provisions of the 
constitution without the approval of the regional assemblies. While the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty, giving supreme authority in the country to the legislature with the 
power to enact or revise or end any law, was provided for in the constitution, there was no 
concomitant law to limit the application of this principle. 
Indeed, the 1954 Constitution and Independence Constitution, 1957, the constitutional 
review processes took place against the background of the nationalist agenda of demands for 
the rights to freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of 
movement, and the right to vote and/or to stand for election. The 1954 Constitution was an 
‘interim’ document in the sense that it was a review of the 1950 Constitution and was done in 
anticipation of a more elaborate process of drafting the Independence Constitution thereafter. 
Apart from a Section 4 provision about people who were eligible to be appointed to the 
Cabinet, a Section 36(A) provision for “appropriation of property without compensation”340 
and a Section 36 (2) provision on freedom from discrimination of any type “subject to the 
provisions of this Constitution” the Gold (Constitution) Order-in-Council 1954 did not 
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radically improve the human rights agenda in the country.
341
 What this reveals is that while 
human rights discourses formed an integral part of the negotiations for democratic rights and 
the constitution-making processes this did not inspire an immediate change of attitude to the 
human rights idea. 
The 1950s phase of constitutional reforms was particularly significant because 
Nkrumah’s government had ‘partnered’ Governor Arden-Clarke in the constitutional review 
process. It must also be highlighted that the principle of parliamentary government was 
reversed, giving extraordinary powers to the Governor under Section 44 that:  
if the Governor shall consider that it is expedient in the interests of the public order, 
public faith or good government… that any Bill introduced, or any motion proposed, 
in the Assembly should have effect, then, if the Assembly fail to such a Bill or motion 
within such reasonable time… the Governor at any time which he shall think fit, may 
… declare that such Bill or motion shall have effect as if it had been passed by the 
Assembly.
342
 
 
Under Section 45, the Governor had the power to send a message to the Speaker of the 
Legislative Assembly asking him to have a draft bill or motion “introduced or proposed not 
later than a date specified in such a message.”343 However, the Governor could only exercise 
these powers with the approval of the Cabinet, and when he failed to get such approval, the 
concurrence of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. What this meant constitutionally was 
that the Cabinet was neither answerable to the Legislative nor responsible to the electorate as 
enshrined in the constitution, since the Governor could sidestep Cabinet and ask the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies to proceed with a course of action he deemed to be “in the interests 
of public order, public faith or good government.”344  
In spite of the clawback clauses in 1954 constitution, it must be emphasised that the 
introduction of universal adult suffrage in the constitutions of the 1950s came about partly 
because of the massive support generated for the construction of a prospective nation-state. 
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Indeed, this improved the conduct of democratic exercises in the Gold Coast. The people now 
had an influential public voice in the ongoing struggle for equality and non-discrimination 
because they saw themselves as rights-bearing citizens with, for example, the right to vote 
and to stand for election. Although the traditional rulers and intelligentsia were at the 
forefront of the discourse on self-determination, their recognition of the lower classes as an 
electorate was somewhat ambiguous until the 1951 Constitution introduced a broader 
franchise in the Gold Coast. Out of the rights provided for in the UDHR, the democratic 
rights were the only ones accorded constitutional guarantees in the Gold Coast 1950s’ 
constitutions, with the question of enshrining a bill of rights deferred to the negotiations for 
an Independence Constitution. 
In the June 15, 1954 elections Nkrumah’s nationalist party consolidated its hold on 
political power by once again winning a majority of seats in the Legislative Assembly. The 
governor recognised the Prime Minister’s position as one that ranked “immediately after the 
Governor or the Officer Administering the Government as the case may be, and before any of 
the three ex-officio Ministers whose position in other respects... remain[ed] unchanged.”345 
Seven African members of the Legislative Assembly were appointed to the first inter-racial 
Cabinet, viz., Kojo Botsio (Minister of Education and Social Welfare), Kobla A. Gbedemah 
(Minister of Commerce and Industry), A. Caseley-Hayford (Minister of Agriculture and 
Natural Resources), E. O. Asafu-Adjaye (Minister of Local Government), J. A. Braimah 
(Minister of Communication and Works), T. Hutton-Mills (Minister of Health and Labour), 
Ansah Koi (Minister of Housing). Three ex-officio members appointed by the Governor, but 
in principle answerable to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, held the Ministries of 
External Relations, Justice and Finance.  
Nkrumah’s government pushed for more constitutional reforms in the march toward 
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independence. The period between 1954 and 1957 also marked a turning point in Gold Coast 
constitutional reforms as well as provided a situation to test the fledgling democratic 
culture.
346
 The State Council Bill, 1956, which was passed into law prohibiting traditional 
rulers from party politics and curbing their influence in post-World War II national politics in 
the country, also shaped the contours of the evolving democratic culture. The constitutional 
guarantee of democratic rights enriched the nationalist discourses in the period leading up to 
independence. For example, when Arden-Clarke announced that the position of Leader of 
Government was replaced by the title of Prime Minister, Ofori Atta, an Opposition legislator, 
pointed out that “if the British people really believe that it was a fundamental change... I 
firmly believe that they could have asked for the immediate dissolution of the House for a 
general election to be made to test the feelings of the people of this country.”347 Busia also 
called attention to the fact that  
It was on the fundamental principle that they object as a people to be dictated to, by 
others, even if the things dictated were good for them. Our fight for freedom is 
fundamental and we disagree with any people however good or however excellent in 
themselves to take it upon themselves to decide our destiny; we regard it as 
degrading. That is why in the years of agitation the whole country was consulted in 
the constitutional changes that were made.
348
 
 
These two members of the Opposition in the Legislature Assembly were critical of the way 
the creation of the Office of the Prime Minister was done without consultation.  
Three issues could be highlighted in the interventions of Ofori Atta and Busia. First, 
the nature of the constitutional change itself, which was done without consulting the 
electorate and their representatives in the legislature. Consultation in a political process was 
important for the proper functioning of a fledgling democracy and the democratic process, 
and so for the Governor to make such a change without consulting the Opposition party 
deprived the rights-bearing citizens of the possibility of articulating their views. There was 
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alertness to the implication of the Governor’s action in replacing the position of Leader of 
Government Business by the title of Prime Minister; second, what the change would mean in 
terms of the role of Nkrumah’s party as well as the Opposition in government; third, the 
relationship of the change to the goal of self-government for the Gold Coast. The shift was 
not just nominal it also signified greater powers for the Prime Minister.  
The 1950 and 1954 constitutional changes constructed the Africans as rights-bearing 
citizens who, for example, could vote and participate in government in their own country. 
The concession to have more Africans in government reinforced the nationalist demands 
while the nationalist resistance, in turn, bore resonance to the idea that one had rights simply 
by virtue of being a human being. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
What this chapter has done is situate the idea that one has rights simply by virtue of 
being human within the debates about extending the ECHR to British protected persons in the 
Gold Coast. Attempts on the part of the Colonial Office to consult the Gold Coast 
administration on the suitability of extending ECHR took into account the local 
circumstances, but indirectly the process of negotiation helped to redefine the colonial 
subjects as rights-bearing citizens. Even though the discourse about the right to self-
determination was unequivocal, individual rights and fundamental freedoms provided for in 
the 1950 and 1954 constitutions reinforced the collective right. The post-World War II 
political circumstances in the Gold Coast, not least debates about extending ECHR provisions 
to the colonial subjects, had implications for the way the 1954 and 1957 constitutions were 
negotiated. Ongoing nationalist agitations for self-determination also contributed to the 
constitutional reforms. Political pragmatism was responsible for the Gold Coast 
administration’s equivocation for some time before advising against a wholesale extension of 
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convention rights to the colonial subjects. At the same time, the rhetoric of rights-holder in 
the ECHR concealed entrenched inequalities in the colonies, which is why the pragmatism 
sometimes flew in the face of the definition of human rights as rights one has by virtue of 
being human.  
The process of vernacularising human rights not only had consequences on the way a 
universal language was translated for colonial subjects in the Gold Coast but also on the 
receptivity of the nationalist movements to the idea. The framing of human rights as universal 
values that “penetrate the impregnability of state borders”349 is more receptive now than it 
was at the time of negotiating the suitability of the ECHR for colonial territories, but to 
consider the universal value of human rights is to call into question  the unfair treatment of 
‘the different other.’ The theme of a bill of rights and the judicial protection of fundamental 
rights in the 1957 constitution will be taken up in greater detail in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Making sense of human rights in the Gold Coast: debates on the bill of rights  
“A person is a person because of other persons” 
       A Bantu proverb 
 
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood [and 
sisterhood].”350 
        Art 1 of the UDHR 
 
6.1. Introduction 
I have argued in chapter 4 above that one of the fundamental flaws of colonial rule in 
the Gold Coast is the way the 'human being' was constructed against the background of race 
so as to justify the subjugation of one group by another. The way human beings are 
constructed within a state has consequences for the protection, respect and fulfilment of their 
fundamental rights. The influence of, for example, the UDHR on the domestic context had 
far-reaching consequences on the understanding of fundamental rights as rights one has by 
virtue of being a member of the human family rather than of a particular racial or gender 
group. Fundamental rights would not have much significance if they were not enforceable. 
Ellacuria highlights this point when he argues that the understanding of historicisation of 
human rights establishes a definite historical context aimed at correcting structural injustices 
and providing remedies in favour of human rights norms.
351
 He identifies historicisation as 
one aspect of praxis in which concepts, values and practices are both shaped and transformed 
by their dynamic interaction with each other, which is what happened with the discourse on 
the bill of rights in 1956-57 Gold Coast. 
The post-World War II changes in Gold Coast colonial politics, in particular the 
partial acceptance of the ECHR, broadened the discourses to include specific debates in order 
to accommodate the emerging concepts and practices of fundamental rights. For example, in 
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the year leading up to independence the Colonial Office, Nkrumah’s government and the 
opposition parties explored the possibility of incorporating a bill of rights into the 1957 
Constitution. But the inter-party negotiations oscillated between consensus on the importance 
of enshrining universal human rights in the constitution and dithering about when exactly to 
do so and suspicion of the idea of a bill of rights. Although the opposition parties made 
consistent demands for a bill of rights in the Independence Constitution, at the end they 
agreed in principle that the Indian example (i.e., introduce the bill of rights after 
independence) should be emulated.
352
 The Colonial Office seemed prescriptive about the idea 
of a bill of rights from the start, stage-managing, as it were, the entire negotiation process and 
roping in Nkrumah’s government as much as possible.353 Indeed, there was general 
agreement about the importance of appropriating and deploying the idea of fundamental 
rights in the Gold Coast in the Independence Constitution, but there was far less consensus 
about the reasons for a bill of rights, its relationship with existing laws and its interactions 
with the three organs of government. Moreover, the structured forum created in the 1950s for 
the transfer of power enhanced the candour in the negotiation process, reflecting the diverse 
ideologies of the colonial administration and political parties.  
The ‘human rights texts’ provide an illustration of a bifurcation in 1945-57 Gold 
Coast politics, the first branch coinciding with the period between 1945 and 1950 when the 
policy of indirect rule effectively emasculated the majority of Africans from government and 
the second with the introduction of universal adult suffrage in 1951 as the basis of electoral 
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representation.
354
 Nationalist narratives of rights’ claims made against colonial domination 
steadily diffused into openly contested versions of self-rule, with the CPP on one side and the 
UGCC (later regrouped as the Ghana Congress Party in 1952) on the other side of the divide. 
Indeed, the formation of mass political parties worsened existing ideological divides in the 
nationalist front after the 1951 legislative elections, with subsequent negotiations for power 
sometimes degenerating into ethnic and sectional rivalries.  
Ellacuria and Tarimo’s thesis that human rights need to be ‘historicised’ in order to be 
relevant to people’s lives is significant in making the link in this chapter between the 
normative idea of fundamental rights and actually making provisions for them in a bill of 
rights. The notion of ‘historicisation’ is a relatively recent introduction to the human rights 
discourse pioneered by Ignacio Ellacuria and Aquiline Tarimo. According to Ellacuria, the 
historicisation of human rights consists  
in seeing how what is abstractly affirmed as an ought to be of the common good or 
human rights is actually being realised in given circumstances... it consists in the 
establishment of those real conditions without which there can be no effective 
realisation of the common good and human rights.
355
 
 
The process of negotiating a bill of rights between 1956 and 1957 is a good example of 
human agency in historicising universal human rights within a domestic context in a 
legitimate manner. Several factors shaped the contours of the discourse about creating an 
enforcement mechanism for human rights, or historicising, in the Gold Coast. They include 
excessive structural injustice in colonial rule, the political pragmatism
356
 of some nationalist 
figures, the fundamental belief that one has rights simply by virtue of being a human being, 
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and the historical contingency of the human rights discourse in the post-World War II 
international world order. The Colonial Office, Nkrumah’s government and the opposition 
parties had competing interests which shaped both the negotiation process and its outcome. 
Each group identified with specific aspects of human rights. For its part, the Colonial Office 
sometimes made the claim that  
nearly all these fundamental rights are fully safeguarded by the basic principles of the 
common law which of course applies in Ghana. The protection afforded by the 
common law is really a much better safeguard against abuse than any enshrinement in 
the constitution—provided of course that the independence of the judiciary is 
safeguarded.
357
 
 
Also, because of the fear that legislation passed prior to independence may not be valid after 
independence, James Griffiths, who was the Secretary of State for the Colonies at the time, in 
one of his parliamentary interventions asked if the  
provisions for fundamental rights, which the Government have already indicated (sic) 
they will accept, be embodied either in a Bill [of Rights], or, if that is constitutionally 
impossible, in a White Paper and be debated in the Legislative Assembly and carried 
by a resolution which would indicate that they proposed to enshrine them in the 
Constitution after independence day?
358
  
 
Although the negotiation failed at the end to produce the corresponding enforcement 
mechanism for fundamental rights, the fact that there was a historicisation process at all 
shows that the UDHR provided a common standard that sections of the Gold Coast 
community deemed critical for the proper functioning of a fledgling culture of democracy 
and self-government.
359
 For the opposition parties, one way to ensure respect, protection and 
fulfilment of fundamental rights was to enshrine them in a bill of rights. Consequently, they 
proposed a constitutional framework that would guarantee citizens’ rights, some checks and 
balances in the exercise of state power and protection of the rights of minorities. 
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6.2. A bill of rights and judicial protection of fundamental rights and freedoms 
The term bill of rights is not altogether unambiguous even in international human 
rights law and discourse. The corpus of literature on bills of rights in British colonies assumes 
that structural injustices, political pragmatism and the international bill of rights, especially 
the UDHR, influenced the content and scope of their independence constitutions.
360
 For 
example, Stanley de Smith, writing in the 1960s about fundamental rights in post-colonial 
constitutions, argues that bills of rights are more than symbolic documents ‘domesticating’ in 
a legitimate manner international human rights in different cultures. Klug’s thesis that bills of 
rights are “part symbolism, part aspiration and part law... fundamentally a set of broadly 
expressed entitlements and values”361 of human rights is a helpful way of describing the 
concept. Parkinson defines the term “as a set of provisions in a domestic constitution 
protecting individual rights that can be enforced by a court and can restrict the actions of the 
legislature and the executive.”362 For these three scholars at least, bills of rights may be 
justiciable in which case violations are liable to be decided by a court of law or non-
justiciable, and therefore merely aspirational. A justiciable bill of rights creates positive legal 
rights for individuals or marginalised groups against the state.  
For the purposes of this thesis, a bill of rights is a list of fundamental rights and 
individual freedoms enshrined in a national constitution that are justiciable and restrains the 
state and its agents from violations. As I pointed out in chapter 3 above, the ‘state’ in the 
colonial regime failed as a human rights’ duty-bearer towards its African subjects through 
legislations such as the British Nationality Act, 1948.
363
 In the politics of citizenship, British 
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citizens and African subjects were two distinct groups with the former acting as the 
caretakers of the British Empire while the latter lacked the wherewithal to be active 
participants in the exercise of their political rights. Without a systematic official endorsement 
of human rights even after the British government’s decision to extend the ECHR to its 
territories, Nkrumah’s government inherited a skewed system in which the exercise of state 
power towards ‘subjects’ seemed unrestricted. Parkinson draws attention to one of the 
reasons for the decision to extend the ECHR to the colonies:  
[it] had little to do with protecting rights. The Colonial Office believed that the 
colonial territories had the highest standards for the protection of human rights and 
consequently that these standards far exceeded the requirements set by the 
convention... It was noted at a joint meeting of the Colonial Office, the 
Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office on 9 April 1953 that ‘one of 
the main objectives in inducing the colonial territories to apply the convention was for 
publicity purposes at the United Nations in connection with the draft Convention on 
Human Rights.’364   
 
The issue of electoral representation before 1951 highlights the problems that arise when the 
system of government excludes the majority of people on grounds of race or gender or 
ownership of property. Anti-colonial nationalism historicised citizenship rights by advocating 
for universal adult suffrage for the Africans in the Gold Coast, something which was granted 
in the 1951 Constitution. By the same token, the agitations made by the opposition parties for 
a bill of rights in the Independence Constitution formed part of broader process of 
historicisation of fundamental rights. 
Until the post-World War II era, the legal system in the Gold Coast was patterned on 
English common law tradition but without the constitutional guarantees for fundamental 
freedoms.
365
 The judiciary formed an integral part of the colonial administrative structure, 
with many of the territorial and district commissioners exercising not only executive 
authority but also legislative and judicial powers upon their subjects. In the colonial 
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dispensation, doctrines such as rule of law, separation of powers or parliamentary supremacy 
were textbook concepts with little significance or no practical import for the people in the 
Gold Coast before 1951. Many of the constitutional drafting processes in this period were 
primarily characterised by popular demands for transfer of power from the colonial 
administration to the Africans and manifestations of sectional rivalries in the fledgling party 
politics. However, the Colonial Office was opposed to having a bill of rights in the 
constitutions for four reasons. The colonial administration did not want to create a litigious 
culture among the colonised populations, create expectations that could not be fulfilled in 
other colonies, and hinder the work of the colonial administration. The reason for this was the 
fear that it would be detrimental to the application of the indirect rule policy especially in 
times of crises.
366
 As a result, the opposition parties were those in the best position to demand 
for inclusion in the constitution a bill of rights. The debates, however, show a more complex 
political situation in the Gold Coast. 
The outstanding feature of the decolonisation process in the Gold Coast from 1951 
onwards was the constitutional process through which the colonial administration slowly 
transferred power to the African people while at the same time providing a forum for the 
political parties to, as it were, resolve their ideological differences. Rathbone argues that a 
weak colonial administration of Governor Creasy, sandwiched between the robust leadership 
of Governor Burns and Governor Arden-Clarke, impacted on the post-World War II politics 
of nationalism.
367
 Parkinson in his exhaustive work on bills of rights in decolonisation 
processes maintains that decisions about bills of rights reflected Her Majesty’s Government 
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view of achieving successful transfer of power in colonies.
368
 What was the understanding of 
a bill of rights in Gold Coast nationalist discourses? In a memo of 1956 to the United 
Kingdom Government in which Busia clarified the position of the opposition parties, i.e, the 
National Liberation Movement (NLM), with regard to the independence constitution, he 
pointed out that:  
The United Kingdom Government has rejected the suggestion that the new 
Constitution should make any provisions for individual rights or the rights of the 
minorities. In this they have apparently not even been prepared to go as far as the 
Gold Coast Government which... has said it wished to include in the Constitution 
fundamental rights guaranteeing personal liberty and the right of political and 
industrial association, together with freedom of speech and the press but that this was 
not agreed to by the United Kingdom Government. We suggest that the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which has been accepted by the UK Government for 
application to overseas territories, should be embodied in the Constitution. This 
Convention includes machinery enabling its provisions to be enforced through the 
Courts.
369
 
 
Although the term, bill of rights, does not appear in the memo a significant number of 
references are made to fundamental rights and individual freedoms including allusions to 
Britain’s acceptance of the ECHR for application in the colonies. The memo, ‘Gold Coast 
Independence,’ perceptibly argued that incorporating human rights into the new constitution 
would provide a safe mechanism for protecting the interests of minorities especially after 
independence. Under paragraph 8 of the memo, the demand for “fundamental rights 
guaranteeing personal liberty and the right of political and industrial association, together 
with freedom of speech and the press”370 is linked to “the European Convention of Human 
Rights, which has been accepted by the UK Government for application to overseas 
territories, should be embodied in the Constitution.”371 
                                            
368
 Parkinson, 1-20. Moyn takes issue with the title of Parkinson’s book, Bills of Rights and Decolonization: The 
Emergence of Domestic Human Rights Instruments in Britain’s Overseas Territories, arguing that it is a 
misnomer. 
369
 Kofi Abrefa Busia, Gold Coast Independence: Memo to the UK Government, November 30, 1956. The UK 
Government gave notice under Article 63 of the ECHR that the Convention be applied to some of its 42 
overseas territories. 
370
 Busia, Gold Coast Independence” Memo to the UK Government, November 30, 1956, para 8. 
371
 Busia, Gold Coast Independence” Memo to the UK Government, November 30, 1956, para 8. 
142 
 
Opinions about the significance of a bill of rights in the constitution were shaped by 
the exposure of some of the nationalist leaders to political theories in Europe and the USA, 
the understanding of the UN human rights framework, the ECHR, and a growing appreciation 
of the constitutional developments occurring in those British colonies gaining their right to 
self-determination. The Colonial Office in Whitehall as well as the colonial administration in 
Accra vacillated between the demands of the two dominant political groupings, opting in the 
long run for elections to decide on the way forward for the Gold Coast. The colonial 
administration wavered on introducing fundamental rights to the Gold Coast, even when 
Britain ratified the ECHR in 1950. The Colonial Office taking into account the Article 63 
provision that the Convention could be extended to overseas territories, wrote to the colonial 
government in the Gold Coast asking if they wanted the convention extended to that territory. 
According to one Colonial Office document, the colonial governments in Brunei, Hong 
Kong, Aden, Southern Rhodesia and Tonga rejected the idea of extending the Convention to 
their territories.
372
 In theory, the colonial government agreed for this Convention to be 
implemented in the Gold Coast but not much else is said about this in the policy documents, 
the newspapers and constitutions of that period or afterwards. Indeed, human rights violations 
were rationalised in relation to the provision in Article 15 of the ECHR allowing for 
derogation in times of emergency. An example of the rationalisation is the use of the 
Emergency Powers Order, Regulation 29 of the Emergency (General) Amendment to arrest 
and detain the leaders of the UGCC following the 1948 Accra riots.  
The 1951 Constitution had paved the way for an increased number of elected 
representatives in the legislative arm of government. With the June 15, 1954 elections the 
CPP consolidated its hold on political power by once again winning a majority of seats in the 
Legislative Assembly. Nkrumah’s CPP government pushed for a constitutional review 
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process as part of the augmented demand for independence; while they were asking for a 
centralised system of government the newly-formed NLM demanded a federal structure and a 
bill of rights. The ‘Proposal for a Federal Constitution’ proposed six issues: constitutional 
guarantees for human rights, a federal legislature with an upper house established along the 
lines of regions and a lower house based on the population distribution, four bicameral 
regional parliaments, a council of state with the power to veto legislation that was 
discriminatory toward the minority, limited powers for the federal government, and 
constitutional amendment requiring a majority of electors in majority states.
373
 As Bing and 
Parkinson have pointed out, the British government had agreed to the transfer of power in the 
Gold Coast on the understanding that the majority of people supported the CPP.
374
 The 
emergence of the NLM as a force to be reckoned with, thus, raised questions about this 
assumption.  
It is against the background of this ideological rift that the different actors framed the 
debate for/against the bill of rights in the 1957 Constitution. Internally, Nkrumah’s 
government also attempted to engage with the leadership of the opposition parties. A select 
committee was set up in April 1955 to review the 1954 constitution. After considering 279 
memoranda and 60 written communications, the committee made at least one main 
concession to the NLM, namely, the setting up of regional assemblies with powers to 
comment on legislations before their enactment. The NLM pushed for general elections at 
this time on the assumption that they could win the majority.
375
 Interventions in the House of 
Commons in the United Kingdom prompted the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan 
Lennox-Boyd, to review the different perspectives and to appoint Frederick Bourne, who had 
served in the colonial administration as governor of the Central Provinces, East Bengal and 
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Berar a constitutional adviser, to broker a deal between the principal domestic actors.  
While the CPP co-operated with Bourne by presenting a set of proposals, the NLM 
refused to meet him. According to the Report of the Constitutional Adviser, Bourne 
recommended devolution of consultative (and not legislative) powers, a centralised system of 
government, and a constitution without a bill of rights.
376
 In part because the NLM refused to 
be part of the process, the issue of fundamental freedoms and human rights was neither raised 
in the public discussions nor included in Bourne’s report to the Colonial Office. In his 
autobiography, Nkrumah explains how he convened the Achimota Conference in February 
1956 to discuss the Bourne recommendations with the NLM.
377
 Although the NLM boycotted 
the conference, the other participants endorsed the recommendations and discussed other 
political matters that were not in Bourne’s Report. The Report of the Achimota Conference is 
quite revealing, in the sense that the issue of human rights is not discussed. Two months later 
Nkrumah’s government released a White Paper setting down the constitutional proposals for 
an independent Ghana: a centralised system of government, a legislature with a national 
assembly and a house of chiefs with consultative rather than legislative powers in six regions, 
and constitutional amendment requiring two-thirds support of the Legislative Assembly. 
Again, there was no mention of a bill of rights. Nonetheless, a statement was included to the 
effect that “The Government is in favour of making provision in the new Constitution that 
citizens of independent Ghana shall have freedom of conscience and enjoy the full exercise of 
their modes of religious worship, subject to public order, morality and health.”378 
Sustained opposition from the NLM to the constitutional proposals led to the 
announcement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the House of Commons on May 
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11, 1956 that the matter would be resolved through a general election.
379
 The CPP and NLM 
election manifestos were the White Paper and the ‘Proposals for a Federal Constitution’ 
respectively, and the elections were held on July 12 and 17, 1956. Nkrumah’s party won a 
decisive victory, with 72 of the 104 seats in the Legislative Assembly, thus resolving the 
main conundrum to the independence constitution. On August 3, 1956, the NLM boycotted 
the sitting of the Legislative Assembly while all 72 legislators of Nkrumah’s party passed a 
motion requesting independence from Britain. The Secretary of State for the Colonies 
announced on September 18, 1956 that Ghana would become a sovereign nation-state under 
the Commonwealth on March 6, 1957. The date chosen for granting the independence was 
emblematic, because it was the anniversary of the signing of the Bond of 1844 which 
established British jurisdiction over the Gold Coast. 
Even though the electorate resolved the sticking point between the nationalist parties, 
Busia in at least two letters to The Times of the United Kingdom alleged both incompetence 
and corruption in Nkrumah’s government.380 The NLM leadership sent a delegation to 
London to petition the Colonial Office on three subject matters: that the modus operandi for 
constitutional amendments be made more difficult than proposed in the government White 
Paper; that their demands in ‘Proposals for a Federal Government’ such as a bill of rights, a 
bicameral legislature and a council of state should be reconsidered; and that the powers of the 
proposed regional assemblies within independent Ghana should be equivalent with those of 
Northern Ireland in relation to the United Kingdom.
381
 The delegation led by Busia met with 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London for talks on September 10 and 11, 1956. 
The NLM deployed the rhetoric of ‘regionalism’ around their support base in the Ashanti 
Protectorate and the Northern Protectorate. When the Secretary of State attempted to create 
new terms of negotiations between CPP government and the opposition NLM, Nkrumah 
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wrote to the Colonial Office asking the Secretary of State for the Colonies not to act as an 
intermediary between his government and the opposition.
382
  
It is, however, obvious that independence rather than individual rights was the biggest 
concern of all the political parties. At the behest of Governor Arden-Clarke, the Attorney-
General for the Gold Coast, Sir George Patterson, drafted an Order in Council on 
independence and tabled it at a cabinet meeting on September 21, 1956. The draft was 
discussed but rejected, and Geoffrey Bing QC was tasked with preparing another 
constitutional document. Bing was a former Labour MP in the British House of Commons 
who was appointed constitutional adviser to Nkrumah’s government in 1956. He prepared 
what came to be known as the ‘Secret Proposals’.383 The most innovative thing about the 
‘Proposals for the Constitution of Ghana’ was the fact that it included a bill of rights which 
provided for rights as well as remedies.
384
 The seven articles in this proposal related to the 
right to personal liberty, inviolability of one’s dwellings, freedom of religion, freedom of 
opinion and assembly, provision against appropriation of property without compensation, 
provision against retrospective laws and double jeopardy, and freedom from discrimination. 
Bing explains in his autobiography that he was instructed to draw material from other 
Commonwealth constitutions, so that he basically picked and chose material from the UDHR, 
existing Gold Coast constitutions, the Indian Independence Constitution and the Irish Free 
State Constitution. In the draft document, Bing included rubrics specifying where all seven 
articles drew their inspiration from. For example, Article VIII providing for the inviolability 
of one’s dwelling has the following notation:  
This article seeks to enact an old principle of British liberty—‘that every man’s home 
is his castle’—and that no one is entitled to force himself into the home of another. It 
provides a provision against arbitrary searches by the police. The wording follows 
Article Seven of the Irish Free State Constitution except that the words ‘every person 
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in Ghana’ have been substituted for the words ‘every citizen.’385 
 
Article XII on the provision against retrospective laws and double jeopardy was based on 
section 20 of the Constitution of India while Article XIII on freedom from discrimination was 
drawn from Article 2 of the UDHR and section 36(2) of the Gold Coast (Constitutional) 
Order in Council, 1954. 
 The ‘Secret Proposals’ were passed on to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on 
October 4, 1956. In a memo the Secretary of State for the Colonies was requested to respond 
to the proposals by October 15, so they could be discussed with the opposition parties on 
October 16, debated in the Legislative Assembly on November 6, 1956 and gazetted for 
incorporation into the draft constitution.
386
 Internally, Sir Arden-Clarke supported the new 
proposals but was cautious about the provision that parliamentary authority ought to be 
supreme, something that would effectively undermine the justiciability of the bill of rights 
even if it was incorporated into the constitution.
387
  
The Secretary of State for the Colonies had constituted a group in the Colonial Office, 
made up of J. S. Bennet, Christopher Eastwood, Ivan Watt and Z. Terry (West African 
Department), to deal specifically with the independence constitution. Sir Ralph Hone, the 
Assistant Legal Adviser, was appointed the lead adviser on constitutional matters and head of 
the group. The Secretary of State for the Colonies sought the advice of the group on the 
‘Secret Proposals.’ Minutes of one of their sessions highlight one clear position, viz., while 
they had a potential of redressing the grievances of the opposition preparing a new 
constitution by Order of Council in which they would be incorporated was not feasible, 
because independence was only five months away.
388
 Furthermore, Bing’s position as 
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Nkrumah’s government’s legal adviser posed a constitutional dilemma to the Colonial Office. 
There was already a tacit use of the Gold Coast Prime Minister’s prerogative of power in 
authorising Bing to draft an alternative constitution to the one being spearheaded by the 
Colonial Office. On October 10, 1956, the Secretary of State for the Colonies  sent a telegram 
to Nkrumah’s government drawing their attention to the fact that the April White Paper rather 
than the ‘Secret Proposals’ should form the basis of the independence constitution. He 
pointed out the he “cannot contemplate that the existing instruments should all be revoked 
and replaced by a comprehensive new constitution embodying many new features not in the 
present instruments such as the codification of fundamental rights and constitutional 
conventions”389 and reminded Nkrumah of his earlier acceptance of this in a memo to him 
(the Secretary of State for the Colonies) on September 7, 1956.
390
 
 Parkinson points out that the Colonial Office proceeded on the Independence Act for 
Ghana in two phases: the House of Commons passing an act that would grant parliamentary 
sovereignty to the Legislative Assembly and dominion status to the Gold Coast, and then the 
amendment of the 1954 Constitution to suit an independence context.
391
 The British 
government was using its experience of granting independence to India and Ceylon to guide 
the way they dealt with the Gold Coast/Ghana transition. In a telegraph, the Governor of the 
Gold Coast notified the Secretary of State for the Colonies of a Cabinet decision taken on 15 
October 1956 to use a modified version of the April White Paper instead of the ‘Secret 
Proposals’ in the new constitution.392 (The cabinet had taken into account the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies’ reply to Nkrumah concerning the ‘Secret Proposals.’)  
Nkrumah’s government invited the parliamentary opposition to a constitutional 
conference in which the Revised Constitutional Proposals were discussed in line with the 
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position of the Colonial Office that the ‘Secret Proposals’ should be shelved. The leader of 
the NLM, Baffuor Akoto, guided the opposition while Nkrumah spearheaded the government 
position. Indeed, the revised proposals were a rehearsal of the April White Paper, namely 
provisions on non-discrimination on the grounds of race, guarantee of compensation for the 
compulsory acquisition of property, freedom of conscience and religion and the intent to 
incorporate a bill of rights after independence.
393
 The NLM, on the other hand, presented the 
same proposals they had given to the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the government, 
asking for the following provisions to be incorporated into the new constitution: justice; 
freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association; equality of 
opportunity; recognition of the rights of minority groups; and subject to law, morality and 
good conscience that the UDHR shall apply in post-independent Ghana.
394
  
Once again, the fundamental differences between the government and the 
parliamentary opposition were threatening to disrupt the talks. To avert this situation 
Nkrumah’s government sought and received permission from the Colonial Office to make 
public the telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies opposing the incorporation of 
a bill of rights in the new constitution. When talks resumed on October 24, the parliamentary 
opposition supported the proposal that a bill of rights should be incorporated into the 
constitution after independence mainly because of the position of the Colonial Office.
395
 
Although the two parties did not agree on everything, for example, the guarantee of 
compensation for property acquired compulsorily, they both supported the inclusion of a bill 
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of rights in the constitution after independence.
396
 
 Another important step taken by Nkrumah’s government following the inter-party 
conference was a three-day session with the leaders of the regional assemblies. 
Representatives from the Asanteman Council, Joint Provisional Council of the Chiefs of the 
Gold Coast, the Northern Territories Council and the Trans-Volta and Togoland Council met 
with the government delegation. After studying the proposals of the government, the regional 
councils made formal submissions. The representatives of the Joint Provincial Council of 
Chiefs asked for a constitutional provision on freedom of religion and conscience while those 
of the Northern Territories Council demanded that “Fundamental rights of the individual 
should be declared before making the functional provisions... [because a] Constitution can 
claim obedience only in so far as it establishes a government in accordance with natural 
law.”397 Parkinson draws attention to the way the assertion that natural law is the 
philosophical bedrock for a constitution served to reinforce the demands for the right to 
equality, the right to freedom, the right against exploitation, the right to freedom of religion, 
cultural and educational rights, the right to property, the right to constitutional remedies, the 
right to expression and freedom of speech to be incorporated into the Independence Council 
in Order.
398
 The government’s position remained the same, namely, that “it would be 
impossible to include in the Independence Order in Council any codification of Fundamental 
Rights”399 and that the Indian constitutional experience should guide the negotiation process 
in the Gold Coast. Thus, the question of a bill of rights was deemed to be beyond the scope of 
two conferences, and as the Secretary of State for the Colonies said in his letter to the 
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Governor of the Gold Coast, the attempt to resolve the differences between Nkrumah’s 
government and other interest groups had not succeeded.
400
 In an undated comment, Arden-
Clarke echoed the words of James Griffiths that “whatever the drafting difficulties or 
however unusual the procedure may be, the writing in of certain fundamental rights would go 
far to allay misgivings, particularly amongst the intelligentsia.”401  
 The government published the Revised Proposals for Gold Coast Independence on 
November 7, 1956 and initiated the debate in the Legislative Council. According to the 
debates, Nkrumah maintained the government position on the new constitution in the 
Legislative Assembly, arguing against the three main proposals of the opposition parties, i.e., 
regional assemblies having the same relationship as Northern Ireland to the UK in 
independent Ghana, the creation of an upper house and a council of state. However, the 
government conceded to the idea of a bill of rights in the constitution after independence.
402
 
Prior to the vote on the Government Revised Proposals in which the government won by 70 
to 25, Nkrumah made a three and a half hour speech to the Legislative Assembly members 
outlining the vision of his government in independent Ghana. Not only did the Colonial 
Office accept the Government’s revised Proposals but also Sir John Macpherson, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office, noted that Nkrumah’s speech was 
excellent and that “if Nkrumah’s action and conduct measure up to this speech all may yet be 
well.”403 
 As the House of Commons tackled the drafting of Ghana’s Independence Bill, the 
question of a bill of rights in the independence constitution came up again. Busia, one of the 
leaders of the NLM, raised the issue at a press conference held in London on December 10, 
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1956; he effectively accused the British Government of not supporting the incorporation of a 
bill of rights in the constitution, pointing out that “the Gold Coast Government was agreeable 
to producing a comprehensive constitution, including a guarantee of fundamental rights, to 
take effect at independence, but that they were prevented from doing so by the attitude taken 
by her Majesty’s Government.”404 In the Hansard of the House of Commons, James 
Griffiths, then the opposition spokesperson for colonial affairs, is quoted as saying that: 
The Government of the Gold Coast have said that when they frame their Constitution 
after independence day that they propose to enshrine in it those provisions about 
fundamental rights which are incorporated in the Constitution of India... if those 
provisions for fundamental rights which are embodied in the Indian Constitution are 
enshrined in the Gold Coast’s Constitution, that may go a very long way towards 
removing many of the fears now expressed by the Opposition in Ghana. Can any steps 
be taken by the Gold Coast Government in advance of independence day?... I would 
put this suggestion to the Government of the Gold Coast, and I hope that the Secretary 
of State [for the Colonies] will give it some consideration. Cannot these provisions for 
fundamental rights, which the Government have already said they will accept, be 
embodied either in a Bill, or, if that is constitutionally impossible, in a White Paper 
and be debated in the Legislative Assembly and carried by a resolution which would 
indicate that  they proposed to enshrine them in the Constitution after independence 
day? If that were done, it would go a very long way, I believe, towards meeting the 
fears which are being expressed...
405
    
  
These words highlighted two key arguments as to why incorporating a bill of rights in the 
constitution should be given a second thought: first, the opposition parties in the Gold Coast 
pushed for it, and second, the Government had theoretically accepted the idea of a bill of 
rights. Parkinson has pointed out that Griffiths’ position did not represent the official Labour 
Party position on bills of rights but rather a personal pragmatic response to a problem.
406
 
Lennox-Boyd’s response to Griffiths’ point was that  
these fundamental rights—freedom from arrest, freedom of association, and things of 
that kind—are already implicit in the common law which extends throughout the Gold 
Coast, and their enunciation in the constitution would not add materially to that... 
Nonetheless, I have listened with sympathy and understanding to the arguments which 
have been used. I recognise that it may be that this ought to be looked at again. I will 
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give an undertaking that I will certainly look at it again, though I would emphasize 
that it would be unreasonable and impracticable not to take very full account also of 
the views of Gold Coast Government on all these matters, though on this particular 
matter it is true that both the Gold Coast Government and the Opposition at one time 
were in agreement that this should be done.
407
 
 
Eastwood echoed a similar point two months prior to independence when he argued that 
Nearly all these fundamental rights are fully safeguarded by the basic principles of the 
common law which of course applies in Ghana. The protection afforded by the 
common law is really a much better safeguard against abuse than any enshrinement in 
the constitution—provided of course that the independence of the judiciary is 
safeguarded.
408
 
 
Nkrumah wrote a personal note to the Secretary of State for the Colonies protesting the 
unfairness of faulting his government for the dearth of a bill of rights and pointing out that 
“we have both agreed that [a bill of rights] is a matter best left until after independence.”409 
The Gold Coast Government also asserted that fundamental rights ought to have enforcement 
mechanisms guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, judicial review and a realisable 
right to remedy, and the only way to safeguard fundamental rights is to accept the ‘Secret 
Proposals.’410 Nkrumah also flagged up the fact that he was “firmly of the view that this is far 
too complicated a matter to be inserted in the Order in Council particularly in the short time 
available.”411 
 Although the House of Commons debate on a bill of rights for the Gold Coast had 
inspired a re-appraisal of the Gold Coast constitution-making exercise, the Colonial Office 
saw the issue of a bill of rights for its colonies as something to be approached with caution. 
As Christopher Eastwood, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in-charge 
of West Africa, explained, “All our instincts are against trying to define fundamental rights 
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and if we do it for Ghana may it not set an awkward precedent for other places?”412 J. S. 
Bennett had also re-evaluated the issue of a bill of rights, situating it within the specific Gold 
Coast context and analysing the reasons for and against setting a precedent in Ghana.
413
 The 
first reason underlined in Bennett’s file is the paradox of making provisions for fundamental 
human rights, while “any formulation of fundamental rights almost invariably ends by 
limiting them.”414 On this point he raised the question of the judiciary having the power to 
either uphold or infringe upon individual rights depending on how freely it exercises its 
powers and the problem of the executive suspending a bill of rights during a state of 
emergency. Second, while the British government was the first to ratify the ECHR on March 
8, 1951 it had not been keen to accede to the UDHR in 1948. (Greece had taken Britain to the 
European Court of Human Rights over its treatment of the Greek Cypriots in the same 
period.) 
 This position was defended by G. W. Putnam of the International Relations 
Department thus: “The reason why her Majesty’s government has become cool towards the 
United Nations draft covenants are (a) that since the 8
th
 Session of the Assembly they have 
included a self-determination article and (b) that more and more rights have been added 
which would probably make it impossible for her Majesty’s government to ratify them.”415 
She went on to argue that “If Ghana becomes a member of the United Nations, I think it must 
automatically pledge itself to the [Universal] Declaration [of Human Rights], but the binding 
covenants have been on the stocks for ten years and if we have our way they are likely to be 
delayed as long as possible. Therefore I doubt whether any of the international Human Rights 
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Covenants could provide any guarantee of human rights in Ghana.”416 In a memo regarding 
fundamental rights , Sir Ralph Hone argued that including a bill of rights in the constitution 
“is not the British system.”417 
 
6.3. The problems with ‘historicising’ human rights through a bill of rights 
The inspiration for a bill of rights in the 1957 Independence Constitution had its roots 
not only in the UN Charter and the UDHR but also in factors such as the constitutional 
experiences of former British colonies, excessive structural injustice and the domestic 
political pragmatism of some nationalist movements. But once the process of negotiation got 
under way it became clearer and clearer that these reasons were not persuasive enough for all 
the parties concerned. Also, the political and historical circumstances of the Gold Coast were 
not considered conducive enough for a bill of rights.  
Ellacuria and Tarimo’s argument that the validity of human rights is in its application 
is relevant to the debate on introducing a bill of rights into the 1957 Independence 
Constitution.
418
 The UDHR undertaking that “All human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights”419 provided a teleological basis for incorporating fundamental rights into 
the constitution of a country emerging from the shackles of colonial rule. The main 
proponents of the bill of rights considered that it would guarantee certain fundamental rights 
and give the new nation-state a legal framework for preventing state agents from violating the 
rights of individuals or minority groups.  
While the opposition parties highlighted nine fundamental rights out of the thirty 
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provided for in the UDHR in their ‘Proposal for a Federal Constitution,’ Nkrumah’s 
government specified only seven in the ‘April White Paper’ as well as in the ‘Secret 
Proposals.’ The ‘human rights texts’ dealing specifically with the issue of the bill of rights 
underline the reasons why the competing parties favoured some fundamental rights and not 
others. Firstly, there was a paradigm shift as anti-colonial nationalist front polarised in party 
politics. The 1951 Constitution paved the way for electoral representation under universal 
adult suffrage. With landslide victories in successive elections between 1951 and 1957, the 
CPP’s hold on state power changed independence politics in the Gold Coast. Thus, political 
pragmatism overshadowed the anti-colonial nationalist agenda that had previously 
characterised the activities of the UGCC and the CPP. The opposition parties united under the 
umbrella of the NLM with plans of changing the balance of power, improving their prospects 
for electoral success, and reversing the inequalities of pre-independence as the country 
transitioned into self-rule. The NLM attempted to shift the balance of state power through the 
constitutional means available to them. By arguing for the integration of fundamental rights 
into the Independence Constitution, they were seeking a safe mechanism through which 
minority interests would be protected.
420
 Secondly, Nkrumah’s government anticipated the 
threat that a coalition of opposition parties would pose to their fledgling hold on state power. 
Although the government’s position on the bill of fluctuated, political pragmatism shaped the 
negotiation process.  
The wavering of the Colonial Office and Nkrumah’s government on having a bill of 
rights in the constitution shaped the way the independence bill was framed in 1956, giving 
sovereign power to the legislative organ of government rather than to the judiciary. The 
reasons were not always consistent, but documents from the Colonial Office and the Gold 
Coast highlight a number of reasons for the vacillation. First, the Colonial Office looked for a 
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precedent upon which to construct the Gold Coast transition; second, they wanted a 
constitution in which the powers of the three organs of governmental could be weighed 
against each other in the model of Westminster; third, Colonial officials such as Bennett and 
Eastwood, Hone and Putnam wanted to wash their hands off any blame in the event a bill of 
rights backfired in post-independent Ghana; fourth, Nkrumah’s government seemed certain 
about the need for independence from colonial rule but unsure about the benefits and 
detriments of a bill of rights under the new regime. 
 The British Government drafted a White Paper on the independence of Ghana in the 
weeks leading up to the visit of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Accra. Apart from 
recommendations on job security for the expatriate civil servants and constitutional 
guarantees, the document reflected the Gold Coast Government’s Revised Proposals.421 
During the Secretary of State’s visit to the Gold Coast (January 24 to 30, 1956) he held 
discussions on the White Paper on the Independence Constitution with the Nkrumah’s 
government and with the opposition parties. According to the minutes of some of the 
meetings, the issues that engaged the imagination of the three parties included safeguarding 
constitutional amendments to two-third majority of the Legislative Assembly as well as the 
regional assemblies, an independent body responsible for the service commission, and the 
question of regional assemblies. Eastwood, who had preceded the Secretary of State on the 
visit, noted that  
We had there ten days of intense discussions on every conceivable subject, but the 
question of fundamental rights was only raised in very general terms by the 
Opposition and we had no detailed discussion on the subject as such with either the 
Opposition or the Government.
422
 
 
After the Secretary of State’s visit to Accra the Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council was 
issued on 22 February 1957. The recognition of the rights of minority groups, and 
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compensation for property compulsorily acquired by the state, and freedom of religion in the 
new constitution was the closest to providing for fundamental rights in new Ghana.
423
 Many 
scholars have pointed out that not including a bill of rights in the independence constitution 
or making it difficult to amend the constitution gave an arsenal of political weapons to 
Nkrumah’s government to use against their critics after independence. Within a year of 
attaining independence, Ghana’s new constitution faced a number of implementation 
challenges. The Constitution (Repeal of Restrictions) Act 1958 was passed expunging the 
three fundamental rights from the constitution.
424
 
 
6.4. Question of justiciability and reasons for the choice of fundamental rights 
The fundamental rights that the ‘Proposal for a Federal Constitution,’ the April White 
Papers, ‘Secret Proposals’ and Proposals for the Constitution of Ghana provided for were 
recognised as justiciable in the sense that, theoretically, they could be invoked in a court of 
law and applied by judges. For example, Article L of the Proposals for the Constitution of 
Ghana stipulated that  
Subject to the provisions of Article Thirty-seven the right to move the Supreme Court 
for the enforcement of the rights contained in Part II of this Constitution is guaranteed 
to every citizen of Ghana wherever he may be and to every other person while in 
Ghana, and the Supreme Court shall have power to issue appropriate directions, 
orders or writs for the enforcement of the rights conferred therein.
425
 
 
The applicability of human rights law is consistent with Edsman’s view that Gold Coast had a 
small number of Western-trained African lawyers.
426
 An inevitable consequence of the 
number of lawyers in the country was that the judiciary could grow out of this group after 
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independence; also, the basic conditions existed for justiciability of the bill of rights to be 
realised since there was a growing understanding and spread of the litigation culture. 
Although the complexity of factors that determine the appointment of judges may make this a 
simplistic position, it points to the fact that there was an enabling environment for a workable 
bill of rights.
427
 Thus, enshrining fundamental rights in the constitution seemed like a goal 
that the post-colonial government, in the estimation of the NLM, should aim for in an 
environment where rights would be protected by the courts. Jurisprudence from Gold Coast 
courts up to that point in history was understandably non-existent on the application of 
fundamental rights which is one of the reasons legal enforceability seemed an appealing 
option as the country moved toward independence.
428
  
Apart from the question of justiticiability is the constitutional and statutory nature of a 
bill of rights in a country emerging from colonial rule. A bill of rights is an extrapolation 
from the values of liberal democracy, something which the nationalist movements fervently 
demanded from the colonial administration. The provisions made in the Gold Coast 
(Constitution) Order in Council 1951 about universal adult suffrage served as a stepping 
stone for the demands for fundamental rights in subsequent constitutions. Busia pointed out 
in a memo to his parliamentary colleagues four months before independence the positions of 
the competing parties on the bill of rights: 
In a recent statement by the Gold Coast Government in a white paper entitled ‘The 
Government's Revised Constitutional Proposals for Gold Coast Independence’, it is 
stated ‘Originally the opposition proposed that there should be an entirely new and 
written Constitution, for Independence. The Government had much sympathy with 
this idea and in particular, like the opposition, wished to include in the Constitution 
fundamental rights guaranteeing liberty and the right of political and industrial 
association, together with freedom of speech and of the Press. The British 
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Government, however, took the view, that these were matters which should be put 
into the Constitution after Independence and after the British Parliament had 
conferred full sovereignty on the Parliament of Ghana.’ The opposition maintains its 
view that a proper written Constitution for the new State should be drafted before 
Independence.
429
  
 
Without the structured forum for the transfer of power brought about constitutionally, the 
nascent democratic culture of debating and negotiating different political positions 
highlighted by Busia would not have been feasible. 
 A diversity of factors determined which fundamental rights were preferred by 
different competing parties on the bill of rights. Firstly, the racial composition of the Gold 
Coast formed the basis for a dichotomy between ‘British citizens’ and ‘British subjects,’ with 
the former having more rights than the latter. As a result, anti-colonial nationalism flourished 
as more and more ‘subjects’ became agitators for greater say in government and the right to 
be recognised as citizens with certain basic rights. Secondly, the colonial administration had a 
draconian legal framework for responding to civil disputes in the Gold Coast, including 
emergency measures under which those aspects of common law that protected rights were 
immediately suspended; also, local leaders who opposed colonial rule were sometimes 
deported.
430
 It should be noted that that the question of citizenship and declarations of states 
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of emergency are not only interconnected but also form part of the background for selecting 
only nine out of the thirty rights delineated in the UDHR.  
The Opposition Parties theoretically situated their demands for a bill of rights on the 
forces that would bind the nation-state together after independence. Busia’s memo to his 
parliamentary colleagues points out that 
The only link which binds these four territories [Gold Coast colony, Ashanti 
Protectorate, Northern Protectorate and Trans-Volta Togoland] at the present time is 
British sovereignty. If that link is removed, there will be no bond either legal or 
political to hold together the proposed new State except upon the basis of general 
agreement.”431  
 
Although Busia’s argument is not really the full story about post-World War II Gold Coast, it 
provides a helpful context for understanding nationalist politics from 1950 onward and 
reveals the way sectional and ethnic interests shaped the contours of party politics in the 
years leading up to independence. The practice of party politics among the nationalist 
movements became a contentious site where ideas of colonial domination clashed with ideas 
of ethnic identity, sectional interest and self-determination. It should also be noted that the 
amalgamation of many of the southern-centred opposition parties into the NLM and 
formation of the Northern Peoples’ Party (NPP) in 1954 highlighted the challenge of 
sectionalism over nationalism. Prior to the 1950s, however, nationalism had generated several 
unifying myths, and the nationalist leaders focused less on the dividing lines on party politics 
or ethnic belonging, as the basis for asserting the right to self-determination in the Gold 
Coast. 
 Thirdly, the underlying principle for the opposition parties coalescing into the NLM 
was to challenge the CPP, the ruling party, as the dominant nationalist party both in the eyes 
of the electorate and the British Government. Bing points out that the timetable for 
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independence was constructed against the background of the electoral success that the CPP 
had had in the 1951, 1954 and 1956 legislative elections.
432
 As a result, the colonial 
administration used “the CPP in the same manner as they once used the chiefs”433 in the 
policy of indirect rule. This created a sense of exclusion in the opposition coalition who 
found ways of asserting their power to the British and Nkrumah’s governments. The NLM 
‘Proposals for a Federal Constitution’ reinforced the idea that the Gold Coast colony, Ashanti 
Protectorate, Northern Protectorate and the Trans-Volta Togoland should have bicameral 
regional parliaments apart from the federal legislature with an upper house based on regions 
and a lower house based on population distribution. Such an arrangement would have limited 
the powers of the federal government, made constitutional amendments difficult and given 
back to the chiefs a central role in government after the introduction of universal adult 
suffrage and the ‘new culture’ of electoral representation in the Legislative Assembly had 
practically eroded the power of the chiefs.  
It is important to note that many of the nationalist figures, sections of the 
intelligentsia and the emerging domestic business class came from royal families. For 
example, Danquah was from the Ofori Panin Royal House of Akyem Abuakwa of which his 
brother, Nana Ofori Atta I, was Omanhene (King) while Busia descended from the Royal 
House of Wenchi.
434
 Nana Ofori Atta I was in fact one of the first Africans to be appointed 
by Governor Hugh Charles Clifford to the Legislative Council in 1916, and paved the way for 
the progressive increase in the number of chiefs in the legislature. Out of twenty-nine 
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members of the Legislative Council in 1945, five were paramount chiefs.
435
 Members of 
royal households filled the leadership slots of the ‘movement,’ among them Danquah and 
Bafuor Osei Akoto, the chief linguist of the Asantehene. Danquah became more or less the 
mouthpiece not only of a centre-right intelligentsia but also of the chiefly class, advocating, 
in the ‘Proposals for a Federal Constitution’, for an upper house of parliament wholly for the 
chiefs. 
Elected representatives took their place in the Legislative Council following the 
February 8, 1951 elections, and the State Council Bill 1956 curbed their already-limited 
influence in national politics. Although the policy of the NLM was not explicit about 
restoring chiefs’ power in national government, three elements highlight the influence of the 
southern royal households on the movement. The reason the coalition of opposition parties 
was called ‘National Liberation Movement,’ and not ‘party,’ is because of the influence of 
the chiefs. Bing points out that the reason for the choice of the term ‘movement’ over ‘party’ 
is because 
[p]arty politics were contrary to the tenets of traditional rule and as a price for their
 [the chiefs’] support they insisted it should embrace feudalism also and thus propose
 the re-division of the country into its old provinces which had existed as almost
 separate entities in the heydays of Indirect Rule.
436
 
 
 Some analysis of the configuration of the Gold Coast Colony is useful to highlight 
why the issue of ‘minority rights’ came up in the demands of the NLM, as it points to 
ethnicity and sectionalism as a raison d'être for demanding protection for the rights of 
minority groups. In at least two memoranda, Busia underlined the issue of the disconnection 
between the four entities that made up the Gold Coast. For example, in ‘Judge for Yourself,’ 
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Busia argued that  
The NLM and its allies stand for a unity of equals in a federation. Federation is a 
unity of equals. We want the Northern Territories, Ashanti, the Colony and Togoland, 
each to be able to manage as much of its own affairs as possible, and at the same time 
walk arm in arm as equals, each helping the other, each contributing to the greatness 
and well-being of our country (italics in the original).
437
  
 
In ‘Gold Coast Independence,’ he highlighted the disparity between the four entities that 
would form an independent Ghana as the basis for incorporating the ‘Proposals for a Federal 
Constitution’ into the independence constitution: 
The area of the proposed State of Ghana is neither geographically, historically or 
politically a single entity. It consists of four separate regions. In addition to the Crown 
colony of the Gold Coast are the separate regions of Ashanti and the Northern 
Territories. Up till 1901 Ashanti was a separate political unit and even after its 
annexation in 1901 continued to be administered separately from the Gold Coast 
colony. The Northern Territories constitute since 1897 a British protectorate. There is 
also a separate Trust Territory of Togoland. It is not sufficient if the Constitution 
meets with the approval of the majority of the Gold Coast colony. Unless it also 
commands the general support of the inhabitants of the other territories, by offering 
them the security and protection to which they are entitled, the new State will be open 
to grave internal conflicts at its very birth.
438
 
 
Although the Gold Coast Legislative Council had African members from 1916 onward, it was 
not until 1946 that the Ashanti Protectorate sent its first representatives. The Northern 
Protectorate continued to “rely upon treaties made between Queen Victoria and their chiefs 
and to be governed directly by British officers under the colonial office, in alliance with their 
traditional authorities.”439 The position of Trans-Volta Togoland as a Mandate Territory, later 
a UN Trust Territory, under British control placed it in a unique territorial situation. Change 
in legislation enabled the Northern Territories and Trans-Volta Togoland to send their first 
representatives to the legislature in 1951, albeit for the former not under universal adult 
suffrage but rather chosen by an assembly of District Councillors.
440
 Even though people in 
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the Gold Coast colony and Ashanti Protectorate elected their representatives by popular vote, 
it took another five or so years before the population in the northern half of the country could 
enjoy the same democratic rights. As an anonymous author indicated in the Journal of 
African Law in 1957, even though the Northern Protectorate was under the full jurisdiction of 
the British Monarch, it did not form “part of Her Majesty’s Dominion… [at] independence 
it… was agreed to adopt the alternative of terminating the various agreements with the native 
Chiefs in the Northern Territories upon which the protection accorded by Her Majesty to 
those territories was based.”441  
Given the differences in developments between the Gold Coast colony as well as the 
Ashanti Protectorate on the one hand and the Northern Protectorate, a federal system of 
government would have left the northern half of the country theoretically enjoying what 
Busia termed ‘unity of equals’ without the attendant infrastructural improvements. Aspects of 
pragmatism justified the different approaches taken by the political parties on the question of 
a bill of rights. 
 
6.5. Negotiating the meaning of fundamental rights and freedoms 
During the transition from colonial to self-rule in the Gold Coast a complex set of 
assumptions, expectations, conventions and frameworks shaped the way meanings of 
fundamental rights and basic freedoms were negotiated. Among the agents of negotiations, 
the principles of human rights were conceptualised against the backdrop of colonial 
domination, existing realities of politics and culture, and the post-independence future of the 
country. The idea that fundamental rights are rooted in ‘human dignity’ reinforced the claim 
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to the right to self-determination and a democratic culture in which all human beings are 
entitled to be treated with dignity and justice. It is worth noting briefly that the nine 
fundamental freedoms and rights that the Northern Territories Council proposed to 
Nkrumah’s government were all guaranteed in the UDHR.  
From the outset, the UN human rights framework gave prominence to the idea that all 
human beings have certain fundamental freedoms and basic rights. The UDHR, which 
underlined the fact that human beings are all equally entitled to human rights without 
discrimination on grounds of gender, race, sex, national or ethnic origin, religion, language or 
any other status, touched a nerve in the nationalist movements in the Gold Coast. It is the 
revulsion to the inhumanity of human beings toward other human beings that inspired the UN 
to express the determination  
to affirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person, in equal rights of men and women and nations large and small, to establish 
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties... 
can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom.
442
 
 
The nationalist movements increasingly integrated the language of human rights into the 
existing emancipatory discourses, and in the period leading up to independence some 
nationalist movements demanded that these rights be guaranteed by law. In the case of the 
NLM, which consistently campaigned for a bill of rights, shaking off the shackles of colonial 
domination was only one of the steps necessary to build a democratic culture in the post-
independent Ghana. These nationalist parties considered the matter of enshrining 
fundamental rights through a bill of rights important. In ‘Judge for Yourself’, for example, 
Busia asserted that Nkrumah’s government had disappointed many people in the country  
because [inter alia] they have seen threats of dictatorship... [and] a federal form of 
government for the Gold Coast ... [would] safeguard the country against dictatorship, 
provide constitutional checks against over-centralization of power, and do justice to 
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the legitimate and manifest desire of each region for a large measure of autonomy.
443
 
 
Collective fear of the opposition parties that without clear constitutional guarantees 
Nkrumah’s government (or any other government for that matter) might deny their basic 
rights to minority groups and individuals holding different views from the party in power 
played a part in the struggle.
444
  
The increasing penchant for the adoption of bills of rights among former British 
colonies also influenced the discourse of human rights in the Gold Coast. Indeed, this was 
part of the broadening awareness of the international political realities by the nationalist 
movements. In particular, the Irish, Indian and Sri Lankan constitutional examples were 
considered worth emulating in the Gold Coast. Some of the rights in the proposed bill of 
rights were inspired by the Irish Free State Constitution Act, 1922 and by the Constitution of 
India, 1949. Nkrumah’s government seemed determined to follow the Indian example by 
arguing for the adoption of a bill of rights after independence. Bing substantiates this point by 
highlighting the sources of the fundamental rights in the ‘Proposals for the Constitution of 
Ghana.’445 Constitutional provisions prohibiting discrimination against minority groups in 
Gold Coast (Constitution) Order in Council 1950 were replicated from the Sri Lankan 
constitution regarding protection for the Tamil minority. 
A complex network of assumptions about international human rights, expectations for 
an independent Ghana, conventions about constitution-negotiating processes and the power 
of an enforcement mechanism influenced the debates, determined which rights were 
considered essential in the proposed bill of rights, and the agreement that Ghana should 
emulate the Indian example. The domestic colonial situation accounted for the type of rights 
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that caught the imagination of the negotiating parties. In the submission of the Northern 
Territories Council in 1956, a bill of rights is viewed as important because of the power of 
justiciability that a constitution would give it.
446
 It is not clear what exactly was meant here 
by 'natural law’ but the philosophical undertone cannot be missed in the use of the term in the 
particular context. Natural law means the designate laws set ‘by nature’ and therefore valid in 
the Gold Coast as in other parts of the world. Be that as it may, the term got lost in the maze 
of the debates about when to introduce a bill of rights rather than about the precise 
philosophy of human rights. Indeed, this point draws attention to the symbiotic interplay 
between theoretical understanding and activism, two essential aspects of human rights 
discourse in a situation of injustice. In UDHR parlance everyone has the right to equality, but 
this may mean nothing to someone whose rights are not protected constitutionally at the 
domestic level. In this context, the idea of a bill of rights was intertwined with what the 
Northern Territories Council understood to be a concept of truth, a notion of the common 
good and the meaning of democratic culture.  
Although Nkrumah’s government and the opposition parties differed on the form 
government ought to take, they agreed on the value of a bill of rights in the constitution even 
if for different reasons. The repeated attempts to reach agreements with the NLM over the 
form of constitution to adopt for the country highlight a certain willingness to negotiate on 
the part of the political parties and openness to the normative principles of parliamentary 
democracy. The number of negotiation activities in 1956 alone underscores the nascent 
democratic culture in the work of government. For example, a select committee was set up in 
1955 to consider the constitution, the services of an independent constitutional adviser were 
employed between 1955-56, the Achimota Conference was held in 1956, a Government 
‘White Paper’ on the constitutional proposals for independence was released in 1956, general 
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elections were held in 1956 in which the CPP again won the majority in parliament, Alan 
Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, paid an official visit to the Gold Coast, 
a delegation of the NLM met with the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London on the 
constitution in 1956 and Nkrumah’s government’s Secret Proposals on the constitution were 
forwarded to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in October 1956, among other activities. 
While it did not provide constitutional guarantees for basic freedoms or principles of 
parliamentary democracy British common law tradition became a reference point for the 
Colonial Office in the debates about a bill of rights. For example, when Christopher 
Eastwood claimed that “fundamental rights are fully safeguarded by the basic principles of 
the common law which ... applies in Ghana,”447 he was effectively arguing that a bill of rights 
would be more or less superfluous. The position of the Colonial Office on fundamental rights 
adversely affected the efforts of the opposition parties and of Nkrumah’s government to have 
fundamental rights entrenched in the independence constitution. 
 
6.6. The gender question in the debates on the bill of rights 
The particular position of Gold Coast women whose basic rights and fundamental 
freedoms were not prioritised in any specific way in the proposed bill of rights highlights the 
disjuncture between the theory and praxis of human rights, the actual experiences of people 
on the ground. The nationalists’ discourses of human rights reflected broad frames of 
reference about self-determination that overshadowed the concerns of minority groups, 
including women and girl-children. In applying a hermeneutic of feminist research which 
examines perspectives that have developed outside the established ways in which women are 
excluded or sidelined, it is worth noting that Gold Coast women were absent from the 
negotiations and their specific human rights’ concerns were neglected in the draft proposals 
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for the bill of rights. This state of affairs reveals a number of things about the gender politics 
in nationalism in general and in negotiating a bill of rights in particular.  
Although women played a crucial part in anti-colonial nationalism in the Gold Coast, 
their role was more predictable than discernible. Nowhere was this more noticeable than in 
the negotiation process for the bill of rights and the content of the draft proposals.
448
 Women 
in the country were legally, and often culturally, subordinate to men in the home and this 
disparity between the sexes was replicated at all levels of public life. Patriarchy (among some 
ethnic communities) and colonialism collectively constructed women as a subordinate group 
to the men. The different shades of discrimination by the state and the nationalist movements 
were further complicated by the transition from colonial rule to self-rule in the country.  
Needless to say, national politics were dominated by men, with the leadership 
positions in the colonial administration and nationalist movements going exclusively to men. 
The reason why women were disadvantaged in the nationalist movements is that they were 
not involved in policy-making at the top levels.
449
 Even when the universal adult suffrage 
was conceded to the Africans in the Gold Coast in 1951 there was a caveat that those 
standing for public office had to know how to read and write in English Language, own some 
property and pay a basic electoral fee.
450
 These qualifications not only disadvantaged women 
but also worsened their already subordinate position in society. Lack of equal educational 
opportunities for girl-children especially in the protectorates and the mandated territory 
already excluded many of them from running for leadership positions.  
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Anti-colonial nationalism is one of the driving forces in the politicisation of Gold 
Coast women. Through it both urban and rural women negotiated new forms of access to 
experiences of political power, what political activities they could engage in, who they could 
vote for in elections, ways to assert their claims to be regarded as people entitled to the 
benefits of democracy, the meaning of fundamental rights and the application of the norms of 
human rights in their lives. At the same time, because “nationalisms are gendered” 451 it 
included a select few but excluded the majority of women in an intersectionality of gender, 
race and class. For example, even though the CPP appointed Mrs. Leticia Quaye, Mrs. Hanna 
Cudjoe, Madam Ama Nkrumah (not a relative of Kwame Nkrumah) and Madam Sophia 
Doku as Propaganda Secretaries of the party in 1951, it took another three years before the 
first woman, Mabel Dove Danquah, was elected (as the CPP Ga MP) to the Legislative 
Assembly.
452
  
It is revealing that the human rights texts that served as the basis of analysis on the 
bill of rights said nothing about the role played by women in, for example, the Achimota 
Conference or in drafting the NLM ‘Proposals for a Federal Constitution’ or in Nkrumah’s 
government’s April White Paper. Takyiwah quotes Margaret Martei, one of the CPP 
women’s activists in the 1950s, as saying that her initial knowledge of nationalist figures 
such as Nkrumah was through various meeting venues “where she was cooking for them.”453 
In other words, the gender-bias was manifested in the absence of women in negotiating the 
bill and also in the dearth of their specific interests in the submissions or draft proposals.  
Although the vote was granted to women in the UK in 1918, the issue of feminism 
and gender politics remained unresolved at several levels in Britain as well as in their 
colonies. It is therefore not surprising that so few women were given senior positions in the 
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colonial civil service in the Gold Coast or even at the Colonial Office. On negotiating the bill 
of rights for Ghana, for example, G. W. Putnam became the lone voice of UK women, at least 
from the available human rights’ texts available. An official of the UK International Relations 
Department, Putnam’s position on human rights seemed somewhat paradoxical in two ways: 
a general scepticism about fundamental rights and no specific mention of women’s human 
rights. Perhaps the scepticism reflected the British Government’s position while the visor she 
wore over women’s rights mirrored a broader international viewpoint on human rights. These 
two positions are captured in her argument that,  
If Ghana becomes a member of the United Nations, I think it must automatically 
pledge itself to the [Universal] Declaration [of Human Rights], but the binding 
covenants have been on the stocks for ten years and if we have our way they are likely 
to be delayed as long as possible. Therefore I doubt whether any of the international 
Human Rights Covenants could provide any guarantee of human rights in Ghana.”454 
 
The UDHR anticipated the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) by emphasising the principles of non-discrimination and equality 
in ‘dignity and rights’ of all human beings. Having these provisions is one thing, promoting 
gender equality and women’s human rights in line with relevant international treaties is quite 
another. The disjuncture between theory and practice remained a major challenge to 
achieving female emancipation and equality. To use Clintock’s phrase to capture the Gold 
Coast situation, both colonialism and nationalism are constituted as gendered discourses that 
cannot be understood without theories of gender power. 
 
6.7. Rights as an emancipatory discourse or just another hegemony? 
Since its emergence, international human rights has meant all things to all people, 
time and again reflecting the requirements for justice when oppressive conditions in the 
power structure have existed. It also sought to provide remedies where violations of basic 
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freedoms and individual rights occurred. The concept of human rights has been used to 
protect the common interest of individuals as well as groups, which is why the question of 
human rights as an emancipatory discourse and/or hegemony is important here. The 
nationalist movement, in particular, appropriated and deployed the human rights language as 
an emancipatory discourse to question the underlying assumptions of colonial rule and assert 
their sense of human dignity through both dialogue with and protest against the colonial 
regime. The term emancipatory discourse is used here to mean frames or practices that free 
individuals and groups from structural injustice and oppressive situations which are limiting 
personal autonomy and restricting communal potential.
455
 For example, Habermas in 
discussing the dominance of economic and political institutions in society justifies a wide use 
of emancipatory discourse.
456
 One of the characteristics of this kind of discourse is its power 
to enlighten people through dialogue and to create a collective consciousness for action; 
Habermas calls this the processes of dialogue ‘communicative action.’457  
The concept of international human rights, it could be argued, achieved dominance or 
hegemony through discursive processes in specific contexts. In the Gold Coast, the norms of 
human rights were increasingly accepted as frames with the potential to reverse the trend of 
colonial domination and create a more democratic culture. As more people recognised the 
possibilities created by appeals to fundamental rights, their participation became better 
focused and more forceful. In an article on emancipatory discourse as liberation, Raelin notes 
that “People join a dialogue provided they are interested in listening to one another, in 
reflecting upon perspectives different from their own, and in entertaining the prospect of 
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being changed by what they learn.”458 For example, the dialogue on incorporating a bill of 
rights in the independence constitution is an exercise in collectively negotiating the 
understanding of fundamental rights in the specific Gold Coast context. 
The human rights discourse, thus, became for the nationalist movements a way of 
protesting against recognizable violations of individual or group rights under the colonial 
regime and a discourse of emancipation in the struggle for the right to self-determination. Of 
course, the ‘shared’ understanding of rights had other implications. The debate about 
extending the ECHR to British colonies was partly informed by a shared understanding of 
human rights in which the unjustified differences in provisions for ‘British citizens’ and for 
‘British subjects’ in the Gold Coast seemed no longer tenable. When the exercise of universal 
adult suffrage became the norm, rather than an exception, colonial domination of the Africans 
was turned on its head. Anti-colonial nationalist movements became participants in the 
democratic process. The rule of law was viewed by both Nkrumah’s government and by the 
opposition parties as a valid principle in post-independent Ghana. It is this belief that fired 
many of the debates about the bill of rights.  
 
6.8. Conclusion 
 This chapter has demonstrated the complex process of debates about incorporating a 
bill of rights in the Independence Constitution. While there were overlaps in the positions of 
the colonial administration, Nkrumah’s government and the coalition of opposition parties 
regarding the idea of a bill of rights their differences were significant enough to scamper the 
process of actually incorporating it in the constitution. Disputes about the meaning and 
significance of human rights in a democratic culture impacted on the negotiation for a bill of 
rights and eventually on the way Nkrumah’s government repealed some laws from the 
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constitution and replaced them with repressive legislation targeting those who were opposed 
to his style of governance. In such a situation, the concept of human rights lost its hegemony 
at the domestic level even though its power as an emancipatory discourse remained relevant. 
Indeed, the endeavour of the opposition parties to have fundamental rights guaranteed in the 
constitution anticipated the authoritarianism that characterised Ghanaian politics after 
independence. One of the things the process also reveals is the absence of feminine voices 
and concerns in many of Gold Coast political debates during the colonial period. The policies 
of exclusion against those who disagreed with the government failed to appreciate that by 
virtue of being human everyone has rights, “and the fact that all of us share these rights 
equally means that each of us has a corresponding responsibility to respect the right of our 
fellow humans.”459 
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Chapter 7 
The Nationalism discourse as a rhetoric of rights 
“During the anti-colonial struggle they showed an unlimited capacity to unite around whatever 
leader or party best and most consistently articulated an anti-imperialist position.”460 
         Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o 
 
“in the struggle for [Ghana’s] independence, one market  
woman... was worth any dozen Achimota [College] graduates...”461 
C. L. R. James 
 
“‘What is truth?’ said jesting Pilate and would not stay for an answer.”462 
       Francis Bacon 
 
7.1. Introduction  
Nationalism is a much-discussed subject, though it could be said to suffer from being 
examined in a limited way. The relevant literature on the Gold Coast has tended to focus on 
the provenance of belonging to the same polity, the anti-colonial consciousness that inspired 
new forms of social organisations, and the collective aspiration for an ‘imagined community’ 
(i.e., a self-governing nation-state) as distinctive elements.
463
 This literature, thus, fails to 
highlight how a nuanced discourse of rights evolved within the post-World War II demands 
for greater participation in government and for the right to self-determination.  
This chapter will attempt to fill this gap in the literature by examining critically the 
articulation of ideas about constitutional/statutory rights and the limited rhetoric of human 
rights in the politics of independence. Nationalism, like a double-edged sword, cut both 
ways—British nationalism was important in the formation of colonial practice in the Gold 
Coast; at the same time, African nationalism eventually became the nemesis of colonial rule. 
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Indeed, nationalism in the 1945-57 Gold Coast reflected broad politics of resistance against 
colonial rule and claims by the African people for recognition as rights-bearing citizens of an 
imagined community, rather than as passive subjects of the British Empire. While much of 
the ‘human rights texts’ used in this chapter have a historical ring to them I shall not explore 
their broad historical relevance, but shall limit myself to analyse them solely in respect to 
what they reveal for nationalist discourses on rights. 
 
7.2. Sowing the seeds of Gold Coast nationalism  
The term nationalism is used here in two distinct but interrelated senses, as an 
ideology and as a discourse in the politics of independence. As an ideology, it helped to forge 
a sense of national unity among diverse ethnic and interest groups in the four territorial units 
(the Gold Coast Colony, the Ashanti Protectorate, the Northern Protectorate and the British 
Mandated Togoland). As a discourse,
464
 nationalism represented a set of social practices 
articulated through language and activism to resist the ‘dominant other’ (i.e., the colonial 
ruler) and to promote the collective interests of the African people against colonial 
subjugation. Mullins’ idea that an ideology is composed of four basic characteristics is 
important for understanding how the human rights idea contrasts with related issues of utopia 
and historical myth.
465
 According to him, an ideology must have power over cognition; must 
be capable of guiding one’s evaluations; must provide guidance toward action; and must be 
logically coherent. Thus, central to the question of nationalism is the way it was used to 
legitimise the idea of a social group and increasingly construct what Kohn described as “a 
prospective nation-state” 466 with all the instruments of power (such as government, media, 
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education, military or the police). To prepare the grounds for the analysis, I will first review 
the delicate trajectory of nationalism in the Gold Coast as a form of resistance especially over 
land rights. 
For the Africans of the 19
th
 century, the idea of the ‘nation’ had practical clarity 
insofar as ethnic compositions were concerned, because ‘the Gold Coast’ initially consisted 
of four disparate territorial units under colonial rule.
467
 Conceptual ambiguity about the 
meaning of ‘nation’ was, however, exacerbated by imperialism. The two-fold link at the time 
comprised the new boundaries delineating ‘the Gold Coast’ territory from other entities and 
the colonial administrative structure. Thus, the earliest manifestations of nationalism and the 
self-determination discourse were fairly provincial, with a group of Fanti traditional rulers 
and educated people coming together under the leadership of Nana Ghartey IV of Winneba to 
form the Fanti Confederation in 1871.
468
 The British House of Commons had set up ‘the 
Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Conditions of the British Settlements on the West 
Coast of Africa’ which in its report in 1865 stated that the Africans should be left alone to 
govern themselves.
469
 The Confederation employed this resolution to oppose the British in 
the area, to resist the idea of British taking over territories from the Dutch and to rally 
opposition to infringement on their land rights. At least, one scholar has drawn comparisons 
between the resistance to British rule in the Gold Coast and a similar uprising that occurred in 
Japan in the same period, raising the question of a possible external influence: 
those who overthrew the shogunate in Japan and those who founded the Fanti 
Confederation in the Gold Coast had many ideas in common. In both cases there was 
an attempt, successful in Japan and unsuccessful in the Gold Coast, by a section of the 
indigenous ruling class to overthrow the feudal order and build up a modern state 
upon Western lines.
470
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In my research, I have not found any other evidence to corroborate Bing’s comparison but 
this assessment may not be far-fetched considering the similarities between the constitutions, 
the forms of resistance and the time at which the two movements emerged. For example, the 
constitution of the Confederation provided inter alia for a “King-President..., a 
Representative Assembly [with the power] of exercising all the functions of a legislative 
body…, [appoint] men of education and position [to form the Cabinet and] a Vice 
President”471 who would be the executive head of government. The constitution of the 
Confederation outlined inter alia goals to 
develop and facilitate the working of mineral and other resources of the country… 
establish schools for the education of all children within the Confederation… [and 
where missionary schools existed, enforce by law] the daily attendance of all children 
between eight and fourteen.
472
  
 
The Shogunate Uprising likewise relied on the indigenous elite to overthrow the feudal order 
and replace it with a ‘modern state’ and the constitution specified the formation of a 
representative government. Spencer Salmon, the Administrator of the Gold Coast at the time, 
felt the Confederation posed a challenge to British expansion and so told the British 
government that “[t]his dangerous conspiracy must be destroyed for good or the country will 
become altogether unmanageable.”473 As a result, the members of the Confederation 
Government were arrested and the organisation declared unlawful in 1874. To make legal 
British sovereignty over the coastal regions, the area was formally constituted as a British 
Crown Colony in the same year through the British Settlements Act, July 1874. In other 
words, expressions of African nationalism were thwarted both through legislation and by 
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military force.
474
 Hobson argues that the migration of part of a nation to a foreign land, with 
those emigrating carrying with them full rights of citizenship of the motherland as well as an 
imperial objective is an expression of nationalism.
475
 His argument is relevant to 
understanding a case of one expression of ‘nationalism’ clashing with another in the 1870s 
Gold Coast context. 
From the above discussion, at least three points can be emphasised about the 
beginnings of nationalism in the Gold Coast. First, the idea of ‘nationhood’ served as a 
powerful site for the coastal ethnic groups to resist those outsiders who had an infringement 
agenda. Nationalism incorporated different shades of political opinion around a common 
agenda of resistance to colonial rule and represented a broad claim especially to land rights 
over the nascent colonial administration. In other words, land and the economy were 
important symbols in the discourse of this first phase of nationalism.  
Second, the nationalism of this period was provincial, spearheaded by elite groups in 
the coast and conforming to what Hughes and Perfect described as a patrician model of 
nationalism.
476
 Even in the emergence of the Congress of British West Africa, the leadership 
was quite provincial—Joseph Casely-Hayford’s father had been a founding member of the 
Fanti Confederation and one of the cabinet members arrested by the colonial administration. 
The provincial nature of nationalism underscores the enduring process of conceptual 
clarifying that characterised the antecedent of post-World War II nationalism in the Gold 
Coast, a process that would continue until independence. Reactions to colonialism heightened 
and diminished ethnocentrism, depending on the balance of power and the nature of the 
‘nationalist’ agenda. 
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Third, while colonialism nullified boundaries and redefined identities, the force of this 
phase of nationalism attempted to validate the old boundaries and identities—and when that 
failed under the power of colonial domination, tried to transcend the old boundaries and 
identities in order to negotiate a collective meaning of an ‘imagined community’ constructed 
around the new borderlines. While the ideology of ‘national’ formation was neither 
prearranged nor systematic in its origins, the sense of difference between the British colonial 
administrators and the Africans generated at least one of the first unifying forces for 
nationalism, which explains why colonies as diverse as the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
and the Gambia could unite under the standard of ‘nationalism.’ Although pre-World War II 
Gold Coast nationalism actually seem to obscure the national narratives, for better and for 
worse these early experiences constructed a foundation upon which the subsequent nationalist 
discourses in the Gold Coast built on. These nationalist movements exhibited a predisposition 
to identify with the common struggle for land rights against the colonial regime, something 
that would be broadened in post-World War II Gold Coast to include the right to self-
determination and democratic rights. 
 
7.3. Post-World War II nationalism and the struggle for rights 
The robust awakening of nationalist consciousness after World War II must be viewed 
against the background of the specific domestic resistance to colonial rule in the Gold Coast, 
the ‘new international order’ and British imperial history at the time. Ideologies of 
nationalism had already taken root in the Gold Coast through the social practices articulated 
through language and activism by, for example, the Fanti Confederation and the Aborigines 
Rights’ Protection Society (ARPS). More and more Africans were returning to the Gold 
Coast over time armed with British and American education, with an increasing awareness of 
the injustice of colonial rule and the measured discomfort of the British government, 
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especially under Clement Attlee’s premiership, about colonialism. 
As Mamdani and Englund have argued, the distinction between rights-bearing citizens 
and subjects was significant, because the latter were instrumental in the success of colonial 
rule but without having the attendant rights of citizens.
477
 In such a situation, the idea of 
‘subject’ became a double-edged sword too, perforating what little allegiance there was 
among the Africans toward British colonial rule and cutting loose an introspective anti-
colonial nationalism. These ‘subjects’ found what Bhabha calls unifying myths such as racial 
belonging, colonial domination, a common cause for self-determination, and a lingua franca 
that bridged the language barriers to employ in anti-colonial nationalism discourse.
478
 The 
Gold Coast (Constitution) Council in Order 1946 failed to respond to many of the demands of 
the nationalist movements, not least the question of citizenship even though the White Paper 
of the British government had stated that “[t]he 1946 Constitution was not a belated 
recognition of long standing demands, but a necessary and accepted step in constitutional 
advancement.”479 
Pressure from the international community, especially through UN politics, gradually 
raised questions about the essence of one group dominating another through colonialism in a 
new international order with a universal human rights agenda in a way that the British 
government could no longer ignore. For example, Andrei Zhdanov, Stalin’s heir apparent, 
delivered a speech in 1947 in which he highlighted the “crisis of the colonial system [and the 
fact that] the peoples of the colonies no longer wish to live in the old way.”480 One official of 
the British Colonial Office in reaction to the critical approach some states adopted towards 
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colonialism observed that, 
the antipathy toward ‘colonialism’ among influential governments in the world is 
such that it is a concrete and important factor affecting HMG’s ability to maintain 
satisfactory foreign relations and to achieve the objectives of UK foreign policy... 
Anti-colonial opinion is so strong in international affairs that it has created a climate 
in which it is no longer possible for the CO and Colonial governments to pursue 
political, economic and social policies in the territories, without taking account of the 
repercussions of those policies on international opinion, since to do so may well, and 
often does, stimulate criticism and dissension which is fed back into the minds and 
attitudes of indigenous politicians.
481
 
 
British Foreign Office study papers no longer shied away from acknowledging the fact that 
nationalism in the colonial territories was indeed a serious issue. In a 1952 study paper 
entitled ‘The problem of Nationalism’ the Foreign Office highlighted the need to respond to 
the sticky situation of nationalism in their colonies through policy changes.
482
 In the new 
international order, the emerging human rights discourse subtly reinforced nationalism and 
demands such as those for self-government in the Gold Coast. Also, many of the British 
colonies in Asia were in the threshold of attaining self-rule in the 1940s. 
The concurrence of factors captured the imagination/energies of the nationalist 
movements, informing the ongoing attempts to negotiate a collective meaning of the national 
community beyond the one constructed by imperial powers. For the Africans returning to the 
Gold Coast after their education in Britain or the USA, the discrimination and inequality 
inherent to colonialism contradicted their knowledge of a fair society. The different groups in 
the colony, protectorates and mandate territory began to notice a common national narrative 
emerging out of the instruments of colonial power such as the education system, a lingua 
franca, the legal system, police and military agencies, and political organisations. Under the 
policy of indirect rule the four territorial units were indeed disparate, but a common 
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administrative thread—with the Governor at the top, the Territorial Commissioners under 
him, the District Commissioners under them, and of course the traditional rulers at the local 
level—linked all the entities into a single ‘community’ with a potential for a prospective 
nation-state. In other words, the administrative structure of the Gold Coast provided a 
national narrative of boundaries within which the nationalist movements could disseminate 
their discourse of independence, one nation and one destiny. For example, writing under the 
heading ‘Toward Gold Coast Nationhood’ in the Ashanti Pioneer, Essiam K. Koomson 
argued that the “appointed time of [Ewe] national awakening has come with the clear 
conviction that unless they come together as one, their course with other tribes of this country 
towards national advancement will be considerably impeded.”483 As a result, dominant 
interest groups were now and again willing to sacrifice their parochial pursuit for the sake of 
‘the common good’ and discourses of justice, equality, freedom, identity and unity ran 
counter to the practices of subjugation, exclusion, inequality, discrimination and injustice.  
In the Legislative Council debates, for example, the Africans unequivocally expressed 
a collective sense in spite of the different shades of opinions they represented, especially after 
the Legislative Council achieved an African majority in 1951. Terms such as ‘this country,’ 
‘our country’ and ‘Ghana’ entered into the nationalism discourse, largely reflecting the 
ideology of the imagined community of a nation. Nana Amanfi III, for example, described 
the 1946 Constitution as “the means whereby this country can be made to take a real and 
effective part in the race of nations towards the attainment of higher ideals.”484 Two years 
later another traditional ruler, Nana Frempong Manso II, responding to the report of the 
Commission of Enquiry into the 1948 riots said that “a new Constitution should be 
formulated and effectuated in such a way as to satisfy the political needs of the people of this 
country and in such a way as to prepare … us ultimately to govern ourselves in no distant 
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future.”485 A news’ report in the African Morning Post of June 2, 1952 notes that the “CPP 
brings respect to Ghana citizens in UK, says Blay”486 and goes on to discuss how “[t]he 
people of England now recognise the people of the Ghana as the most civilised and think of 
them as a people in a colony who can manage their own affairs in the Commonwealth of 
Nations, said Benibengor Blay, author and journalist.”487 The use of ‘Ghana,’ the name 
chosen by some nationalist movements for the post-independent Gold Coast, entering into the 
discourse could be interpreted as form of resistance to the colonial regime and an assertion of 
a new identity.  
The gatekeepers of the dominant discourses tended to be the local chiefs and the 
intelligentsia. It is not clear whether or not the elite-driven nationalism in the Gold Coast took 
a cue from W. E. B. Du Bois’ concept of the ‘talented tenth’ in the colonies, the idea that an 
educated elite was destined to lead the masses to independence.
488
 Since there was some 
contact between Du Bois and some Gold Coast nationalists in the Pan-African movement, it 
is conceivable that the idea of the ‘talented tenth’ had a faint bearing on nationalism. 
However, this can only be a conjecture since post-World War II anti-colonial nationalism was 
elite-driven in most, if not all, British colonies. In the Gold Coast, the people who could best 
articulate the trajectory of rights and employ the unifying myths of a prospective nation-state 
were those with symbolic power such as chieftaincy and Western education. Nkrumah’s 
understanding of the nationalism situation in the 1940s was that  
[t]he promoters of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) came from the middle 
class. They were lawyers, doctors, academics, and indigenous business men, with 
little or no contact with the masses. When they invited me to become general 
secretary of the UGCC they hoped that I would help them bridge this gap, and to draw 
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into their movement the growing anti-colonial, nationalist elements, particularly 
among the youth, which were at that time beginning to make their voices heard 
throughout the country.
489
 
 
Nana Ofori Atta’s challenge to “the Chiefs of the Gold Coast and Honourable Members of 
the Legislative Council [to] support their people in their legitimate demand for self-
government, not by violence nor any unusual means but by constitutional means”490 
reinforces the claim that the traditional rulers and educated Africans saw themselves as 
having a key role to play in the agitations for self-rule. The UGCC founders were very much 
aware of the issue of elite-led nationalism, and therefore laid emphasis on how the party “is 
neither an association nor a party exclusively for the Chiefs or for the intelligentsia. It is for, 
and belongs to, the people of the Gold Coast irrespective of tribe, clan, class, creed or sex.”491 
In spite of the rhetoric that the UGCC would have a national character and move 
beyond an elite group, the choice of the first party executive failed both the inclusive gender 
and sectional tests. A newspaper report on the subject of the executive board illustrates how 
unrepresentative the party was at its inception: “George Grant [from the Western Province of 
the Colony] is Chairman, [the] Vice Presidents, Dr. Joseph Boakye Danquah (Accra) and K. 
Bentsi-Enchill (Central), R. S. Blay (Western), Awoonor Williams [from Accra] is Treasurer, 
Dr. [J. W. de Graft] Johnson [from Western] is Secretary, and Albion Mends [from Western] 
Financial Secretary.”492 As a matter of fact, not a single member of the executive board came 
from the Ashanti Protectorate or the Northern Protectorate or Trans-Volta Togoland. Women 
were marginalised from the upper echelons of the party. The Ashanti Pioneer reported that 
“Mrs. Sophia Eyeson and Mrs. Martey… [were] speakers”493 along with several men at the 
launch of the party at Saltpond on August 4, 1947. The tokenism with regard to women’s 
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participation at the launch may be pointing to a certain awareness about gender issues at this 
stage in nationalist politics, but the ‘human rights texts’ illustrate that it remained only an 
idea in the UGCC. Even though the patrician politics of the UGCC reflected the narrow 
interests of the elite, the agenda in theory was broad, embodying, according to the 
Constitution, “independence in the shortest time possible.”494 
As a result of the dominance of the traditional rulers and intelligentsia in nationalist 
politics, the discourse of human rights tended to fluctuate, subject to the balance of power in 
nationalism vis-à-vis the colonial administration or other nationalist movements. At the same 
time, as the gatekeepers of nationalism discourses in local politics, any infringements 
suffered by the intelligentsia and local chiefs were more likely to be reported in the media or 
debated in the legislature than those of the masses. For example, the reportage on the 1948 
nationwide boycotts and the shooting incidents tended to focus more on the detention of the 
six UGCC leaders under the Emergency Powers Order, Regulation 29 of the Emergency 
(General) Amendment No. 2 than on the 29 people who were killed and 237 injured.
495
 The 
issue came up in the Legislative Council debates on May 7, 1948 although under a point of 
order Danquah, who had raised the matter, was not allowed to proceed with what he desired 
to say. The bit he said was the following: “I wish to report to the Council that on the early 
morning of 13 March [1948] I was removed from my home… All that I want to do is tell my 
fellow Members of the Council what happened to me from the 13
th
 of March to 11
th
 of 
April.”496 
Post-World War II nationalism in the Gold Coast while providing a good platform for 
articulating the independence discourse could not sustain a unified teleology for a long time. 
The major rupture occurred with the breakaway of Nkrumah in 1949 to form the Convention 
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Peoples Party (CPP). According to Nkrumah, “[t]he CPP was launched in Accra on June 12, 
1949 with over 60,000 members. Because it broke away from the UGCC, it incorporated the 
Gold Coast masses and embodied a less pretentious agenda of 'self-government now'.”497 He 
goes on to give the grounds for the breakaway: first, the other leaders of the UGCC failed to 
agree with Nkrumah on the agenda for independence and self-government; and second, the 
support base for the UGCC was mainly the intelligentsia in the urban areas and therefore not 
representative of the masses.
498
 
With the background knowledge from working for the Pan-African movement and the 
UGCC that Nkrumah brought into the new party, he and the other leaders ensured that it had 
a mass-appeal, brought the young people into nationalist politics by forming a Committee of 
Youth Organisation (CYO), and created what wa Thiong’o described as “unlimited capacity 
[for people] to unite around … [a] leader or party best and most consistently articulated an 
anti- imperialist position.”499 The party also articulated a clear programme of action in which 
subjects became rights-bearing citizens with a voice to demand their fundamental freedoms 
and human rights, and not merely asking for concessions to be made for a tiny educated class 
of Africans. By electing Kwame Nkrumah, Kojo Botsio, Komla Gbedemah, Mabel Dove 
Danquah and Akua Asabea Ayisi to the executive the party had managed to break new 
grounds in nationalist politics with a fairly representative leadership.
500
 
Perhaps the major innovations were the setting up of a women’s wing in the party and 
the appropriation of Gandhi’s idea of ahimsa or non-violent resistance to nationalist politics. 
                                            
497
 Kwame Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom 2
nd
 ed., London: Panaf Books, 1973, 55.  
498
 Ibid., 55-6. 
499
 Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature, Oxford: James 
Currey, 1986, 23. 
500
 Hastings, 154. The new nation took its name from the ancient Ghana kingdom that spread over the great 
Sahara between the fifth and twelfth centuries C.E. 
189 
 
According to the party constitution, “[t]here shall be no separate status of women in the 
Party.”501 However, 
"[i]ndividual women members of the Party shall be organised into women's sections. 
Women's sections may be organised on Branch and Ward basis. A General Council of 
Women's Sections shall be established to co-ordinate the activities of the women in 
the Party. Leaders appointed by each Women’s Branch or Ward shall be responsible 
for the co-ordination of work amongst women in the Branch or Ward.
502
 
  
It was also stipulated in the constitution that “[e]ach Party Branch shall have a Women's 
Section to cater for the special interests of women.”503 The CPP through its activities shifted 
the discourse of nationalism and politics of resistance away from the patrician group to reflect 
the aspirations and concerns of the masses. For example, Nkrumah introduced into nationalist 
politics a practical programme of resistance called ‘Positive Action.’ In ‘What I Mean by 
Positive Action,’ Nkrumah defined the concept as  
the adoption of all legitimate and constitutional means by which we can cripple the 
force of imperialism in this country. The weapons of Positive Action are: legitimate 
political agitation; newspaper and educational campaigns; and as a last resort, the 
constitutional application of strikes, boycotts, and non-co-operation based on the 
principle of absolute non-violence.
504
 
 
He developed this theme in Towards Colonial Freedom by acknowledging that he borrowed 
“the kind of tactics employed by Gandhi in India”505 and modified them for the Gold Coast 
context. The Watson Commission described ‘Positive Action’ as “a programme which is all 
too familiar to those who have studied the technique of countries which have fallen victims to 
Communist enslavement.”506 Indeed, ‘Positive Action’ led to the arrest of some of the CPP 
leaders in January 1950 and the eventual incarceration of Nkrumah for thirteen months. The 
CPP clarified the discourse to include a more robust discourse of rights for the wider 
population within the colony. The new party’s approach challenged the monopoly of an elite 
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group and broadened the self-understanding of the African people, giving them confidence in 
the new social practices of activism and lingo.  
Scholars such as Hyam and Rathbone are of the opinion that the 1948 boycotts were 
not inspired by the nationalist movements but rather by a chief.
507
 It depends on their 
understanding of Gold Coast nationalism. A broad spectrum of people affiliated themselves 
with the nationalist movements—some were traditional rulers, others members of the 
intelligentsia, some joined the nascent political parties such as the UGCC and CPP, still 
others were free-standing and of course there were the masses. But all these people 
participated in diverse ways in the nationalism discourses. The argument that a traditional 
ruler by virtue of his role in the policy of indirect rule is not a nationalist in the strict sense of 
the word is simplistic. Nii Bonne was as much a nationalist leader as J. B. Danquah. They 
both led people under their influence with the collective aspiration for an imagined 
community. When Nii Bonne called on the masses “to fight and die for the liberty and 
freedom of your country… Strangers had come to the Gold Coast not for love of its people 
but only to take away the riches of the country by all possible means”508 his words echoed the 
message of other nationalist leaders from, for example, the intelligentsia class who were 
collectively calling for self-government.  
The only relevant difference between the two is the fact that one is a traditional ruler 
and the other a member of the intelligentsia. In a memo to the Watson Commission, an 
anonymous Gold Coast African described how Nii Bonne organized the chiefs and masses to 
resist the post-World War II price increases:  
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Nii Bonne stepped into the [nationalism] scene with his Anti-Inflation campaign 
which he personally financed and waged to a successful conclusion… The method 
adopted by Nii Bonne was very simple… The stubborn resistance of the firms did not 
deter him. He successfully applied our venerable Native Law and Custom which 
outmaneuvered the application of English Law. Nii Bonne needed no special 
legislation to do this… This cloth [wax print] sold by the whiteman at eighty-four 
shillings per piece and sold at the black market for six pounds piece cost the 
whiteman about fifty shillings landed here in these days. If the whiteman sells it at 
fifty shillings he would gain ten shillings profit more than the print cost him. Is the 
whiteman not cunning taking away your money for nothing? … The people will reply, 
‘yes, the whiteman is stealing our money by tricks.’ Nii Bonne will then say, ‘Don’t 
buy anything from the whiteman’s stores and don’t allow your fellow countrymen 
[and women] to buy. If they do swear the oath of the Omanhene on them.
509
 
 
To ‘swear the oath of the Omanhene on them’ is a loose translation of an Akan 
saying, meaning to pronounce the forbidden words reminding them of breaking a taboo and 
then ordering them to appear in the Chief’s Court for prosecution according to customary 
law. Nii Bonne basically turned the colonial policy of indirect rule on its head, which 
according to Bing translates discursively to the following: “the Colonial administration had 
endowed the chiefs, to prosecute and fine those who would not take part in his boycott”510 
and Nii Bonne used the same powers granted him under the Native Authority to set up a 
special court to prosecute people who went to European-owned shops. He received the 
support of the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs before calling on the masses to take 
collective action against the colonial regime and in his decision to set up parallel courts to 
support the boycotts. 
The fundamental link in the resistance politics of traditional rulers and the 
intelligentsia is underscored in the way the UGCC Working Committee used the boycotts as 
a springboard to “ask in the name of the oppressed, inarticulate, misruled and misgoverned 
people and their Chiefs… to hand over Government to an interim Government of Chiefs and 
Peoples.”511 The UGCC leaders sent the cable to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
Arthur Creech-Jones, explaining the effects of the boycotts and demanding the establishment 
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of an interim regime in place of the colonial administration.
512
 However, in response to their 
demands, Creech-Jones, in consultation with Governor Creasy, appointed a Commission of 
Inquiry under the leadership of Andrew Aiken Watson, K.C., to investigate the reasons for 
the 1948 boycotts and disturbances. The other members of the commission were Keith 
Murray, then Rector of Lincoln College, Oxford and Andrew Dalgleish, an officer of the 
British Transport and General Workers Union. At least Bing and Hyam have pointed out that 
Watson had Fabian persuasions and that the commission’s report was “above all, fearless, 
[and] was an outstanding analysis of colonialism not only in the Gold Coast but, by necessary 
implications, in the whole of British Colonial Africa.”513 
The Watson Commission’s Report basically re-stated some of the issues on the post-
World War II nationalist agenda by criticising the gradualist timetable in including Africans 
in government and highlighting that the 1946 Burns Constitution was outmoded at birth;
514
 
they also pointed out that “a failure of the Government to realize that with the spread of 
liberal ideas, increasing literacy and a closer contact with political developments in other 
parts of the world the star of rule through the chiefs was on the wane”515 and identified “an 
immense intense suspicion that the chiefs are being used by the Government as an instrument 
for the delay if not for the suppression of the political aspirations of the people;”516 they also 
recommended that there should be a fully-elected legislature, with the Africans having a 
greater representation in the work of both the Legislative Council and the Executive Council, 
and that a new constitution should be drafted as a prelude to the people realising their full 
right to self-realisation. Two main critiques of the Watson Commission’s report are, first, the 
recommendation that political reforms should be formulated and carried out by the colonial 
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administration, and equating routine activities of the CPP with communism.
517
  
Rathbone and Hyam have noted that the Watson Report “is one of the most significant 
documents of the end of empire,”518 identifying it as evidence of the British Labour 
government’s post-World War II policy orientation toward African colonies. However, the 
British government’s comment on the Watson Commission’s Report stated inter alia that 
In the very short time available to them in the Gold Coast the Commssion were not, it 
is understood, able to travel extensively in the rural areas, and they can therefore have 
had less opportunity of hearing evidence from representatives of the rural 
communities which form the great bulk of the population of the Gold Coast. His 
Majesty’s Government therefore feel it necessary clearly to state that, while attach the 
greatest importance to modernizing the Native Authorities and making them fully 
representative of the people, they regard the Chiefs as having an essential part to play. 
In general the Chiefs of the Gold Coast are the traditional leaders of the people. Their 
functions in regard to local administration are based on popular support; and the 
transfer or delegation of any of their functions would require popular sanction, since 
the position of the Chiefs affects the whole system of relationships on which 
community life is traditionally based. Increasing numbers of Chiefs recognise the 
need for modernizing their institutions and in this every encouragement is given to 
them by the Gold Coast Government and their administrative officers.
519
 
 
The commentary is curious considering the fact that the Watson Commission highlighted 
how Nii Bonne employed his chiefly power to establish a legal basis to support anti-colonial 
agitations, the form of resistance that characterised nationalism at the time.
520
 Some of the 
local chiefs who recognised the need for modernizing the institution of chieftaincy had 
already taken sides, throwing their weight behind the CPP, “and among those later to be 
imprisoned with Kwame Nkrumah [in 1950] was one of the most prominent representatives 
of this class, Nana Kobina Nketsia IV.”521  
The appointment of Sir Charles Arden-Clarke as Governor in 1949, replacing Creasy, 
marked a new phase in Gold Coast nationalism. As David Rooney has pointed out, Arden-
                                            
517
 See Report of the Watson Commission in CO 96/231. 
518
 Richard Rathbone, ed., “Ghana: Introduction” and “Ghana: Part I, 1941-1952” in British Documents on the 
End of the Empire, London: HMSO, 1992, xliv- xxxi-lxxviii. Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The 
Road to Decolonisation 1918-1968, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 148. 
519
 British Government’s Comment on Watson Commission Report in CO 96/796. Also see September 1949 
Minutes in CO 96/800/1. 
520
 See Report of the Watson Commission in CO 96/3.  
521
 Bing, 112. 
194 
 
Clarke summoned up goodwill among the Africans with “batons not bullets... bloody 
coconuts but not bodies.”522 In one of his maiden speeches to the Legislative Council, he 
articulated the sense of partnership that ought to characterise post-World War II relationship 
between United Kingdom and the Gold Coast: 
My understanding of the present position… is that of one partner handing over the 
management of a business to another. There has long been a partnership between the 
United Kingdom and the Gold Coast. The United Kingdom is the elder and more 
experienced partner; he appreciates that the younger partner desires and is qualified 
for greater responsibility and he now proposes to hand over management of affairs to 
the younger… But partners look forward to the day that when with complete 
responsible government the Gold Coast will reach its full stature, having learnt by 
experience with the new Constitution to maintain itself with dignity and secure self-
reliance among nations of the world.
523
  
 
His first set of policy decisions had to do with implementing the recommendations of the 
Watson Commission, such as support for the work of the Sir Justice James Henley Coussey 
Committee to review the 1946 Burns Constitution. Sir Creasy had appointed the Coussey 
Committee in December 1948 “to study conditions in the country and to make 
recommendations for changes in the constitution of the country such as might help us towards 
responsible government. This was purely an African committee.”524 Sir Coussey was a Gold 
Coast African Judge, appointed by the governor along with thirty-nine other Africans to the 
Coussey Committee. At least, eight members were chiefs while the others were divided 
between different interests’ groups. The radical section of the UGCC such as Kwame 
Nkrumah and Ako Adjei as well the ex-service men and the Trade Unions did not have 
representatives on the Committee. Indeed, the CPP was formed just before the issue of the 
Coussey Committee’s Report in October 1949. 
Governor Arden-Clarke’s government had accepted the Coussey Committee’s Report, 
which recommended inter alia municipal elections between April and November 1950, and 
noted that “[c]ontrary to the view expressed in the Watson Report, we believe that there is 
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still a place for the Chief in a new constitutional set up.”525 There is some disparity between 
the recommendations of the Coussey Committee’s Report and the policy decisions of Arden-
Clarke’s government especially regarding the composition of the Legislative Council as 
provided for in the Gold Coast (Constitution) Order in Council 1950. While the Committee 
recommended chiefs choosing one-third of the members of the legislature, the government 
changed it to chiefs electing thirty-seven members to the five to be chosen through direct 
election and the thirty-three to be chosen through electoral colleges.
526
 Moreover, two 
European members were also to join the legislature to represent the Chamber of Mines and 
the Chamber of Commerce besides the three ex-officio members to be appointed by the 
Governor. These measures effectively advantaged the colonial administration and nullified 
the idea of greater representation in government proposed by both the Watson Committee and 
the Coussey Commission. Reactions to the Coussey Commission’s Report and the Gold 
Coast (Constitution) Order in Council 1950 varied, with the leaders of the UGCC describing 
the constitution as “inadequate [and called] for action to be taken now to set up a special 
body to draft for the Gold Coast a constitution that will give us the kind of self-government 
we desire and which we know we must have.”527   
For a context that historically operated on oral tradition, the media introduced another 
platform for the nationalism discourse especially among the educated Africans. The media 
became an emblem providing a functional tool for consolidating the nationalism discourse, to 
claim the freedom to express their views, and a defense against the racial and gender theories 
that had justified colonisation and legal prohibitions against representation in government. 
The editors, who tended to be Western-educated Africans, readily recognised the connection 
between the broader struggles for racial equality and non-discrimination in many parts of the 
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world and the domestic agitations for self-government in the Gold Coast. Examples of the 
most vocal newspapers in the post-World War II era are the Gold Coast Independent, Ashanti 
Pioneer and The African Morning Post which serve as important ‘human rights texts’ for this 
research. 
 
7.4. Changes in British policy after World War II 
The role of the British Labour government in post-World War Gold Coast nationalism 
must also be acknowledged. The Labour Government had won a surprising victory in the 
post-World War II general elections in Britain and initiated as part of a broader foreign policy 
a “metropolitan new deal”528 with colonies such as the Gold Coast for the gradual transfer of 
power to the Africans. Attlee’s government focused on three policy goals, including securing 
the British people against aggression, sustaining a foreign policy that was resistant to 
Communist influence, and achieving rapid development for British overseas dominions.
529
 
The third of the policy objectives represented a paradigm shift in British government’s 
relations with many of its colonies and there was a recognition that imperial Britain had to 
come to terms with the increasing power of nationalism in places such as the Gold Coast. 
Apart from the nationalist agitations for political independence there was also the campaign 
for economic development programmes in the colonies. Cold War politics already inhabited 
many aspects of international affairs in this period, with USSR making “a major drive against 
[the British] position in Africa”530 in the view of Ernest Bevin, the then Secretary of State for 
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Foreign Affairs, and “an attempt to maintain the old colonialism would, I am sure, have 
immensely aided Communism.”531  
Gold Coast nationalism was increasingly influenced by a radical philosophy in the 
1950s, due mainly to some of the ideas of Nkrumah. As James Griffiths, the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, asserted “we [the British] had to face an ideological battle in the 
world, especially in the Colonies.”532  
The experience of the colonial administration in Asia had become an important frame 
of reference for British government policy-makers regarding West African colonies. Indeed, 
the Labour Government wanted a “two-way teamwork”533 approach between Britain and the 
African colonies to prevent a repeat of the Asia decolonisation process from recurring in the 
West African colonies. Cold War politics also shaped British foreign policies towards its 
African colonies throughout the 1950s. Indeed, Hyam argues that the British government was 
preoccupied with swelling the Commonwealth with increasing numbers of newly-
independent states as a way of shielding them from undue Russian influence, “since this 
would be exploited by Russia as a failure and would automatically diminish British influence 
throughout the world.”534 
Indeed, in the Colonial Office there was an acknowledgment that military force 
against nationalist agitations was no longer a viable option. Trafford Smith conceded to this 
fact when he noted that, 
This leads to the conclusion that the important ways in which we deal with 
nationalism, both inside and outside the Colonial sphere, are those which depend on 
                                            
531
 Prime Minister’s Minutes in CAB 21/2277, minute 29 Oct. 1946, & 2280, minute, 23 Dec. 1949; Committee 
on Commonwealth Membership in CAB 134/786, CCM (54)1; C. R. Atlee, As it Happened, London: Odhams 
Press Ltd, 1954, 189.  
532
 General Policy Towards UN On Colonial Questions in CO 537/5699/89 A, 16 June, 1950.  
533
 Administration of High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland; 
the African Conference held in London in DO 35/4023/62, Speech at the opening of the African Conference, 23 
Sept. 1948. Atlee could not attend the conference because of ill health, so Creech Jones represented the British 
Government and read Atlee’s speech.  
534
 Ronald Hyam, “Africa and the Labour Government, 1945-51” in The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 16(3), 1988: 148-172. See also Atlee and Gordon Walker Papers (Churchill Archives 
Centre, Cambridge) in ATLE 1/24/1. 
198 
 
publicity and propaganda, especially in the United States and the United Nations, and 
not by thinking in Edwardian terms of the use of military and economic power which 
we no longer possess.
535
 
 
World War II reinforced nationalist consciousness, when a sizeable group of Gold Coast 
African veterans of the British Army returned to lend support to the aspirations of the 
intelligentsia. One of the first benefits of the nationalist struggle was that a number of 
legislations dealing specifically with a broad array of ‘rights’ were passed in 1951, 1954 and 
1957 progressively opening the way for greater representation in the Legislative Assembly.  
Three interrelated challenges affected the episteme, ways of thinking, about 
nationalism in the Gold Coast in the post-World War II era. First, ethnic and sectional interest 
framed many aspects of nationalism, especially with regard to the local chiefs and some 
indigenous elites being appointed to the Legislative Assembly in the period between 1946 
and 1951; the interests of their particular communities were often at the forefront of the 
debates on ‘national development’ and policy implementation. Minority ethnic groups were 
threatened by the influence of the major ethnic groups, and responded by introspectively 
being ethnocentric. Since economy and land were controlled by political power, ethnic 
considerations came to play a central role in the political life of the nation. Second, the 
economy and economic development increasingly drove the political dynamics of the Gold 
Coast as ex-service men and indigenous elite vied for shares in the ‘national cake’, which 
hitherto was enjoyed by the colonial administration and a select group of local chiefs. Third, 
a class war was brewing between the dominant groups such as the local chiefs, the 
intelligentsia, and the urban poor and rural dwellers (so-called verandah boys). 
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7.5. Party politics and the struggle for hegemony: A test case for respecting rights 
The lines of opposition drawn between the different nationalist movements after 1949 
represented an ideological symptom of multiparty politics. An incremental introduction of 
constitutional guarantees between 1951 and 1957 created rights-bearing citizens out of 
subalterns, strengthened the territorial framework for a nation-state and reinforced the 
contours of power struggles between political parties. For examples, the nationalist 
movements disagreed fundamentally on whether state power should be centrifugal or 
centripetal, with the UGCC advocating for a federal constitutional framework and the 
preservation of chieftaincy as an integral part of state power through an upper chamber of 
parliament. According to Danquah, “only two types of persons favour single chamber 
legislatures, the dictator and the imperialist.”536 His insight on a bicameral legislature 
preventing the risk of dictatorship is an extrapolation from history and the fact that post-
independent Ghana failed to take a cue from it had dire consequences on those whose views 
differed from Nkrumah’s. The creation of sectional centres of power was predicated on the 
understanding of national unity versus ethnic fragmentation in Gold Coast nationalism. The 
‘human rights texts’ provide an illustration of the ways the different interest groups 
negotiated the meaning of the right to self-determination and the implications of exercising 
democratic rights in the Gold Coast. 
The nationalist agitations were not altogether free of interpellations, in the sense that 
the colonial rule ‘created’ subjects who oscillated between an understanding that the interest 
of the dominant group was synonymous with ‘the common good’ and the awareness that 
colonial rule, by its very nature, disenfranchised the African communities from exercising 
many of their basic rights. The chiefs were interpellated as the agents of the indirect rule 
policy in the Gold Coast but in a different sense from many of the intelligentsia who by and 
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large were products of Western education and felt they also had a stake in political power. 
The latter group were basically excluded from administrative positions in the civil service 
and appointments in government. In the years leading up to independence, for example, the 
degree of a group’s interpellation took on sectional and ethnic significance. 
A classic example of the way political groupings attempted to use hegemonic control 
is in the period following the provision in the 1950 Constitution effectively lifting the ban on 
party politics in the Gold Coast. Sir Arden-Clarke believed that successful direct elections 
would be one of the preconditions for granting the right to self-determination to the people of 
the Gold Coast. Inter-ethnic rivalry became more visible in the nationalist movements, with 
political parties emerging out of ethnic and sectional groups to contest with others for 
political power. 
The Anlo Youth Organisation (AYO) was formed in 1952 to advance the sectional 
interest of the Anlo people. Modesto Apaloo, who led the party, advocated that the Ewe 
people in British Mandated Togoland vote in the plebiscite to stay within Ghana after 
independence. The party existed for only five years, from 1952 to 1957, and won one seat to 
the Legislative Council in the 1954 elections.
537
 The Togoland Congress Party (TCP), on the 
other hand, opposed the Anlo agenda by campaigning for a separate Ewe state, bringing 
together the Ewes in French Togoland and British Togoland. Although the party won two 
seats in the 1956 general elections, its overwhelming defeat in the 1956 plebiscite brought 
about the amalgamation of British Togoland into the Gold Coast (Ghana) at independence.  
In the Northern Territory, the Northern Peoples’ Party (NPP) emerged under the 
leadership of Simon Diedong Dombo, the paramount chief of Duori, to represent the 
sectional interests of the people in that territory within the Gold Coast. The emergence of a 
political movement in the Northern Protectorate coincided with the Colonial Office’s 
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decision to annex the region to join the Colony, Ashanti Protectorate and the Trust Territory 
of Togoland in a new constitutional dispensation.
538
 The party contested both the 1954 and 
1956 elections in which they won 12 and 15 seats respectively to the Legislative Council. It is 
important to underline the fact that the party only won seats in the Northern Territories. The 
Muslim Association Party (MAP) grew out of the Muslim Association which started in 1932 
as a welfare society but metamorphosed into a political party in 1954. Although the party 
failed to win a seat in the legislative elections of 1954 it existed for three years, eventually 
merging with the United Party (UP) in 1957.   
Disgruntled former members of the UGCC and CPP also came together to form the 
Ghana Congress Party (GCP) in 1952 to represent the concerns of the chiefs and sections of 
the intelligentsia against the rising power of the CPP. Kofi Busia became the leader of the 
party, and after winning one out of the 104 seats in the 1954 legislative elections, the party 
merged with the NPP, AYO, GCP, MAP to form the NLM in 1956 as part of a broader 
preparation for that year’s legislative elections. Allegiance to this new party was so tribalised 
that the CPP was compelled to close its regional headquarters in Kumasi, the capital of the 
Asante Kingdom. The Liberator newspaper of December 20, 1955 reported that the NLM 
supporters in Ashanti referred to the CPP members as “those who belong to no family or 
clan, those who are strangers, not properly trained to appreciate the value of the true and 
noble Akan.”539 Bing explained how Obetsebi Lamptey, one of the leading nationalist leaders 
and a Ga by ethnicity, described Nkrumah as “a ‘stranger—a Nzima—a man from a far away 
(sic) tribe—who, as a non-Ga, had no right even to address a public meeting in the Ga 
stronghold of Accra.”540 Danquah, another foremost nationalist leader, is said to “constantly 
return to the greatness, glory and power of the Akim Abuakwa state, the largest State in the 
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colony [and so] must also be the greatest in the Land.”541  
The assessment of R. J. Vile, an Assistant Secretary and the Head of the West Africa 
Department at the Colonial Office, of the NLM after an official visit to the Gold Coast in 
March 1955 was that “so little is known about the internal politics of the NLM that it is 
difficult to know the importance of this core determined people, or the kind of control 
exercised by the Ashantehene (sic) over them.”542 Vile went on to say in his report that “[i]t 
is possible that Dr. Nkrumah’s peaceful approach... may lead to the resolution of the 
differences between the NLM and the CPP on constitutional matters.”543 At the same time, he 
asserted that “it is quite possible that the core of determined young men will take to the forest 
and engage in guerrilla warfare from there if other methods fail.”544 Bing mentioned how the 
houses of CPP leaders such as C. E. Osei, Mary Akuamoah (wife of Krobo Edusei) and 
Archie Caseley-Hayford were targets of bombings in the Ashanti Protectorate.
545
 
As the overview of the political parties in the 1950s has shown, many of the 
nationalist movements were at the intersection of the hegemonic struggles around ethnicity, 
sectionalism and class. The discourse of ethnicities became a tool of control politics among 
some nationalist movements,
546
 basically employing ethnic ‘otherness’ to create a discursive 
link between the struggle for political power and the understanding of who was more or less 
‘human’ to run the affairs of the country. Indeed, the politics of Gold Coast nationalist 
movements between 1951 and 1957 affirm Mutua’s argument that the conceptual aspirations 
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of the African upper classes in the colonies tended to be amphibian, with one part of them 
renouncing colonialism and another part extolling the trappings of power it offered them as 
the elite among the colonised lot.
547
  
The struggle also highlights the way some of the nationalist leaders understood the 
concept of democratic rights in particular and human rights in general. One aspect of the 
poverty of understanding of a good concept is in the way it is turned on its head, with 
violence and ethnic hegemony becoming the tools for gaining political power. On the issue of 
ethnicity, there is also the underlying question posed through the political activities of the 
ethnically-based parties as to who in the Gold Coast is more or less ‘human’ enough in the 
scheme of things. In the midst of the political violence, the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
reaffirmed the need to understand the basic democratic processes as the starting point for self-
rule: 
I have told Nkrumah that if a general election is held, Her Majesty’s Government will 
be ready to accept a motion calling for independence within the Commonwealth 
passed by a reasonable majority in a newly-elected legislature and then declare a firm 
date for this purpose.
548
  
 
There is ample evidence of legislative discourses on the question of the preparedness of the 
Gold Coast for independence. This position is captured in the intervention of Nii Amaa 
Ollenu in Legislative Council debates in 1950:  
We want self-government! Yes; every one (sic) of us is anxious that it should come 
within the shortest possible time... But we do not want self-government in a state of 
anarchy, in a state where we are all slaves... where we shall not be able democratically 
to express our views without fear of being assassinated or suffering some peril. Those 
who employ such methods to subdue the people of their own country for their own 
needs... are enemies of the country. I would say they are traitors. Like Hitler and 
Mussolini the might have appeared to be heroes, but in the end they shall be proved to 
be traitors.
549
  
 
Busia asserted a similar but stronger position two years later when he said that: 
The issues which are before us in the matter of self-government are many. As we look 
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back upon the various philosophies which have been expressed on that matter, I single 
out three as representing the three different camps on the matter of self-government 
for the colonies or particularly for Africans. There is the view which says that the 
African is by nature not fit to rule either himself or anyone else, and that he must be 
ruled by Whites... This is the view of the South African Government. The second is 
that the Africans have the right to self-determination and to govern themselves 
whether they are political experts or not, and that they should all be free at once; they 
should have Self-Government Now. This was the view which was held by the 
Convention People’s Party at the time of the elections. ... There is another view that 
Africans should govern themselves, but that they have still a great deal to learn, and 
that it would be unwise of the Imperial Government to withdraw until the hard lessons 
have been learnt, that is the British view.
550
  
 
Although the jurisprudence on the enforcement of human rights norms in the post-war Gold 
Coast political landscape is non-existent, the superior courts by following English common 
law tradition upheld the constitutional rights of some natives.
551
 Nkrumah’s CPP government 
enacted legislations that clawed back the limited rights provided for in the country’s 
constitution. For example, the Deportation Act 1957, which I referred to in chapter 6 above, 
was passed immediately after independence, giving authority to the executive to issue 
deportation orders without consulting other organs of government. As Nana Busia has 
pointed out, “[t]his act... exposed the limitations of the [1957] Independence Constitution 
with respect to the protection of rights as well as the danger of leaving such rights to be 
determined by common law principles.”552 Within the first few months of independence, the 
implementation of the Deportation Act 1957 was challenged in the High Court in Larden and 
Anor v. Attorney General.
553
  
This case is significant on several levels. First, it led to positive judicial developments 
in the immediate aftermath of independence. Second, Nkrumah’s government passed a 
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legislation overruling the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear the case, which in turn was 
challenged on the grounds that the constitution did not confer parliamentary sovereignty on 
legislators with which they could pass the Deportation Act of 1957. The use of extraordinary 
powers by Nkrumah was a replication of colonial laws such as Sections 44 and 45 of the 
Gold Coast (Constitution) Order in Council 1954 which provided for the Governor to act 
unilaterally “in the interests of the public order, public faith or good government.”554 The 
judge in the case, however, held that the legislature was sovereign and therefore no court 
could question the exercise of its authority:  
In England it is not open to the court to invalidate a law on the ground that it seeks to 
deprive a person of his life or liberty contrary to the court’s notions of justice, and so 
far as the Independence Constitution, Section 31(1) is concerned, this is the position I 
find myself.
555
   
 
With a majority in parliament, the CPP increasingly used parliamentary sovereignty to pass 
repressive laws, neglecting in the process the obligations to enforce, respect, protect and fulfil 
human rights provisions in the country.  
The Avoidance of Discrimination Act, 1957 (CA 38), for example, prohibited 
political parties that were formed to advocate specific ethnic, sectional or religious agendas 
from functioning. The timing of the bill raised questions as to why it was not passed before 
independence even though it controlled the activities of ethnically-based movements that 
posed a threat to the country’s unity. Bing points out how “[t]o the African Minister self-
Government implied the right to use, in national interest, the same powers and methods of 
government which the Colonial authorities had employed”556 when he discusses in great 
detail Krobo Edusei’s decision not to approve the issue of a re-entry visa for Christopher 
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Shawcross, a British lawyer, who had accepted a brief to defend the Ashanti Pioneer and Mr 
Ian Colvin in court for contempt. The case identifies the complexity of the politics of human 
rights and the way Nkrumah’s government viewed the courts “primarily as the institutions 
through which a government, Colonial or otherwise, imposed its policy behind a cloak of 
magisterial propriety.”557 Even as it took on an ideological scope, human rights became a 
source of controversy. On the one hand, international human rights inspired some of the 
political changes in the Gold Coast; on the other hand, post-independence balance of power 
affected the recognition of constitutional and human rights principles. 
 
7.6. The question of gender equality in Gold Coast nationalism 
C. L. R. James has argued that “in the struggle for [Ghana’s] independence, one 
market woman... was worth any dozen Achimota [College] graduates.”558 In spite of 
women’s participation in nationalism their particular constitutional and human rights, as I 
have pointed out above, did not make an item in every nationalist movement’s agenda. Rev. 
Bardsley, a member of the Gold Coast Legislative Council, noted the historical link between 
gender imbalance in England and that in the Gold Coast when he said that “[t]he country has 
got to learn democracy, and modern democracy is a very recent thing indeed… In England, it 
is only 83 years since the majority of English received the right to have a say in their own 
government. It is only 31 or 30 years since English women were enfranchised.”559 And this 
was a literal truth, thus overlooking the limits of the franchise. 
The women in the Gold Coast could not enjoy the vote conceded to their British 
counterparts in 1918 because British colonies, unlike the French assimilé territories, were not 
extensions of Britain and people there were denied British citizenship and its attendant 
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rights.
560
 For example, the colonial education system exacerbated the subordinate role of 
women in the Gold Coast by laying emphasis on ‘feminine’ skills for girl-children. The 
employment sector was also characterised by unequal and discriminatory practices against 
women, such as working in the lower echelons of institutions as secretaries, clerks and 
telephone operators on lower salaries than their male counterparts, being excluded from 
management-level jobs in the civil service, and having to choose between marriage and 
remaining at home or a career. There was some awareness about the problem as Ampadu, the 
Ministerial Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, noted in a legislative 
intervention: “I have noticed in the press some criticism of the absence of any reference to 
Women Police.”561 Even in matrilineal societies where women had political, economic and 
legal rights, the enjoyment of those rights was contingent more or less on whether or not one 
had ‘royal blood.’ Some scholars hold the generalisable idea that power resided in the female 
in matrilineal societies, but that is open to debate because chieftaincy was rapidly converted 
into a patri-centric institution to support the policy of indirect rule.
562
 In other words, gender 
equality in the public sphere even in matrilineal traditional societies was suppressed. As 
Manuh has pointed out, “it is true to say that women occupied subordinate positions in all 
societies in [the Gold Coast] and were not regarded as the equals of men.”563 
There was a slight improvement of gender roles in the media after 1949 and in politics 
and women themselves begun to articulate gender equality as a constitutional and human 
rights issue. Two women, Mabel Dove Danquah and Akua Asabea Ayisi, were elected to the 
executive of the CPP along with three men. As I have pointed out above, the party 
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constitution provided for a women’s wing where the specific interests of the female members 
would be taken on board.
564
 The activities of women’s groups and individual women played 
at least two functions in reinforcing the ‘public spaces’ in which women articulated their 
opinions in the nationalism discourse; there emerged in the 1940-50s a crop of women 
leaders such as Mabel Dove Danquah, Akua Asabea Ayisi, Leticia Quaye, Hanna Cudjoe, 
Ama Nkrumah and Sophia Doku, among others, whose roles were not tied to belonging to 
royal families; they shifted the locus of women’s concerns to a national platform through 
involvement in the CPP. Writing in the Daily Graphic, Edith Wuver highlighted how the time 
of gender inequality should be a thing of the past, with women having an important role to 
play in an independent Ghana: 
The time of regarding women below the standard of men is long past. Many 
responsible posts held by women of other countries are practically unheard of in ours. 
Lecturers of big universities consist of women who cover all subjects just as men. 
Many leading magazines are edited by women and even in the army women rise to 
the same rank as men. What holds us back?
565
 
 
In the African Morning Post of July 31, 1952, Nkrumah was quoted as saying that “women 
should be left alone to choose their suitable husbands; there is no force in love and spinsters 
should not be arrested for not marrying.”566 The fact that such an issue came up for comment 
is a reflection of a patriarchal society that was slowly waking up to the changes in the world. 
In the 1950s, all the major newspapers had women’s columnists. In the Ashanti 
Pioneer an article on unequal opportunities in education argue that “women’s right to 
education is a human right.”567 In the Accra Evening News, for example, Akosuah Dzatsui 
championed the cause of equal right to education for girl-children
568
 in one piece and in 
another challenged women to enter into the profession of journalism: 
Women of Ghana it is a fifty-fifty world, men have been running it for centuries and 
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they have been doing it very badly, and we must help them whether they like it or not. 
We are the mothers of men and they have no more intelligence or sense than 
ourselves so enter journalism and play your part in this new brave Ghana of Ours.
569
  
 
Dede Barkye observed in the Daily Graphic the increased number of girls getting an 
education that in the medium to long term would make them eligible for what she described 
as “men’s work.”570 Diana Korsah also raised the issue of equal opportunities for men and 
women in the Gold Coast, noting that women “talk of equal partnership in the home; and 
would like equality of opportunity in work and politics.”571 Gender equality became a 
recurring theme in editorials and columns of many newspapers. There is, for example, an 
acknowledgment on the part of government in 1952 that  
financial provision for three women NCOs and nine women constables in the current 
Estimates [was being made]. No women recruits have yet been enlisted, the reason 
being that Mr. Collens, the Commissioner of Police, who is at present on leave is 
studying the organisation and duties of women in London.
572
 
 
The matter came up for comment because of “press criticism of the absence of any reference 
to Women Police.”573 Indeed, Gadzekpo maintains that Gold Coast women journalists in the 
print media “were particularly successful in publicly articulating ... viewpoints on various 
subjects in national newspapers.”574 Sadly, the same could not be said about women in 
politics, such as Mabel Dove who was the sole woman to be voted into the legislature in the 
Gold Coast.  
Indeed, this is a symptom of the ‘double colonization’ suffered by women in the Gold 
Coast. The argument that discrimination against women intersect at race, gender and class—
what Williams calls intersectionality—puts in proper perspective the way Gold Coast 
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women’s experiences were negotiated and constructed in the nationalism discourse.575 The 
idea of intersectionality is highly relevant to the analysis of gender discourses in nationalism 
for two reasons. First, nationalist movements in the Gold Coast employed the language of 
‘rights’ for a specific agenda, viz., realising the normative principles of justice, equality, non-
discrimination, freedom and self-determination but tended to be ambivalent about the 
particular rights of women in the discourse. Some of the discriminatory practices were 
products of both culture and colonialism, the ‘gatekeepers’ of what was appropriate or 
inappropriate for women to do or say. Second, at least the CPP attempted in small measure to 
enhance women’s participation in politics by creating at the launch of the party a women’s 
wing and electing women to the executive. What this proves is that change is possible where 
there is foresight and collective will. 
 
7.7. Conclusion 
What this chapter has done is demonstrate how nationalism in the Gold Coast formed 
part of a trajectory of constitutional, statutory and human rights discourses. It becomes clear 
that the fuller expression of nationalism occurred in the post-World War II period even 
though the beginnings of nationalism go back to the advent of colonial rule. In situating the 
different rights’ discourses within the narratives that nurtured nationalist thinking I have 
highlighted how the nationalism process was neither orderly at all times nor the demands 
direct all the time. Indeed, most of the time the expression ‘human rights’ never featured in 
the demands made by the nationalist movements. As an ideology, nationalism grew out of the 
particular historical situation in the Gold Coast and in relation to changes taking place around 
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the world. Increasingly, the nationalist movements deployed the idea of a prospective ‘nation-
state’ as a heuristic device and at the same time made more and more demands for 
constitutional guarantees of liberties. Through nationalism, deeply internalized inter-ethnic 
rivalries were sometimes transcended because of a collective perception of colonialism as ‘a 
common enemy.’ The question of gender is pertinent to any discussion of the human rights 
situation in the Gold Coast, or in any context for that matter, which is why I have given it the 
attention it deserves but too rarely receives.  
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8. General conclusion 
“Truth is like oil; no matter how much water you add it always floats to the top.” 
Dagara proverb 
 
“Every time a poor, oppressed, tortured person uses the language of human rights — because  
no other is currently available — to protest, resist, fight, she draws from and connects with  
the most honourable metaphysics, morality and politics…[of our time].”576 
        Costas Douzinas 
8.1. Human rights: an affirmation of every human being as a rights-holder? 
This thesis examined the meaning of ‘the human’ in human rights discourse and the 
ways in which the idea of rights-bearers shaped the contours of independence debates in the 
Gold Coast between 1945 and 1957. The analysis has been based largely on an investigation 
of primary sources. It is important to return to the key questions for this thesis, and draw 
attention to the fact that the study has shown how the complex interplay of historical realities, 
a certain degree of visionary leadership, and political pragmatism inspired a new-fangled idea 
of universal rights. The UDHR presented to the post-World War II context an affirmation that 
‘the human being’ of rights is every human being. This idea contested longstanding regimes 
of falsity that had rationalised and justified the ill-treatment of others on grounds of their 
“race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion or social origin, property, 
birth or other status”577 but also spoke a particular truth to politics. 
The understanding of human rights principles in 1948 is not what it is today. 
Therefore, whatever the critiques of the precursors of human rights or the process of drafting 
the UDHR, the antecedents represent at least one way of understanding the evolving idea of 
human rights. The UN Charter, and the UDHR in particular, launched what its drafters 
termed “a common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations.”578 These treaties 
presented a discourse, indeed a ‘promise,’ that every human being is a rights-bearer. By 
defining the rights-holder as every human being, the UN human rights regime transcended 
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extant constructions of people as racialised others, gendered others, colonised others, 
nationalised others or ethnicised others. This idea also contested the regimes of falsity that 
rationalised a human hierarchy or justified the binary logic of white/black, 
civilized/primitive, male/female or those more-deserving/less-deserving of human rights. 
The idea of human rights has a link, however tenuous, with notions of justice, non-
discrimination or equality in history. But the UDHR transcended what Moyn argues 
represented “politics of citizenship at home”579 to put the accent on the inherent dignity of all 
human beings and to emphasise the universality of fundamental rights norms. These provide 
part of the groundwork for the applicability of human rights principles in all places, 
underscore its ‘promise’ as a heuristic tool for asserting claims to be treated fairly and draw 
attention to the potential of fundamental rights for reform. One of the symbolic results of the 
nascent UN human rights regime was the Council of Europe’s ECHR, which inspired the 
debate between the Colonial Office and its administrations in British dependencies as to the 
relevance of the instrument for colonial subjects.  
Colonial rule had basically constructed the colonised person as less deserving of land, 
statutory or constitutional rights, and the UDHR idea of rights contested that thinking and 
went further to affirm the inherent dignity of every human being. At the heart of the debate 
about extending ECHR to the colonial subjects were a number of complex issues, not least 
questions about ‘the humanity’ of the colonial subjects, indigenous agency in the nationalist 
movements and symbolic embarrassment around colonial rule vis-à-vis all human beings 
being rights-bearers. The debate itself came to represent, as it were, a process of 
‘vernacularising’ the universal language of human rights into a Gold Coast dialect through a 
number of constitutional reviews in the 1950s.
580
  
However, human rights as an idea was also at the mercy of the power brokers who 
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debated the suitability of extending the ECHR to the Gold Coast and the nationalist 
movements, i.e., those doing the vernacularisation. The discourses of human rights are 
political. In other words, the domestic process was not free of the politics of colonial rule and 
competing claims in the nationalist movements. Even when the nationalist movements 
deployed the language of human rights as a tool for challenging colonialism and the unequal 
treatment of Africans by the colonial administration in the Gold Coast, it was characterised 
usually by some tentativeness. In other words, the universal significance of international 
human rights resonated well with the local politics of resistance against colonial rule, but was 
not deployed in its entirety by the anti-colonial movements. They only adopted those aspects 
that reinforced the discourse of independence such as better representation in government, the 
right to self-determination, freedom of association, the right to vote and to be voted for, 
freedom of assembly, freedom of movement and freedom of expression. Also, many of these 
demands already formed part of the language of nationalism before the emergence of the 
post-World War II idea of human rights. 
Just as anti-colonial resistance eclipsed issues of gender or ethnic equality, the politics 
of demands for the collective right to self-determination overshadowed interests in individual 
rights. Even though anti-colonial nationalism served as a counter discursive practice to 
colonialism it did not integrate human rights principles fully into its discourses, begetting, for 
example, an independence constitution without a bill of rights. The reluctance to incorporate 
a bill of rights in the Independence Constitution points to the failure of the state, the poverty 
of cultures and partisan selfishness in the Gold Coast. All these factors as well as Cold War 
politics contributed to the level of ambiguity about the subject of human rights.  
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8.2. The duty of being human 
The November 10, 1949 editorial of the Accra Evening News summed up the demand 
for the right to self-determination in the Gold Coast thus, “[s]elf-government is our inherent 
right... no nation has the right to take it away from us under the pretext of ‘protection and 
trusteeship.’”581 Colonial policies and practices had inspired a politics of nationalist 
resistance among the Africans and reinforced specific discourses of justice about 
participation in government and ultimately the right to self-determination. In themselves, 
these discourses neither resonated entirely with the notion of individual rights proposed by 
the UN human rights regime nor represented an unequivocal expression of public interest in 
the idea of individual rights, as we understand it today. Even the two key debates dealing 
specifically with incorporating human rights principles into domestic legislation did not 
constitute struggles for individual rights as such. Indeed, the cause for the collective right to 
self-determination trumped the philosophy behind imperial domination, and increasingly, 
concerns about individual rights. 
The normative objective of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and nations”582 is as significant today as it was in 
1948. True, there has been enormous poverty in the understanding of the concept of human 
rights in history, but it still has great potential as a language of protest against unfair 
treatment of others on grounds of their race, sex, gender, ethnic belonging or political 
opinion. The clout of human rights is in what it has helped people living under unjust 
situations achieve and what it stands for in the struggle for equality and fairness. When its 
standards are genuinely applied it has the power to restore ‘humanity’ to those who are 
oppressed and to those who are doing the oppressing. Processes of legal recognition make, as 
it were, the human being and human rights speaks to situations where a person is victimised 
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because of her gender or tortured because he holds a political opinion that is different from 
the party in power. The guarantees through legal instruments are one way of asserting how 
human beings have rights. 
History is full of examples of violations that raise questions of receptivity, but 
universal human rights contracts the distance of time just as the history of human rights is 
telescoped in human dignity. We human beings have sometimes fallen into the trap of 
denigrating each other on the grounds of our differences and disparaging the concept of 
universal rights for various reasons. The reasons for the unfair treatment of each other tend to 
be ignoble, polemical and egoistic, yet the truth is that the person who does the dehumanising 
also dehumanises himself/herself without recognising it. Hence, human rights norms help to 
restore ‘humanity’ in situations of abuses, the victim and the perpetrator of abuse benefitting 
in the process. 
The human rights idea remains relevant in our world as a conceptual, political and 
ethical matter. As a regime of truth, it could be a transformative and creative force for change 
in societies where discrimination and inequality form part of the value system. But this 
potential is only a potential requiring human agents to harness it. It is when human agents 
appropriate and deploy the power of human rights that it can bring about change in thinking 
about who ‘the human being’ of rights is and the ways in which the idea of rights provides at 
least one of the bases for building a legal framework within a state. This way, human rights 
generate legal obligations that are justiciable in local courts while providing a normative 
baseline against which government accountability could be measured. In a world where 
‘naming and shaming’ has sometimes inspired change, human rights could actually bring 
about legislative change. In human rights lies one of the duties of being human. 
The thesis has approached the human rights discourse as a truth regime which helps in 
contesting regimes of falsity. When the language of human rights is deployed as a protest 
217 
 
against systematic violations of individual or group rights, it fulfils one of its key functions. 
In this way, it constructs rights-holders—‘the human being’ of human rights—through 
affirmations in human rights instruments and also through a process of state recognition. Rule 
of law, a strong state and some form of accountability are important in building an authentic 
human rights culture. But the driving force of human rights will always be a community of 
human beings with more than goodwill or tolerance for those who may be different. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I: Gold Coast timeline 
 
1434   Contact between Africans in Guinea littoral region and European explorers 
 
1470s  Fernão Gomes arrived with permit to trade in the region 
 
1482  First European settlement, São Jorge Castle, built in Elmina 
 
1530s  William Hawkins arrived in West Coast of Africa 
 
1553  Thomas Windham reached area that came to be known as ‘the Gold Coast’ 
 
1560s   John Hawkins pioneered triangular trade in the region 
 
1550-1700s British Royal African Company monopolised trade  
 
1750  African Company of Merchants regulated to trade in the coastal regions  
 
1807  Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1807 passed 
 
1821  Transfer of British settlements in ‘the Gold Coast’ to British Crown 
 
1828  African Company of Merchants converted to the Committee of London with 
responsibility to administer ‘the Gold Coast’ 
 
1833 Slavery Abolition Act, 1833 passed abolishing trade in human being 
throughout most of the British Empire 
 
1844  Bond of 1844 signed 
 
1865 Ashanti-British war; House of Commons’ Select Committee recommended the 
signing of another treaty to the British Crown; British defined coastal region 
as ‘protected protected territories’ 
 
1873-74 Ashanti-British war 
 
1874 ‘Gold Coast’ formally declared a protected territory; through British 
Settlements Act, 1874; new Treaty negotiated with local chiefs  
 
1877  Capital moved from Cape Coast to Accra 
 
1883  Native Administration Ordinance, 1883  
 
1884-5  Berlin Conference held 
 
1888  First African appointed to the Gold Coast Legislative Council 
 
1891  First census in the Gold Coast  
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1895 Chief Justice Sir Joseph Hutchinson settled confusion over the meaning of 
‘British protected territories’ and ‘British settlements’ 
 
1899 Heligoland Treaty agreed on the dividing line between the English territory to 
the east and Germans territory to the west 
 
1901 British Crown Order, 1901; Ashanti annexed a ‘protected territory’; Northern 
Territories created ‘protected territory’  
 
1904/1906 Chiefs Ordinance/Native Jurisdiction Bill  
 
1914 League of Nations passed Togoland as a mandated territory to British colonial 
administration in Gold Coast 
 
1925  The Gold Coast (Constitution) Order in Council, 1925 
 
1927  Native Administration Ordinance  
 
Achimota College (Prince of Wales School) formally opened 
 
1935  Native Authorities Ordinance 
 
1939  Native Treasuries Ordinance 
 
1945  UN founded; UN Charter 
 
1946  Gold Coast (Constitution) Council in Order, 1946 
 
1948  UDHR  
 
1950 Gold Coast (Constitution) Council in Order, 1950; introduction of universal 
adult suffrage; legislative elections held in Gold Colony and Ashanti 
Protectorate   
 
1951 First all-African Legislative Assembly formed with Nkrumah as Leader of 
Government 
 
1952 Nkrumah became Prime Minister of the Gold Coast  
 
1954  Gold Coast (Constitution) Council in Order, 1954; elections held   
 
1957  Ghana (Constitution) Council in Order, 1957 
 
Independence from British colonial rule; Change of name from Gold Coast to 
Ghana 
 
1958 Constitution (Repeal of Restrictions) Act, 1958 passed expunging the three 
fundamental rights from the 1957 Constitution. 
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Appendix II: Draft Proposals for a Constitution of Ghana, 1957  
   Part II: Fundamental Rights
583
 
 
VII. The liberty of the person is inviolable and no person shall be deprived of his liberty 
except in accordance with law. Upon complaint made by or on behalf of any person that he is 
being unlawfully detained any Judge of the Supreme Court of Ghana may forthwith enquire 
into the same and may make an order requiring the person in whose custody such person is 
detained, to produce the person so detained before such court or Judge without delay and to 
certify in writing as to the cause of the detention and such a court or Judge shall thereupon 
order the release of such person unless satisfied that he is being detained in accordance with 
the law. Provided however that nothing contained in this Article is invoked to prohibit, 
control or interfere with any act of the Government of Ghana during the existence of a state 
of war, or when an emergency has, in accordance with law, been proclaimed. 
 
VIII. The dwelling of every person in Ghana is inviolable and shall not be forceably entered 
except in accordance with the law. 
 
IX. Every person in Ghana is equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to 
profess, practise and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality and health. 
 
X. The right of free expression of opinion as well as the right to assemble peaceably and 
without arms, and form associations or unions is guaranteed for purposes not opposed to 
public order or morality. Laws may be made regulating the manner in which the right of 
forming associations and the right of free assembly shall be exercised. 
 
XI. (i). No person shall be deprived of his property except in accordance with law. 
      (ii). No property, movable or immovable, including any interest in, or in any company 
owning any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of, or acquired 
for public purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such 
acquisition unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or 
acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on 
which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given. 
 
XII. (i). No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of the law in force at 
the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, not be subjected to a penalty 
greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the 
commission of the offence. 
      (ii). No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. 
      (iii). No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 
 
XIII. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution every citizen of Ghana and every other 
person in Ghana is entitled to all the rights and freedoms provided in this Constitution 
without distinction of any kind, whether on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
                                            
583
 This bill of rights was part of a bigger proposed draft constitution prepared by Nkrumah’s government in 
1956. It was sent to the UK government, with a dispatch to Charles Arden-Clarke, the governor of the Gold 
Coast, indicating the willingness of Nkrumah’s government to have a bill of rights in the Independence 
Constitution. In a reply to Nkrumah, Alan Lennox-Boyd, the UK Secretary of State for the Colonies, said that 
the UK government was not amenable to Ghana gaining its independence on the basis of the proposed bill of 
rights in particular and the proposed Constitution in general. 
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Appendix III: Memo of the Opposition Parties in the Gold Coast on the Constitution
584
 
 
Gold Coast Independence 
Kofi Abrefa Busia 
30th November, 1956. 
 
Attached hereto for your consideration is a memorandum setting forth in brief outline the 
standpoint of the Opposition Parties in the Gold Coast as to the safeguards which they 
consider to be essential if the peoples of the Northern Territories, Ashanti and Togoland are 
to be persuaded to accept union with the Gold Coast Colony. My colleagues and I would 
welcome an opportunity of explaining our case in detail, either to individual members of 
Parliament or to groups of members. In the meanwhile urgent steps are being taken to present 
a petition to both Houses of Parliament praying that the representations of the majority of the 
peoples of Ashanti, the Northern Territories and Togoland be considered by Parliament 
before any further action is taken.  
Yours faithfully,  
K. Busia  
Leader of the Opposition,  
Gold Coast Assembly  
Gold Coast Independence 
 
1. The United Kingdom Government announced that the Gold Coast will be granted 
Independence in March 1957. It is essential that the Constitution of the new independent 
State should command general acceptance amongst its citizens. If it did not the consequences 
might be disastrous. The area of the proposed State of Ghana is neither geographically, 
historically or politically a single entity. It consists of four separate regions. In addition to the 
Crown colony of the Gold Coast are the separate regions of Ashanti and the Northern 
Territories. Up till 1901 Ashanti was a separate political unit and even after its annexation in 
1901 continued to be administered separately from the Gold Coast colony. The Northern 
Territories constitute since 1897 a British protectorate. There is also a separate Trust 
Territory of Togoland. It is not sufficient if the Constitution meets with the approval of the 
majority of the Gold Coast colony. Unless it also commands the general support of the 
inhabitants of the other territories, by offering them the security and protection to which they 
are entitled, the new State will be open to grave internal conflicts at its very birth. The only 
link which binds these four territories at the present time is British sovereignty. If that link is 
removed, there will be no bond either legal or political to hold together the proposed new 
State except upon the basis of general agreement.  
 
2. This agreement does not at present exist. The United Kingdom Government supports the 
proposal of the Gold Coast Government upon the basis that the Convention Peoples Party 
obtained a majority at the General Election held on the 17th July 1956. The proposals of the 
Gold Coast Government are, however, opposed by the National Liberation Movement and its 
allies. The latter include the Northern Peoples Party, the Moslem Association Party, the 
Togoland Congress and the Federation of Youth Association. These groups fought in the last 
                                            
584
 This memorandum was circulated to MPs before the debate in Parliament concerning Gold Coast 
Independence four months before Ghana's independence. Dr Kofi Abrefa Busia was then leader of the 
opposition in the Gold Coast Parliament. Paragraphs 5(3) and 8 are especially pertinent to the question of human 
rights in the new constitution. 
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Election under one manifesto and under one leader. In the Legislative Assembly they accept 
one leadership and a common Whip. Their views are shared by the Asanteman Council, 
which is the supreme authority of the Ashanti nation. The N.L.M. speaks for the majority of 
the peoples of the Northern territories and Ashanti and generally for the opposition in the 
Gold Coast Legislative Assembly. We also believe that it commands the support of the great 
majority of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory of Togoland who, while they wish to join 
the new State, only desire to do so provided regional and minority interests are properly 
safeguarded. At the General Election on the 17th July 1956 only 58% of the registered voters 
actually voted. Of these, 57% voted for the C.P.P. and 43% for the opposition and its allies. 
In the Gold Coast colony the C.P.P. had a majority but it was defeated in Ashanti and the 
Northern Territories. Ashanti and the Northern Territories constitute together with Togoland 
approximately three-quarters of the proposed total area of the new State.  
 
3. The communities we represent wish to take part in the new independent State provided, 
however, that it is endowed with a Constitution which commands general support amongst its 
citizens and which gives real and firmly entrenched protection to regional, minority and 
individual rights and provides sound and stable Government.  
 
4. In 1951 the United Kingdom Government gave an assurance that special consideration 
would be given to the wishes of the Northern Territories before any further constitutional 
advances were made. The United Kingdom Government has also agreed that an agreed 
Constitution is very necessary and that there should be provisions in the Constitution before 
Independence to safeguard regional and minority rights. The United Kingdom Government 
has not however, produced any proposals for a Constitution to give effect to these views. In a 
recent statement by the Gold Coast Government in a white paper entitled "The Government's 
Revised Constitutional Proposals for Gold Coast Independence", it is stated "Originally the 
opposition proposed that there should be an entirely new and written Constitution, for 
Independence. The Government had much sympathy with this idea and in particular, like the 
opposition, wished to include in the Constitution fundamental rights guaranteeing liberty and 
the right of political and industrial association, together with freedom of speech and of the 
Press. The British Government, however, took the view, that these were matters which should 
be put into the Constitution after Independence and after the British Parliament had conferred 
full sovereignty on the Parliament of Ghana". The opposition maintains its view that a proper 
written Constitution for the new State should be drafted before Independence.  
 
5. Some of the more important questions which must be dealt with in the Constitution are as 
follows: 
 
(1) The question of alterations in the constitution is vital. Whatever safeguards are given they 
are of no value if they can be removed easily at any time. It is not sufficient to say that they 
can only be removed by a majority. The whole object of safeguards is to protect Groups who, 
taking the new State as a whole, would be minorities. Under the Government's revised 
proposals it is suggested that certain safeguards be introduced into present Constitution by the 
time independence takes effect in respect of a limited category of subjects. The adequacy of 
these safeguards is discussed below. The present point is that wholly inadequate steps are 
taken to prevent even the Government's safeguards from being removed the day after 
independence. The Government still apparently proposes that constitutional change can be 
effected by a simple two-thirds majority of a single Chamber. Assuming the Government 
could obtain the two-thirds majority, and it might be able to facilitate its task in so doing by 
altering electoral districts and managing the voting register, it could immediately abolish all 
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the safeguards and could even change the provision in the Constitution itself which requires a 
two-thirds majority. It could, for example, alter that provision by providing that only a simple 
majority is required. There is no second Chamber to delay and give a second opinion on the 
point. There is no provision for any consent or agreement to be obtained from any of the 
Regional Assemblies or the Chiefs or from any other body.  
 
(2). The Constitution itself 
The U.K. Government has rejected the view that in the instruments conferring independence 
there should be embodied a new Constitution containing such safeguards as are proper. They 
merely contemplate that the present Constitution may be amended before independence in 
certain limited respects but exclude, for example, that the Constitution shall embody 
provisions as to fundamental rights and constitutional conventions. They indicate that these 
are matters for settlement by the new State after independence has been granted. By the time 
that stage has been reached, however, a simple majority will be able to dictate the whole 
position and none of those safeguards would probably ever be inserted at all. Even as regards 
the particular matters which the U.K. Government agrees should be inserted into the 
Constitution before independence it will be seen below that they are in many respects 
inadequate and for others there is no provision at all.  
 
(3) Regional Assemblies  
The Government's revised proposals leave the following matters to be determined by the 
Gold Coast Parliament:  
(a) The number of the regions and the boundaries thereof;  
(b) The authority, functions and powers of, the Regional Assemblies:  
There is provision that certain specific matters are to be included in their powers but this is 
only "subject to the authority of Parliament". This means in practice that Parliament is 
entirely free to decide exactly what functions and powers the Regional Assemblies shall have 
from time to time. In fact Parliament could decide by changing the Constitution not to have 
any Regional Assemblies at all.  
 
There is no provision or safeguard Assemblies. Nor, so far as can be seen, is there provision 
for the composition and membership of the Assemblies to be provided in the Constitution, 
Under the present proposals it would appear that the whole matter of the composition of these 
Regional Assemblies is to be left in the air for subsequent consideration by Parliament. This 
means again that the safeguards as regards Regional Assemblies are illusory.  
 
(4) Position of Chiefs in Regional Government  
The Government acknowledges in principle that the Chiefs should have a part in the Regional 
Government of the country and for that purpose state that the office of a Chief as existing by 
customary law and usage should be guaranteed and also provide for a House of Chiefs in 
each region. Nevertheless, the provisions made are wholly inadequate. The Regional House 
of Chiefs is only to have power to consider matters referred to it by a Minister or by the 
National Assembly and to offer advice with regard to certain specific matters. The National 
Assembly is under no obligation to refer matters (except in the case of Bills affecting the 
traditional functions and privileges of a Chief) and is under no obligation to accept its advice. 
The House of Chiefs is to play no part in the Regional Government of the Country. There is 
no definition of the rights and powers of the Chiefs which are to be guaranteed by the 
Constitution.  
 
(5) Checks and balances in Central Government  
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There is no provision for any checks and balances. There is no Second Chamber, no Council 
of State and the Governor-General has always had to act on the advice of the Prime Minister. 
If this is to be the position as regards the Council of State and the Governor-General, it is 
particularly necessary that there should be a Second Chamber.  
 
(6) Public Service  
It is clearly essential to have an independent public service but the Government proposals do 
not secure this, in that they do not provide for the independent nomination of the members of 
the Public Service Commission. Furthermore, the members should be appointed on a regional 
basis so as to ensure adequate representation of minorities.  
 
(7) The Judiciary  
The same applies to the Judiciary. In particular the Government proposals enable the 
Government to appoint the Chief Justice, enable Judges to be removed on a bare two thirds 
majority of the Assembly and do not provide adequately for the independent character of the 
Judicial Service Commission.  
 
(8) Human rights  
The United Kingdom Government has rejected the suggestion that the new Constitution 
should make any provisions for individual rights or the rights of minorities. In this they have 
apparently not even been prepared to go as far as the Gold Coast Government which, as 
stated above, has said that it wished to include in the Constitution fundamental rights 
guaranteeing personal liberty and the right of political and industrial association, together 
with freedom of speech and the press but that this was not agreed to by the United Kingdom 
Government. We suggest that the European Convention of Human Rights, which has been 
accepted by the U.K. Government for application to overseas territories, should be embodied 
in the Constitution. This Convention includes machinery enabling its provisions to be 
enforced through the Courts.  
 
(9) Police  
If regional devolution is to be really safeguarded against abuse there should be an 
autonomous regional Police Force.  
 
(10) Electoral Provisions  
Much depends in a Constitution upon preventing the boundaries of regions or other areas 
from being adjusted so as to give unfair advantage to one party or the other. There should 
therefore be a Boundary and Electoral Commission to investigate boundaries and electoral 
matters. There is no such provision in the Government's proposals.  
 
(11) Agreed Constitution  
The Government has stressed the desirability of having a Constitution which is generally 
agreed and accepted. Nevertheless it is proposed to introduce independence without any of 
the above matters having agreed. The Government has even decided on the name for the new 
country and its flag and coat of arms without consulting the country.  
 
In the light of the above considerations, it is the earnest hope of the majority of the peoples of 
the Northern Territories, Ashanti and Togoland that the Parliament of the United Kingdom, 
as trustee for the peoples of the four territories will insist that there be a constitution 
embodying such safeguards as would make it possible for the Northern Territories, Ashanti 
and Togoland to accept independence on the basis of a United Gold Coast. It is feared that if 
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no provision is made for such a constitution and H.M.G. take the step of declaring the Gold 
Coast independent on March 6th next, the effect of the removal of the ultimate control of the 
Parliament of the U.K. will be sever the only link between the four territories and bring about 
an extremely confused situation in which Ashanti, the Northern Territories and Togoland will 
have no alternative but to take the standpoint that they are independent, but as separate 
entities. It is within the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to prevent such a 
situation from arising, and it is submitted that effective measures should be taken, before it is 
too late, to insist upon such constitutional safeguards as will make it possible for  
Ashanti, the Northern Territories and Togoland to accept union with the Gold Coast Colony. 
